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The analysis and theorizing about concepts like “knowledge” and “justification”
has played a central role in much of epistemology in the past half century. This
dissertation argues for the claim that we should understand this conceptual concern as one
of design. Concepts are tools and the concepts of interest to epistemologists must be
those that we can best use in service of our epistemic interests. On this understanding of
the conceptual project, we determine the content of epistemic concepts, not by consulting
our naïve linguistic intuitions, but by determining what concepts will best help us express
and enforce the epistemic norms that serve our interests. The determination of what
concepts will do this job best will pull on information from many empirical sources like
psychology and sociology. It will also require some means of determining what our
epistemic interests are. In defending this view of the methodology of epistemology, we
examine how one might go about designing and thinking about the purposes of an
example epistemic concept: “epistemic ought”. We also consider how thinking about
things from a design prospective can help in the determination of our epistemic interests
by considering how design considerations feature in the debate between scientific realism
and anti-realism. We also examine and respond to a few potential problems for this
methodological view from Selim Berker’s arguments against epistemic teleology to
problems with the design method’s potentially problematically self-undermining or selfreinforcing character.
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Preface
1. Goals of the Project
This dissertation is concerned primarily with methodological questions
surrounding how we ought to answer conceptual questions in philosophy. It is at its core
an argument for a reframing of these questions from a conservative frame of analysis to
one of design. It will argue that this framing will improve both the arguments we provide
in answer to existing philosophical questions, and just as importantly, encourage debate
and thought about important conceptual questions that don’t naturally fit into more
traditional framings of the conceptual project.
This is also a dissertation about epistemic concepts in particular. Much of what is
said about the appropriate approach to conceptual question will be general, but some
aspects of the correct approach to conceptual questions will naturally be shaped by the
nature of the concepts we are attempting to examine. Epistemic concepts are largely
normative concepts, and this raises unique issues in how it makes sense to think of them.
Epistemic concepts are also methodological concepts, and thus the methodological
questions this dissertation focuses on are in a unique way inseparable from the very
concepts we seek to study. This issue is captured in the reflexive nature of a question like:
“what methods are we justified in using in studying the concept of ‘justification’?” This
kind of reflexive question just won’t directly arise when we are thinking about nonepistemic concepts.
The core thesis of this dissertation will be that we should understand concepts as
cognitive tools, and that recognition of the nature of concepts as tools suggests that
methodological framings of core philosophical debates as debates about the analysis of
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the content of some preexisting set of concepts would be as mistaken as an engineering
framing her questions as an analysis of the tools used in her current culture.
Understanding how a tool functions in a society is an interesting question for cultural
anthropology, but not the prime concern of an engineer who is concerned with whether
the tool is well-design to accomplish particular tasks. Likewise, the question of what
English speakers mean by “knowledge” or “justification” is interesting, but it ignores the
things of primary philosophical concern. Knowledge and justification are only important
in so far as they have normative authority, and the core advantage of approaching
conceptual questions as one of design is that it explicitly aims at producing concepts that
have the kind of normative authority that would justify their use in our practice.

2. Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 1: Initial Arguments for a Conceptual Design Method
This first chapter gives the initial case for the methodological picture advocated
for in the dissertation. It begins by discussing what is plausibly the naïve background
picture of conceptual analysis that still implicitly shapes many of the conceptual
arguments given in philosophy. To avoid discussing an outdated picture I do this by
discussing a version of this picture outlined by Mark Balaguer (2016). The clear
problems with this initial characterization motivate thinking of some alternative
approaches. The chapter outlines three approaches: Naturalized Conceptual Analysis,
Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis, and Conceptual Design or the Design Method.
Naturalized Conceptual Analysis is argued to be ill-suited to the discussion of normative
concepts and is underwritten by a narrow semantic picture only obviously and directly
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applicable to a narrow range of concepts such as names and kind terms. The Pragmatic
Conceptual Analysis picture is superior to the Naturalized approach in so far as its
underlying teleosemantic understanding of concepts is both better supported and more
broadly applicable than the causal/informational semantics of the naturalized view. It also
has the advantage of being one of the more broadly accepted views by people working
within the philosophy of language. However, Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis is also
inherently incomplete as a methodology because there is no guarantee that the purposes
that regulate our uses of our concepts are good purposes to have, nor is there any
guarantee that our particular community has existing concepts that correspond to all the
useful purposes we might have for concepts. A methodological approach that see things
in terms of design is a dominant approach because it promises to be able to deliver all the
results of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis and potentially more. If our concepts are ones
we should be using, the they will be ones it would be sensible to design and we should
expect the design method and the teleosemantic pragmatic conceptual analysis approach
to give the same answers about the content of such concepts. If the concepts we employ
aren't ones we should be using, then the Design Method will lead us to useful and
important revisions in our conceptual scheme.
Chapter 2: Working Through a Sample Concept
As a way of helping to elaborate in more detail how the conceptual design method
would approach epistemological debates, this chapter attempts to design the concept
“epistemic ought” using a simple normative theory that one might derive by supposing
that the goal of inquiry was something rather simple like possessing true beliefs or an
accurate model of the world and that epistemic norms work in an analogous fashion to
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how consequentialist norms in ethics do. The simple consequentialist picture is deeply
flawed but can be improved by more explicitly thinking about what purpose concepts like
justification or epistemic ought are supposed to play in the regulation and guidance of our
epistemic activities. The contention through the chapter will be that the design mindset
opens a whole new and interesting range of constraints that make the resolution of key
epistemic debates about concepts like epistemic ought and justification far more tractable
than we might have supposed from an alternative methodological standpoint. Also, by
forcing philosophers to explicitly engage with questions about how various epistemic
concepts are used in the regulation of our activities, it opens the possibility of
disambiguating between different possible concepts of justification that could be
conflated in our unconsidered ordinary use. Such a mindset makes what is at stake in the
debate between externalists and internalists far clearer and thus perhaps easier to resolve
than if we were to frame the issue in terms of the intuition pumping about True-Temp or
clairvoyants in which it is often framed. If parties to such thought experiments are
thinking of the regulative purposes of justification differently, then it is entirely possible
that parties to the debate are thinking of distinct concepts both of which it would be
sensible to design and use in different contexts. Thus, the alternative framing helps us get
behind the intuitive responses to such cases to the deeper epistemic purposes which likely
make such thought experiments so appealing in the first place. The debate then turns into
one about what function the concept or concepts of justification should play in our
practices and how it could best serve that purpose, and this makes a huge new body of
potential empirical facts about the effects of the use evidence relevant to resolving the
question.
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Chapter 3: Defending Teleology
This chapter addresses the worries that the design method might be committed to
a flawed teleological view of epistemic concepts. It begins by outlining a set of
arguments by Selim Berker who argues that teleological views in epistemology make an
analogous error to consequentialist views in ethics which fail to recognize the distinction
between persons. Berker thinks that teleological epistemic views will fail to recognize the
distinction between propositions and allow bad trade-offs. For example, it allows
believing some false things for bad reasons if there is a greater payoff in terms of gaining
true beliefs about other propositions. Berker’s arguments fail as potential objections to
the design method on three grounds: (1) Nothing in the conceptual design method denies
that the propositionally isolating concept of justification that Berker discusses might not
be a perfectly good part of a larger epistemic theory. (2) Although it sounds odd to use the
concept justified in ways straightforwardly suggested by the teleological approach, when
we ask the large question about what one epistemically ought to believe, it seems
plausible to suppose that trade-offs between propositions are in fact something a good
epistemic agent should do. (3) Many of the more puzzling cases Berker raises have their
problematic source not in the teleological way of looking at the norms, but rather in the
inherent problems with framing the goal in terms of countable true beliefs. Any counting
or weigh scheme centering explicitly on numbers of true beliefs will end up implausible.
This suggests that the proper epistemic ends should probably be something like an
accurate model of a subject of interest rather than simply believing a high number of true
propositions. The chapter ends with a discussion of why non-teleological approaches to
epistemic norms will likely be deeply unsatisfying because without being tied to a pursuit
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of truth or some analogous epistemic end, cognitive norms would appear arbitrary or at
least non-epistemic. The argument focuses on phenomenal conservatism as a view that
might be formulated simply in terms of content matching and which doesn't derive the
normative force of its concept of justification from a connection to the truth. It's argued
that such a content matching picture divorced from any possible justification for engaging
in the practice that connects back to clearly epistemic ends robs the concept of any
plausibility of counting as an epistemic concept.
Chapter 4: Determining our Ends
This chapter returns to a problem temporarily set aside in chapter 2, namely the
question of what epistemic ends are the right ones to pick. It begins by attempting to
outline in general terms what kinds of evidence or constraints we can bring to bear to
settle question about what overall purposes give shape to our epistemic norms. One of the
primary sources of evidence will be judgments about the desirability of various
alternative epistemic ends. This suggests that one approach to refining our understanding
of what ends are the optimal ones will be the result an equilibrium process in which we
compare the desirability of the products of different normative systems we develop.
Another kind of constraint on a good set of epistemic purposes to use in determining the
content of our epistemic norms and concepts will be practical. Some proposed ends might
not be achievable by creatures like us, and some things, if treated as end by creatures like
us, might have negative unintended side-effects. In this way, thinking about what norms
will result as an output of the Conceptual Design Method can give feedback on whether
the proposed purpose was an appropriate thing to treat as an end in the first place. To
illustrate how this reasoning works in a concrete epistemic debate we go through a pair of
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arguments, one for anti-realism and the other for realism and illustrate how practical
considerations about our ability to find the truth or side effects of aiming at something
other than truth can figure in epistemic debates within the design framework.
Chapter 5: Revising Norms: Self-Defeat and Bootstrapping
This chapter considers a set of potential problems that could arise during an
attempt to engage in a design process to derive epistemic normative concepts. Unlike
other concepts, concepts like evidence and justification play a central role in determining
what our standards for accepting or rejecting propositions are in the first place. This leads
to a threat of a kind of circularity. In order to know if I have justified grounds for
believing that some set of proposed norms are the ones that would best allow our
community to seek its epistemic ends, I already must have in place some set of
justificatory standards by which I evaluated all the beliefs that functioned as inputs to the
design process. This is a form of epistemic circularity, but it is one that any view which
isn’t unduly conservative must accept. Any view which allows revision of our epistemic
norms and standards will end up arriving at whatever information is used in the alteration
of those standards in part by having followed the old standard. This isn’t problematic if it
is explainable how the old standards, though flawed, had enough positive epistemic
features to have enabled the gathering of accurate enough information to reveal their own
weaknesses. Since any epistemological view which allows some revision of epistemic
norm must allow some minimum circularity, the chapter spells out what kind of
circularity are more problematic in order to illustrate how the Design Method is
unproblematic. First, the chapter discusses what is problematic about self-defeating
arguments, beliefs, and norms. It then illustrates how accepting new norms that reject the
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norms that lead to the acceptance of the new norms need not be self-defeating in
problematic ways. For such a move to not be self-defeating, we only have to suppose that
the view of the world that is the product of following the new norms still produces a view
of the world in which is isn't an accident that the old norms could have gotten us the
necessary truths required for motivating the revised norms. Second, the chapter discusses
what is potentially problematic about bootstrapped beliefs or norms. Bootstrapped beliefs
are problematically self-affirming because they lead to feedback in which an initial
assumption that a method has some positive epistemic status directly leads by itself to
increase credence in the positive status of the method. Applying the design method need
not lead to such problematic feedback. This is because the unwanted features of such
feedback are obviously something we would want to design constraints within our
methods to avoid.

1

Chapter 1: Initial Arguments for a Conceptual Design Method
1. The Naive Framework for Conceptual Analysis
A significant portion of the debate in contemporary epistemology continues to be
centered on either analyzing or clarifying concepts like knowledge, justification,
evidence, and epistemic basis. This task seems worthwhile in part because the
clarification of such concepts would presumably help us determine how best to pursue
knowledge, gain justified beliefs, and properly base our beliefs on evidence. How have
traditional analytic epistemologists approached this task? Perhaps the simplest and most
naive conception of the method used in epistemology in the analytic tradition derives
from the linguistic turn during the mid-20th century. On the naive view, our goal is to
understand what speakers who use epistemic terms or concepts mean and refer to when
they use these concepts. If philosophers are competent with the concepts, it seems
plausible on the naive picture that we can make significant progress in determining a
concept's meaning merely by using our conceptual competence to determine the
conditions under which the concept applies. If we follow the naive method, we begin
with what we take to be the most plausible initial analysis of the proposed concept. We
then test the analysis against our own conceptual aptitude by seeing how the extension of
the analysis measures up to intuitions about cases that reflect our conceptual competence.
In rough form, analyses are theories about the term’s content which we test against a data
set of intuitions about the application of the terms. A proposed analysis succeeds to the
extent that it captures our intuitions and fails to the extent that it conflicts with them.
We might wonder how much this naive conception of conceptual analysis really
underlies actual work in epistemology or philosophy more generally, but a few things are
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clear. First, many epistemologists make appeals to kinds of intuitions that at least prima
facie only seem to be evidence if something like the naive picture is true. For example,
debates in the contextualism and pragmatic encroachment literature are filled with cases
that are designed to prompt intuitions about whether differences in an agent’s practical
interests affect our evaluations of whether people know a claim is true. (Stanley 2005)
With rare exception, these intuitions are often treated as evidence without further
justification. If intuitions are evidence of something besides conceptual competence,
philosophers should spend some time explaining how they function as evidence, since if
they don’t function in the naive way, we are due some explanation of why we should care
about these intuitive reactions. Some philosophers have done work explaining views of
intuition that don’t cleanly fit into the conceptual competence framework. For example,
Williamson (2007) argued that many philosophical intuitions rely on our intuitive skill at
reasoning with counterfactuals. How much Williamson view is conceptual competence
with a modal flair is debatable, but the thing to note is just that a detailed explanation of
how intuitions are functioning as evidence is surprisingly rare, and, since there is no other
obvious and widely accepted methodological paradigm, an author who appeals to
intuitions without further justification is either herself thinking in terms of the naive
picture or allowing her readers to implicitly think in those terms.
Secondly, certain kinds of non-intuition based linguistic evidence are sometimes
cited in defense of views about concepts. A prominent example is when Jason Stanley
(2004) defended an invariantist view of knowledge based on the fact that the word
“knowledge” lacks certain linguistic markers of other contextually varying words.
Argumentative moves like this only make sense if the project is commonly conceived as
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one directly concerned with the meanings of concrete terms in a particular language.
Otherwise, these details about the English word “knowledge” and its linguistic markers
would not be relevant. Finally, this view of the project is at least a prevalent enough
viewpoint that people working in X-Phi have taken it to its logical endpoint and
attempted to increase the pool of available intuitive data to include people outside of
academic philosophy (Alexander and Weinburg 2007). After all, if intuitions are the kind
of data suggested by the naive view, then focusing just on the intuitions of a small subset
of the community who use the term seems either epistemically irresponsible or at least in
need of lots of justification. Determining to what extent philosophers actually engage in
conceptual analysis as construed above would be a difficult sociological question
requiring detailed empirical research, but as long as there is good reason to think it
functions as a default frame for some of our approaches to answering conceptual
questions, which is obvious enough even without detailed research, it is useful to see both
whether it is the appropriate frame and whether there is a better alternative.
This chapter will proceed in two stages. The first stage will highlight some
problems with framing the core questions of epistemology in terms of the conceptual
analysis framework. It will discuss an argument from Mark Balaguer (2016) who thinks
most contemporary philosophers are concerned with answering what he calls type-C
questions, which essentially amounts to doing conceptual analysis. Although I think he is
mistaken in thinking that philosophers are concerned with the kind of conceptual
questions he takes them to be, seeing the extreme and implausible positions that such a
view of conceptual questions naturally lead to will be a useful illustration of why a naive
framing of the philosopher’s conceptual project can be deeply problematic, and thus why
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a more sophisticated understand of our methodology can avoid the problems he raises.1
Second, I will discuss three possible alternative understandings of the conceptual
project. The first view, which I will call the Naturalized View or Naturalized Conceptual
Analysis, sees the core questions that epistemologists are concerned with as not being
purely conceptual at all. We are only interested in concepts like knowledge on this view
because they are natural kind terms. The real concern of epistemology is determining the
borders of these epistemic natural kinds. The project is only conceptual to the extent that
we need to both determine what kind our concept is picking out, from among all the
different kinds an individual instance might fall under, and we want to make our
conceptualization of the epistemic kinds line up as close as we can to what they really
are. The second view, which I will call the Teleosemantic View or Pragmatic Conceptual
Analysis following the names introduced by Fisher (2006), sees the core questions that
epistemologists are concerned with as being conceptual, but understands concepts as
having their content fixed by a set of common purposes that regulate their use. The last
view, which I will call the Design View, sees the conceptual project fundamentally
differently than the previous two. Rather than seeing the project as one of finding out the
shape of our preexisting concepts, it conceives of the project as one of both refining
existing concepts to better serve our continually changing purposes and even inventing
new concepts to help regulate our activities. This dissertation is essentially a long
argument that from a methodological perspective the Design View is the best one to use

1

Balaguer also thinks that thinking of philosophy in terms of answering what he calls type-C questions
leads to problems, but rather than revising his view of what conceptual questions we have really been
asking, he concluded that the philosophical project is largely concerned with something very silly.
Balaguer thinks type-C questions are stupid questions philosophers are stupid to ask. I think the silliness
of purely type-C questions is reason ti think we were never really asking his type-C questions in the first
place.
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in actual epistemological debates, and no doubt in other areas of philosophy more
generally. This is in part because it is consistent not just with the truth of teleosemantics
but with the truth of any semantic framework which allows for at least some concepts to
be introduced and individuated by the purposes that they serve. Any semantic framework
which wouldn’t allow for concepts with at least stipulative definitions that function in
this way is deeply implausible. The Design view is a methodological view first rather
than one that arises from a broader commitment to a general semantic theory. The Design
View also doesn’t build an undue conservatism into its very framing of the conceptual
project. Epistemologists should be just as concerned with new concepts as with old ones.

2. The Trouble with the Naive Framing
To avoid talking about a way of framing conceptual questions that nobody accepts
and doesn’t structure anyone’s arguments about the discipline, I am going to discuss a
way of framing philosophical questions that has been recently used to defend the
applicability of X-Phi to philosophical questions by a philosopher in a prominent journal.
This is a least some indication that this way of understanding philosophy has appeal to
some corner of the profession. Mark Balaguer in “Conceptual Analysis and X-Phi”
(2016) defends the view that philosophers are concerned with what he calls type-C
questions and that X-phi is relevant to answering type-C questions. What is a type-C
question?
Let me start by deﬁning the notion of a type-C question. A type-C question
is (I hereby stipulate) a certain kind of question of the form, ‘What is C?’
(or ‘What is a C?’), where ‘C’ denotes or expresses a concept. To give a
few examples, I’m thinking of questions like ‘What is free will?’, ‘What is
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a person?’, ‘What is knowledge?’, and so on. Now, it’s important to note
that not all questions of the form ‘What is X?’, or ‘What is an X?’, are
type-C questions. Neuroscientists might ask “What is a decision?”, and
they might answer that decisions are neural events of a certain kind; but
this is different from the type-C question ‘What is a decision?’ The type-C
question is about the concept of a decision, whereas the neuroscientiﬁc
question is about the physical nature of the (actual) referents of that
concept. Thus, when I talk about type-C questions, I’m not talking about
all questions of the form ‘What is X?’; I’m talking only about those
questions that ask about the nature of the given concept. (Balaguer, 2016)

Balaguer distinguishes type C-questions from questions about the nature of the
thing picked out by the concept. Type-C questions are supposed to be about something
like the Fregean sense or the Kaplanian character of a concept. In this way, type-C
questions are supposed to be purely conceptual questions. A possible answer to the typeC question “What is water?” would be that water is the actual watery stuff we are
acquainted with, at least if Chalmers (1996) is right.
Type-C questions aren’t really about what they seem to be about on their face.
Questions like “What’s water?” are really the question “What’s WATER?” where capital
letters signal we are talking directly about a concept rather than water itself2. So, it is only
sensible to ask, what is a concept? For the purposes of his argument Balaguer assumes
that they are or are at least often talked about as if they are abstract objects. There could
then be an abstract object that corresponds to each of the possible senses or characters
that could counts as meanings of any of our expressions. Balaguer thus see type-C

2

I'm mostly going to forgo the use of the capital letter convention because when I talk about a concept
rather than the thing itself, I will tend to explicitly say “the concept X” and the capital letters aren't
needed to resolve any ambiguity.
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questions essentially as questions about which abstract object our mental representation
picks out as its meaning.
This characterization of type-C questions and the nature of concepts is fairly
extreme, but it fits very nicely with a naive picture of the conceptual analysis
methodology. If we are concerned with type-C questions, then intuitions seem to be a
form of evidence. Our use of a term is some evidence about the nature of its cause, our
mental representations. These representations are what determine which concept is picked
out by the mental representation, so combined with some theory of how representations
pick out abstract objects, intuitions can then be evidence of what abstract object is the
meaning of our expression. The evidential value of intuition is even more straightforward
if we construe concepts as the mental representations themselves rather than as abstract
objects picked out by the mental representations. This construal of type-C questions and
the nature of concepts also seems to make sense of more general linguistic evidence. For
example, patterns of use rather than particular intuitions would be easy to see as evidence
because the patterns would reveal something about the nature of the representations that
produce that pattern.
However, Balaguer argues that a proper understanding of type-C questions is
inconsistent with a number of metaphilosophical views, and these metaphilosophical
views seem to be indirectly appealed to in many philosophical arguments. Balaguer
identifies three rough metaphilosophical views of Type-C questions.
1) The decompositional view sees type-C questions as concerned with the structure
of abstract objects. An answer to a type-C question tells you about what simpler
and more basic concepts compose a complex concept like C.
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2) The ordinary language view sees type-C questions as concerned simply with what
the folk have in mind when they use the expression “C”. In other words, what
abstract object fits with our usage, intentions, and practices about C.
3) The hybrid view sees type-C questions as concerned not fully with the mental
representations of the folk, but with whatever more “cleaned-up” concept fits with
the folk usage. So, for example, if the folk usage seems to pick out some
incoherent concept, but there is some close-by coherent concept, then the answer
to “what is C?” will be the more coherent concept. What exactly goes into the
“cleaning-up” will be variable depending on the philosopher’s particular views
about conceptual analysis.
Balaguer thinks that the ordinary language view is the right metaphilosophical
view to have about answering type-C questions. I think the ordinary language view is a
crazy view to take towards the kinds of conceptual questions that philosophers ask. But, I
think it is a view that is very tempting when we approach the conceptual project through
the kind of naive framing that Balaguer does. If we think that philosophers really are just
answering what he calls type C-questions, then much of his reasoning, even if flawed,
must be taken seriously. Considering his argument for the ordinary language view in
more detail and the consequences of embracing it as a metaphilosophy will, in my view,
reveal something about the inherent problem with framing conceptual issues in
philosophy in terms of conceptual analysis or type-C questions.

2.1 Balaguer’s Argument against the Hybrid View
In his article Balaguer argues against both the decompositional view and the
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hybrid view as part of an argument by elimination for the ordinary language view. Since
our purpose here isn’t to defend Balaguer’s argument we need not go through all of it.
However, an examination of his argument against the hybrid view will reveal something
about how framing conceptual questions as analyses of concepts we possess can tempt us
towards a highly flawed view, and focusing on his argument against the hybrid view will
most clearly illustrate where the framing of philosophy in term of Balaguer’s type-C
questions will lead us astray.
Balaguer’s argument against the hybrid view is an argument by elimination. The
hybrid view is essentially the view that folk linguistic usage, intentions, and conventions
matter, but other things matter to the determination of what concept is pick out by our
representations. Balaguer thus thinks that if he can show that the additional non-ordinary
language constraints on the concept aren’t relevant, then he will have shown that the
hybrid view is false and that only the ordinary language data is relevant. If that data is the
only relevant data, then X-phi is a huge challenge to traditional methods of argument
used by philosophers. Again, I won’t go through all of the possibilities he argues against,
but I will use a few to illustrate the general method by which he argues and how the
highly constrained nature of his construal of type-C questions plays a central role in his
reasoning.
One thing that a hybrid theorist might appeal to in fixing what concept is picked
out by our term is the relationship that the concept has to other concepts. Balaguer argues
against this view using the example of free will and responsibility.
On this view, the answer to the question ‘What is free will?’ depends on
the answer to the question ‘Which kinds of freedom are required for moral
responsibility?’ But this is just to say that it depends on the answer to the
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question ‘What is moral responsibility?’ There’s a concept of Humeresponsibility (that requires Hume-freedom); and a concept of libertarianresponsibility (that requires libertarian-freedom); and so on. We need to
determine which of these concepts provides the right definition of ‘moral
responsibility’. But, of course, this is just another type-C question, and so
we have to ask our meta-question all over again. In other words, we need
to ask what kinds of facts settle the question ‘What is moral
responsibility?’ (or, in particular, ‘Which kinds of freedom are required for
moral responsibility?’)—and when we do this, we’ll be right back where
we started. (2016, 2378)
Essentially Balaguer’s argument here is that connections to other concepts don’t
get us out of the ordinary linguistic method. Pointing out that we think there is a
connection between two concepts just raises another question about the ordinary meaning
of the second concept.
I think this argument is too quick for a number of reasons. The reason someone
might suggest that connection to other concepts matter and give reason beyond the
ordinary language data seems to be highlighted in the following example. Suppose that
careful examination of solely the linguistic data about responsibility suggested that
people had a concept of Hume-responsibility, but data just about the usage of freedom not
in connection to responsibility suggested people had a concept of libertarian-freedom.
But, also suppose that people in general thought that freedom was necessary for
responsibility. We thus have a conflict between their use of the terms. They have a
concept of responsibility that doesn’t require what they think of as freedom. So, either
they are mistaken for thinking freedom is necessary for responsibility or judgments about
the connections between concepts are also data that we need to use in deciding what

11
concept is picked out by people’s usage. Either way we will have to attribute a mistake to
the users of the terms either we interpret them as have matching concepts of freedom and
responsibility that they just sometimes poorly apply and thus give the appearance that
they have conflicting concepts, or they are wrong about the connection between the two
concepts.
But, what I’ve said above just seems to be an argument that what we should care
about in the hybrid view isn’t the connection between the concepts per se, but rather that
we ought to attribute a conceptual scheme to people that has the best chance of being
coherent or involves the least mistakes on their part. Balaguer, however, thinks that it is a
mistake to think of coherence as a constraint on our accounts of answers to type-C
questions.
This view — that facts about coherence and/or instantiation are relevant to
our type-C questions—is implausible. The problem, in a nutshell, is that it
makes perfect sense to say that a concept of ours is incoherent and
uninstantiated. For instance, it makes sense to say that the concept of free
will is incoherent (or uninstantiated) because (a) freewill is libertarianfreedom, and (b) libertarian-freedom is incoherent (or uninstantiated). But
if it were built into the correctness conditions of analyses of free will that
the correct analysis has to pick out a concept that’s coherent and
instantiated, then this view—i.e., the (a)–(b) view—wouldn’t make sense.
In this scenario, the claim that (b) was true (i.e., that libertarian-freedom
was incoherent or uninstantiated) would undermine the claim that (a) was
true (i.e., that free will was libertarian-freedom). But, in point of actual
fact, (b) doesn’t undermine (a); the two are perfectly compatible. (2016,
2379)
Essentially, Balaguer sees this urge to attribute coherent and sensible concepts to
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people as unmotivated and as he says later, even a kind of “cheating” (2016, 2380).
There’s some fact about how our mental representations work and it should count as a
real possibility that we are deeply confused.
There is no doubt something right about this. We shouldn’t, like Davidson (1973),
get so gung-ho in our commitment to charity that we make nearly everything that people
believe true and coherent. But, focusing too much on the folk usage and the ordinary
language perspective has an analogous issue. We shouldn’t take ordinary use as free from
error. Suppose we went around and asked people questions about whether certain
diseases were cancer. The folk probably have a very poor understanding of cancer. When
we get back the data and see that the folk identify many things as cancer that doctors do
not, we can respond in at least three ways.
(1) There is a folk concept of cancer that differs from the scientific concept.
(2) There are thousands of individual concepts of cancer for each individual usage.
(3) The folk concept is the really just the concept “what the experts mean by cancer”
and their applications of it are just mistakes in its use.
The basic motive for wanting to draw a distinction between an individual’s mental
representations and an abstract object that is the concept itself is precisely a desire to talk
about something that can be shared by people who in practice conceptualize and use
words in different, sometimes mistaken, ways. This means that, even if we are aiming at
figuring out what a person’s concept of cancer is, if we don’t want millions of concepts,
we have to be willing to attribute errors to people in their intuitive identifications about
what falls under their concept. This means that ordinary language data isn’t unambiguous
evidence about the abstract object that is the concept, because evidence about an
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individual’s representation isn’t a perfect indicator of what abstract object they are
representing. The motive for seeing something like (3) as the concept of cancer is that a
commitment to defer to the experts is common to everyone’s conception of cancer and
taking that as the core intention that determines what concept is picked out by each
individual helps to make sense both of how we could be said to be communicating in a
shareable language with shared concepts, but also explains how uses and associations that
might build up in an individual’s conception aren’t necessarily evidence about the shared
abstract object everyone manages to pick out. This kind of complex weighing of the
individual uses verse the idea that concepts are by their very nature a social constructed
meaning seems to be precisely the kind of thing that would motivate someone to take up
a hybrid view. We can get a well-motivated constraint that looks something like
coherence that is just motivated by the idea that concepts are shared meanings. There is a
reflective equilibrium between taking all uses of a concept seriously and having a concept
that plays its role in linguistic theorizing about communication and expression.
Balaguer thinks this kind of reasoning is again problematic There might be
pragmatic reasons to want concepts to work this way, but that doesn’t mean that they do.
But it’s hard to believe that pragmatic considerations of this kind are
relevant to type-C questions. On the contrary, it seems that such
considerations are best thought of as giving us reasons to stipulate certain
definitions of our words, counterintuitive consequences be damned.
Suppose, for instance, that we’re trying to come up with a definition of
‘reasonable doubt’ for use in our legal system, and suppose we’re trying to
decide whether to deﬁne it as RD1 or RD2, where these are precisely
deﬁned concepts. Finally, suppose that if we use RD1 in our instructions to
jurors, we’ll have a better or more just legal system than if we use RD2—
in particular, suppose that juries will do a better job of convicting guilty

14
people and not convicting innocent people. Is this reason to think that RD1
captures what it means to have a reasonable doubt? Surely not. It maybe
reason to use this definition in our legal system, but that’s another matter.
There’s the question of what we should tell jurors in order to have the
most just legal system, and there’s the question of what a reasonable doubt
really is, and the two questions might not have the same answer. (2016,
2381)
Balaguer sees a discovery of the usefulness of a concept as reason to change our
conceptual scheme, as reason to stipulate new concepts, but not necessarily any reason to
think that our old concept works in a particular way. Going back to my cancer case we
might imagine Balaguer objecting that it might be practical for us to invent the expert
concept of cancer and tell people to defer to that concept, but it isn’t really evidence that
the individuals actually have that concept in mind.
Both Balaguer’s examples of reasonable doubt, and responsibility illustrate
something that I think is fundamentally confused in his understanding of concepts. He
talks about our folk concept as if it will end up being clearly one out of a number of more
precise concepts. For example, our concept freedom is either compatibilist-freedom or
incompatibilist-freedom. But, this is a mistake and we can see it by thinking of an earlier
example, water. The concept of water isn’t the same concept as the concept of H2O. They
have the same extension. They apply to the same things, but concepts, as Balaguer has
been discussing them, are supposed to be like Fregean senses or Kaplanian characters.
The concept of water is a different concept from that of H2O because it has a different
sense. The concept of free will and that of libertarian free will are different concepts.
They might as a matter of fact have the same extension, but this doesn’t entail that they
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have the same sense. Just like the concept water probably picks out things in the world by
including components that are e.g. the watery stuff around here, there is reason to think
that many concepts we have don’t have fully spelled out conditions of application. This
means that they rely on other, often outside markers for determining their actual
application. For example, the inclusion of indexical or ostensive parts in anything that
could count as their sense. When we introduced the term “water” we did it with the
intention to refer to that stuff, the stuff we are in contact with, and it seems plausible to
think we do something similar in these other cases. Free will is as plausibly thought of as
“that thing that happens when I make choices like this” as being some highly theoretical
concept with certain built in necessary parts. To what extent we see the concept as having
these variables in their senses that in part determine what they are concepts of using
features of the external world will to some degree determine how much we find the kinds
of moves made by the hybrid theorist appealing.
When we introduced the concept “reasonable” we probably didn’t have a fully
spelled out way to separate the reasonable from the unreasonable, this wasn’t part of our
mental representation. We just took it for granted that there are things that are more or
less reasonable and gesture roughly at what that amounts to. We see paradigm examples
of reasonable actions and thoughts and our initial conception of reasonable become
“whatever shares the feature that those have in common that makes them seem this way”
where “this way” is essentially a kind of ostension. Our sense of what we are picking out
in the world is vague and we rely on external facts about the thing we are picking out and
the purposes we have for picking them out to do most of the work in actually fixing some
more definite reference. Now, returning to Balaguer’s example of reasonable doubt.
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Suppose we discover that there are pragmatic reasons for thinking concept RD1 would
work better than RD2. If those features that make it work better are in fact the kind of
things that make sense of our vague conceptual grouping in the first place, then wouldn’t
that be evidence that RD1 picks out what our original concept picked out?
This is of course far from a theoretical example. Putnam (1975) in his initial
arguments for externalism about meaning used the example of water to make roughly the
same point I am making here. When we first began talking about water we pointed out
something in the world, and over time we developed theories about that thing. For a long
time, water was intuitively connected to a role as a fundamental element and to a role in
determining whether something was a liquid. If we went simply off of ancient people’s
intuitive conception of water, we might be tempted to say that water doesn’t exist because
nothing plays the role water plays in all their theories. But, there is a clear sense in which
both a modern person and an ancient person could communicate and be talking about the
same thing when they talk about water. It’s important to separate out mere associations
and theories we have about a thing picked out by our concept and the core of the concept
which determine and fixes its extension. The common commitment by all the parties to
this conceptual core is what allows communication with shared concepts even when
separate parties understand and think about the things picked out by the concept in very
different ways.
Thinking of concepts as being importantly distinct from our individual intuitive
understanding of them also plays an important role in our understanding of how we come
to learn concepts. When I am first introduced to a concept like the concept gold, I might
begin trying to categorize things as gold or non-gold. Obviously when I first begin I
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might be quite bad at it. I rely on certain markers that might lead me astray and perhaps
identify iron pyrite as gold. It’s crucial to me being able to learn and pick up the shared
group concept gold that when someone tries to correct me in my identification of pyrite
as gold, that I don’t just treat them as having a different concept they are trying to get me
to use, but that they are correcting a concept we share. The concept and my ability to
understand it and use it is subject to refinement, and even the experts in the community
should and do treat their concept in the same way. The fact that we have intuitively
identified some things as gold for some time does not in and of itself guarantee that those
things do in fact fall under the concept. We can be mistaken.
All of the things I have said should seem to be just basic parts of most
contemporary philosophers understanding of concepts that we have gained since
arguments against internalist and descriptivist views of concepts like those of Putnam
(1975) and Kripke (1972) began appearing. Balaguer’s approach to C-questions only
makes sense if they are concerned only with Fregean sense and see them as something
like tacit descriptions or theories that determine the reference of the concept. But, most
contemporary philosophers recognize that whatever determines the extension of a
concept, it can’t simply be something like a Fregean sense alone. Even those like
Chalmers (1996) or Jackson (1998) who have attempted to revive the descriptivist view
have largely done so by an appeal to 2D semantics in which mental descriptions are only
half the story about how reference is determined. Even on these 2D views facts about the
external world as it actually is play a role in fixing actual reference.
Given how much of what I have said is part of a fairly common set of background
assumptions, why not just reject what Balaguer says as an anomaly? The concern is that
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though many philosophers have largely moved on from the kind of purely descriptivist
Fregean picture that fits with what Balaguer is saying, we often make appeals to intuition
as though something like the Balaguer story is right. If the naive picture isn’t right, then
intuitions are very imperfect guides. This is clear to see because the very motive for the
rejection of this naive picture is the idea that our individual intuitive conception of a
shared concept can be flawed and subject to correction. This means that any adequate
appeal to intuition as evidence would have to be paired with a good explanation of why
this intuitive response isn’t mistaken, and any such appeal would require a better and
more nuanced understanding of what role a share concept is supposed to play.

3. Three Paths Out of the Naive Frame
In this section we will begin by looking at two possible promising ways that some
philosophers have embraced to make sense of what is involved in having a shared
concept and briefly describe some possible methods that might be motivated by these
differing views of concepts. The first way is to embrace some kind of
causal/informational view of reference and understand the idea of a single communal
concept as being about how members of a community all have their use of the concept
regulated by a causal connection to some single object or natural kind. This semantic
theory motivates the adoption of what we might call Naturalized Conceptual Analysis.
The second way is to embrace some kind of teleosemantic view and understand the idea
of a single communal concept as being about how members of a community all have their
use of a concept regulated by its fulfillment of some common purpose had by the
community. This semantic theory motivates the adoption of what we might call
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Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis. (Fisher, 2015) Though most of the methods used by
some version of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis will be correct, as an overall
methodology, it is substantially incomplete for the purposes we have in epistemology and
no doubt other sub-disciplines. It will potentially ignore crucial and important conceptual
questions because of its inherently conservative framing. We should instead adopt what
we will call the Design View or the Conceptual Design Method which is compatible with
the truth of the teleosemantic view and manages to give answers to important epistemic
concerns that would be ignored within an analysis framework.

3.1 Naturalized Conceptual Analysis
There are many views of reference which fall into what we can call causal or
information views of reference. The simple views that Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972)
first elaborated as well as more complex (often labeled “hybrid”) views like those of
Evans (1982) and Devitt (1980) and all their successors. We’ll briefly outline Evan’s
influential view as a starting place.
On Evan’s view a name like “Barrack Obama” refers to whatever thing in the
world is the causal source of the body of descriptive information that a person associates
with the term. This view avoids the problem of error that was pointed out in the previous
section because there is no necessity that the body of information be true or that the
person is the one referred to because they satisfy the description. So, say for example, I
watched too much far right media and most of the things I believe about Obama are
mistaken, it is still the case that Obama functions as a causal source of my descriptions
about him in so far as the reporting by the right wing sources are caused by and a
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response to the actual person Obama and are passed on to me with the intent to get me to
form beliefs about that individual. We can extend this picture to reference about natural
kinds. The ancient Greeks were talking about the same stuff as we are, even though they
were mistaken in their views because the descriptions they associated with water had
their causal source in contact with H2O. That they formed bad theories on the basis of that
contact doesn’t alter the role that H2O played as a causal regulator of their use of their
term for water.
Suppose we want to take this causal and/or informational view of reference and
meaning seriously and use it in our method of conceptual analysis of epistemic terms.
What would have to be true? First it seems that there would have to be something in the
world that could function as the causal source of our concept. This seem to imply that at a
minimum the epistemic terms we would analyze within this semantic framework would
either have to be descriptive terms or at least supervene on to some descriptive kind that
could play the causal role in regulating its use. Suppose we wanted to think about
epistemic terms like “knowledge” as descriptive in nature. One natural way to do so
would be to think of them on analogy with terms like “water” or “proton.” One way to
characterize such a view would be that epistemic terms referred to natural kinds in a
similar way to how “water” refers to a natural kind. In fact, this kind of view is capably
represented in the philosophical literature by Hilary Kornblith (2002). So, by laying out
some details of his view will be able to get a basic grip on an example of a methodology
falling under what I’ve labeled Naturalized Conceptual Analysis. However, it will be
important to recognize that not every view in this category will look like Kornblith’s and
thus different views might avoid some particular problems with his way of setting things
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up.
In its broadest outlines, Kornblith thinks that epistemologist’s concern with
knowledge isn’t best thought of as a concern with a concept, but rather as an actual thing
in the world. This fits with the causal semantic model. Knowledge is literally whatever
causally regulates our usage of the word. As such knowledge is the kind of thing that is
capable of being studied in empirical sciences the way that anything else that makes up
the world ought to be studied. The methodology Kornblith advocates is fairly
straightforward. One begins by attempting to find samples or instances of the phenomena
or item in question i.e. examples of the thing that causally regulates our use. One then
observes and performs experiments involving those sample phenomena in order to reveal
further features of the phenomena and, as one develops a better theory of that
phenomena, our conception of that phenomena becomes clearer. The analogy with
investigation into water makes this broad outline somewhat clearer. When trying to
understand water, one starts off with some samples of water. One observes the features of
the sample by doing things such as measuring its density, its refractive index, its boiling
and freezing points, etc. One performs experiments to determine its reactivity with other
substances or to see if it is constituted of other things, etc. All these observations in
conjunction with other things that we have learned about the functioning of the world
taken as whole allow us to see how water fits into the world and our conception of that
natural kind becomes sharper in the process. To frame things in the terms of Evan’s
semantic theory we expand the informative descriptions that are associated with the
concept that is causally tied to that natural kind by investigating the kind itself. Our
concept gets better, but it remains in some key way the same concept by being tied to the
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same external reference.
Such a methodology is sharply at odds with the naive methodology outline in the
first section. Intuition has a fairly minimal role to play in such a methodology. Our initial
intuitive understanding of what the natural kind is will play a role during early stages of
an investigation in helping us pick out what samples are the causal regulators of our
usage, but our intuitive understanding is always taken to be revisable. Furthermore, it
becomes apparent under such a methodology that the tools and methods of sciences like
cognitive psychology or cognitive ethology become much more appropriate tools for the
epistemologist’s task than the semi-linguistic and logical methods often used in the
epistemic literature.
Of course, Kornblith’s epistemology would only be a single example of a
methodology fitting under the Naturalized Conceptual Analysis umbrella. So, we might
wonder whether all such methodologies are committed to seeing epistemic concepts as
natural kinds or, on the assumption that they do, whether they really have to eschew the
use of intuitions quite so radically. My inclination is to think that the answer to the first
question depends on what one takes a natural kind to be. If all it takes for a kind to be
natural is that it fits in the best theory of a natural descriptive subject, then I suppose if
we rely solely on Naturalized Conceptual Analysis as a method, then all the epistemic
kinds discovered by such a method will end up being natural. However, if we think of
natural kinds more robustly, maybe as something akin to completely theory independent
kinds, then I don’t think Naturalized Conceptual Analysis is committed to searching
solely for natural epistemic kinds. As far as the second question about intuition is
concerned, I think it is also possible for this methodology to avoid the dumping of
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intuitions as direct evidence. However, it might turn out that such alternative
methodologies engender strange commitments about the nature of intuition. For example,
one could hold a robust view of intuition in which intuitions give substantive insight into
descriptive kinds and not merely of the intuitive descriptive content associated with these
kinds. The worry about such a view is that such insight seems to require a mechanism or
faculty to guarantee that the intuitions are representative and evidence for the existence of
such a substantive faculty seems fairly slim. Of course, there are defenders of robust
intuitions of the sort suggested here3, but the rest of this dissertation will at best only
indirectly address one their arguments. One class of arguments that defenders of robust
intuition give has the following Moorean structure:
(P1) Knowledge of facts in domain D requires the existence of robust intuition.
(P2) We know facts in domain D.
(C) There are robust intuitions.
Thus, to the extent that the rest of this dissertation can provide a methodology
which avoids the need for robust intuition, it will indirectly undermine this kind of
arguments for its existence at least about the class of facts relevant to conceptual
questions within epistemology.
Although all the differences between the various versions of Naturalized
Conceptual Analysis might be relevant to certain debates or objections, a general problem
can be formulated for all methodologies fitting under a largely descriptive rubric. The
problem can be seen by thinking about the problems with taking a completely descriptive
methodological approach to concepts like: “strong”, “efficient”, etc. Suppose we want to

3

See Bealer 1996 or BonJour 1998
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refine and improve our concept of the strength of a material. So, we begin as a descriptive
approach would seem to suggest. We gather together samples of things that are strong and
then begin to investigate them by performing observations on them and doing
experiments with them. Suppose that our initial samples were metals and with
investigation we discover a great number of facts about metallic bonding. We even learn
empirical facts about what makes one metallic bond stronger or more difficult to break
than another. Has such an investigation laid bare the nature of strength to us? The answer
would seem to be no, or at least not quite. We may suppose that someone then comes
along with a different material, for example, a polymer. This material is also quite strong,
but it is strong for very different reasons. So, if we took our investigation as being
definitive of that nature of strength, we might mistakenly claim that this polymer wasn’t
in fact strong. Strength is multiply realizable.
We might also confront another problem. During our initial selection of samples,
we had to pick out samples as strong in some way. Suppose we said that a sample
counted as strong if an L meter long rod of the material with a C meter circumference
didn’t break when subjected to N Newtons of force at the midpoint of the rod. It appears
that the choice of L, C, N, and testing a rod at the midpoint would be arbitrary and it’s
hard to see how investigation of the materials themselves is supposed to resolve this
ambiguity about strength for us. There are of course many concepts like strength. These
are concepts where an object falls under the concept when it fulfills some functional
specification that has flexible standards. There are many ways to be strong or efficient,
and no specification of ways of being strong or efficient directly gets at the concept. The
descriptive conditions necessary for fulfilling the function are only half of the story. The
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other half has to do with the nature of the function and the standards for fulfilling it.
When we think about concepts like knowledge or justification, it seems hard to
maintain that they are more like the concept of water than like the concepts of strong or
efficient. Talk of standards is prevalent in the epistemology literature and it’s hard to see
how a completely descriptive approach to the subject is supposed to answer these kinds
of questions. It also seems strange to try to assimilate the investigation of terms, which
seem to be obviously neutral to the particulars of their substantial realization, to a
methodology that seems a more natural fit for investigations of material kinds.
Although this line of objection seems initially compelling, I think there are a few
replies that a defender of Naturalized Conceptual Analysis might give. First, as to the
question of multiple realizability of epistemic kinds, a defender of Naturalized
Conceptual Analysis can argue that multiply realizable kinds are clearly subject to usual
empirical investigation. We could point towards examples in psychology, but no example
would be more fitting than the example we have been focusing on all along, water. Water
is, strictly speaking, a multiply realizable kind. There are many ways of being water. For
example water could be 1H216O, or 1H2H16O, or 2H216O, or… Quite simply, there are
many isotopes of the constituents of water, and their differences are not trivial. (For
example, drinking enough heavy water could kill you by altering the rates of key
reactions in your body.) Just like in the “strength” example, we could suppose that some
scientists started their investigations with incomplete samples composed of entirely
1

H216O. Their final account of what water is might not include the other isotopes.

However, this really isn’t the threat that it seemed to be at first. There is certainly a
conceptual place for 1H216O, and having such a concept is no block to developing a
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broader concept that includes all the isotopes and is picked out by our usual concept
“water”. Likewise, investigating the strength of metals might lead one to develop a
narrow “metal strength” concept, but that is no bar to developing, in the usual empirical
ways, a broader concept that encompasses all the various kinds of strength. So, we might
suppose that focusing on knowledge or justification of smaller categories is no
impediment to investigation of the larger categories that contain some similarity that we
initially ignored.
A defender of Naturalized Conceptual Analysis might reply to the second
“standards objection” by appealing to the following analogy. Thermodynamics is an
adequate and empirical investigation of temperature. This investigation is not threatened
in the least by the fact that some concepts surrounding temperature involve standards.
The fact that there is no definitive way to resolve via normal descriptive means what it
takes for a room to be hot doesn’t mean that we can’t learn about temperature via the
usual kinds of empirical means.
I’m uncertain whether something like the above reply to multiple realizability is
ultimately successful, but I am quite confident that the problem of standards is not
resolved simply by pointing out how normal descriptive methods can get us answers to
issues that are intimately connected with the subject in question. The trouble with the
reply to the standards worry is best seen by looking at engineering. Engineering problems
consist of two core components. First, there is the nature of the world and the materials at
hand, and second, there is the nature of the task to be accomplished. We might imagine a
materials engineer is trying to design an industrial process for making a certain alloy. In
the process of design, he wants to efficiently make the alloy by wasting as little energy
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and material as possible, but he also wants the alloy to be pure and strong, so that it will
be suitable for his later projects. Normal empirical information about how the reactions
involved work and the nature of the materials involved are of course relevant, but if he
wants to determine what will count as efficient or strong, he can’t succeed without taking
into account the purposes involved in the project.4 What he is going to use the material
for isn’t just relevant; it’s ineliminable from a good understanding of how the engineer
should understand the application of terms like strong and efficient. Pointing out that
empirical investigation supplies information that is relevant isn’t sufficient to show that
he can forgo the normative stance altogether when considering questions of strength or
efficiency.
The deeper problem revealed through the problem of standards is that framing the
discussion in terms of a causal theory of reference is inherently incomplete because the
causal theory is acknowledged not to be a complete theory of reference for every term.
Perhaps it would work as part of a complete semantic theory as an explanation of how
reference of names and kind terms work, but we often have terms that don’t fit nicely into
the framework. Fictional names and kinds, for example, are notoriously difficult to
account for on the causal theory because, by definition, there isn’t something out there
that regulates their use. Cases like this make it clear that we might have to look elsewhere
to understand how concepts function more generally.

This is not to imply that the engineer might not be able settle the proper way of setting the standards
objectively or through empirical investigation of what methods work best (though I harbor some doubts
here). It’s just that without understanding his purposes, he won’t be able to tell what works. Once fixed
goals are in place, the issue might then become fully empirically decidable (though I don’t think that fixed
goals guarantee decidability).
4
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3.2 Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis
Suppose you are concerned with the question of how we have shared concepts but
are somewhat skeptical of the idea that a straight appeal to the reference of terms will
completely solve the problem as would be suggested by causal/information views of
reference. “Batman” means something different than “Superman” even though neither
has any referent, and yet a purely descriptivist view seems bad as well. Someone might
misunderstand a Batman comic and thus mistakenly think that Alfred is Batman. What
can unify a diverse set of varying understandings into a shared concept about which
individuals can be mistaken if there isn’t always necessarily an external referent that
serves a unifying focal point? One natural suggestion is that we are all unified by a
common set of purposes and norms. On such a view, some terms, such as names and kind
terms, will be ones we are deeply concerned with insuring they have a common
reference, so we purposely commit ourselves to certain norms about how to revise our
mental contents about those agreed upon terms. We are going to call that stuff “water”, so
if we find out anything new about it, we need to change our conception of the shared
concept. Fictional terms also have some unified purpose. We engage in a game of
pretense where we act as though there was something to find out about, and thus simulate
the revisions that happen to real name and kind term. So, although there is no Batman, we
can all communicate using this shared concept because we understand the purpose that
the term is supposed to play in the construction of a fictional universe.
Likewise, when we discussed normative concepts like efficiency or strength in the
previous section, it was obvious that part of what we end up picking out isn't just some
pure function of us pointing to some kind in the world and investigating what ties the
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kind together. Rather, we use terms such as strength or efficiency in a way that allows us
to pick out different sets of things on different occasions depending on the particular
purposes we have in mind. There is something common to all strong things, but what
exactly that common thing is contextually dependent on the particular purposes and
intentions that we have when using the concept.
Any view of semantics which understands the notion of a shared concept in terms
of the people using that concept having some shared purpose regulating their use of the
concept falls under what I am calling Teleosemantic Views. On this construal, causal or
informational views of reference can count as teleosemantic as long as the reason why the
causal relation fixes the reference of the term is because one of the purposes our concepts
serve is to pick out things that we have been in causal contact with. If the causal fixing
relation is somehow construed independent of our purposes, then that version of a causal
theory wouldn’t be a teleosemantic view, though such a view is probably implausible. In
fact, it is quite natural to try to explain why the causal/informational view is so plausible
as an account of the reference fixing relations of names and kinds by appealing to the
truth of a broader teleosemantic view. Why is the reference of so many terms fixed by
some causal connection to a kind we ostended? Because treating the concept as having
the meaning and reference of that sort is highly useful and helps us fulfill many purposes
we might have in communication. Concepts are human tools and they have the reference
fixing features they do, not because of some magic about language, but because those
features are built in to serve particular purposes that we have for the concept.
Another quick note to avoid potential confusion is that the way I am using
“teleosemantic” is a bit broader than the way teleosemantics is often discussed in the
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literature. Some views calling themselves teleosemantic such as Dreske’s (1986) or
Millikan’s (1984) often more narrowly conceive of the purposes a concept is introduced
to fulfill as something like an evolutionary or biological function. This is in part because
they want to not just solve the linguistic question about shared communicable contents,
but also the deep question about how mental representation works at all, be it linguistic or
otherwise, and explain how it emerged within a naturalistic framework. If we are asking,
for example, how basic representations in color vision manage to refer to exterior features
of objects, it probably doesn’t make sense to think about this in terms of human
intentions or socially constructed purposes, since these seem to be things that are built on
top of these more basic representational contents. However, this deep set of facts about
basic mental representations is not my concern, since many epistemic concepts are quite
high level, and thus explanations of the semantics of terms that appeal to interests and
purposes that are completely unrecognizable to our evolutionary ancestors will be
completely consistent with views that I am labeling teleosemantic.
Suppose we find teleosemantics to be a promising way of understanding our
notion of a shared concept. We might try to formulate a method we could call Pragmatic
Conceptual Analysis which focused on the purposes that regulate our use of a concept.
One possible way of construing this form of analysis can be found in Edward Craig’s
Knowledge and the State of Nature (1990). In a significant portion of theorizing about
normative concepts in ethics and political philosophy people have appealed to state of
nature justifications. The idea seems to be roughly this. When we are considering
concepts like justice, we can determine their content by determining the fundamental
purposes to which such a concept answers. We discover that purpose by reflecting on an
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idealized story about how such a concept would originate. This idealized story reveals to
us the fundamental needs and concerns which the concept deals with. For example, such
a way of thinking might reveal to us that the concept of justice is fundamentally about the
best way for rational agents to resolve the disputes that occur due to their divergent
interests and how to manage limited resources considering those interests. We can
understand state of nature stories as fitting into Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis by seeing
the method as proceeding in two stages. First, we take an existing concept, and by
constructing a state of nature story, we determine the basic purposes to which that
concept answers. This purpose determines the scope of the space of norms that the
concept should govern. In the second stage, once this purpose is revealed, we consider
alternative conceptions of the concept or property in question to determine which
conception of the concept will best fulfill the purpose in question.
Unfortunately, this simple picture, though suggestive, doesn’t seem to model what
Craig uses in his book. Rather than identifying a purpose for a concept and then
determining its content by what best fulfills the purpose, Craig identifies a purpose and
then shows how a concept originally intended for such a purpose could be “objectified”
into a concept that roughly fits with our intuitive conception of the concept (1990). Craig
thinks that the concept of knowledge originated as a way of flagging good informants. A
good informant is someone who knows whether something is the case. Unfortunately, if
you still have implicit lingering commitment to the naive method from section 1, there
will appear to be a few problems with such a suggestion. It seems intuitive that someone
could know something but be unwilling to tell you, and thus not be a good informant.
Thus, strictly identifying knowledge with the property of being a good informant fails the
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ordinary language intuition test. So, given his underlying commitment to saving
intuitions, Craig must introduce the notion of “objectifying the concept.” Craig holds
that, when objectified, the concept only retains certain core features that usually make for
good informants but eliminates others to make the concept align more closely with a
feature of the world rather than a functional kind. Regardless of whether this strategy
works to produce a concept which is both connected to some basic purpose and fits our
intuitions about a preexisting concept, there is an immediate worry for taking this route if
our concern with epistemic concepts was originally driven by the need to answer more
basic epistemic questions like what to believe or how to alter our methods of belief
formation. Suppose that some concept could have emerged to answer to the purpose
suggested in the state of nature story and could have gone through a process that
produced a concept that fits our intuitions. So what? Does this mean that the concept
which has gone through that process ought to perform a central role in our epistemic
lives?
To illustrate the problem more clearly, let’s consider two ways we could develop
concepts by considering the following two concepts: hammer and efficient and accurate
nail pounder. We might suppose that the right way to think about the concept of a
hammer is to look at the historical use of the term “hammer” and intuitions about what
counts as a hammer to determine what kinds of objects the term applies to. Such an
examination would be useful. When a builder wants a tool that has historically been used
in building projects, it would be useful to know how to refer to the tool. This way the
builder can communicate with others in order to pick out the same set of objects. Thus,
objectified concepts are no doubt useful. However, if one is working not simply as a
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builder using existing tools, but rather as a designer of tools themselves, then the concept
of an efficient and accurate nail pounder is much more useful. There are many tools that
an engineer could design to pound in nails. Many wouldn’t count as hammers given our
historical position and accidental features of the word “hammer”. However, it seems
foolish to think that such a fact ought to constrain the engineer’s designs or thinking
about the design of tools for fulfilling the purpose in question. If his final product isn’t a
hammer, but still fulfills the concept of an efficient accurate pounder, the appropriate
response by an engineer ought to be “so what?” Likewise, suppose an epistemologist
were to lay out a concept which better fulfilled epistemic purposes than what is
intuitively picked out by knowledge. Shouldn’t her answer be “so what?” Objectifying
away parts of the fundamental purposes of concepts may produce concepts that are far
more likely to align with common intuition. The question is whether the philosopher’s
task is merely to probe epistemic banalities or rather provide the conceptual tools for
improved epistemic understanding. The comparison with state of nature theories of
justice is fruitful here. I take it that such philosophers were not simply trying to determine
the usage of the English word “justice”, but rather provide us with reasons to entertain
revisions to our conception of justice.
So, suppose that we removed the objectification material from Craig’s
methodology and stuck with simply the two step methodology I laid out in which state of
nature stories provided purposes and the second stage focused simply on what would
fulfill certain purposes rather than what would partially fulfill the purpose and also fit
with our intuitive judgment about an already existing concept. Would such a shift fix all
the problems for the method? The answer seems to be: No. The worry in this case has
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more to do with the state of nature approach in general. We have many epistemic
purposes. Some of them have been around with us for a long time. No doubt reflection on
very simple epistemic situations can give us significant insight into some of the purposes
and problems we must overcome. However, by directly focusing on very basic situations
a state of nature approach can't get us at some more complex purposes and problems that
may only emerge in less generalized contexts. State of nature analyses are likely to
overlook certain kinds of epistemic problems which only emerge in a large and more
complex historically embedded situation. No doubt there are numerous normative
questions about how to deal with the historical record and testimony i.e. the kinds of deep
epistemic questions with which historians must contend. All of us have a significant
number of beliefs that hinge on answers to these kinds of normative issues and no doubt
there are useful concepts that would apply here. I don’t think that we ought to presume
that we can resolve them simply by asking simpler and smaller questions about
testimonial knowledge in some highly general and abstract state of nature scenario. We
should at least be open to the possibility that long chains of historical transmission and
interpretation with all their highly contextual details open emergent epistemological
issues that require an expanded epistemic vocabulary. I don’t see how state of nature
analyses, traditionally understood, will help us there. It's also clear that epistemic
concepts need to evolve with changes in our epistemic capacities and there is every
reason to suppose that our epistemic capacities have significantly changed over time and
are influenced by the details of the environments and societies that we find ourselves in.
Given these problems, what would a better alternative methodology look like? An
alternative version of Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis that isn’t tied to the state of nature
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framework is given by Jason Fisher (2006). His summary of the view is that “pragmatic
conceptual analysis seeks an explication that will best preserve the patterns of beneficial
usage for a given concept.” Essentially the idea is that concepts are employed to produce
certain benefits, and our analysis of a concept’s content will be whatever way of
explicating it manages to explain and preserve that concept’s function. One example
Fisher uses to illustrate the idea is the concept of free will. Fisher thinks that being able to
draw distinctions between normal people who perform bad actions in the usual way and
those who perform an action while sleepwalking or under the influence of strong drugs
provides many benefits. So, however we end up filling out the content of the concept of
free will, we ought to do so in a way that preserves its ability to function as a way of
drawing the line between these kinds of cases. Why should we give this explication? First
because this concept of free will is one that we ought to adopt even if it isn’t the one we
already have. Fisher calls this the normative authority of the concept. Perhaps equally
importantly, he thinks that if teleosemantic views are correct, then the natural purpose to
which the concept free will answers is to provide precisely these kinds of benefit, and
thus if teleosemantics is right, this is actually what our concept or free will was all along.
Fisher calls this descriptive authority.
Although this way of construing Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis is better than
Craig’s state of nature approach, in large part because it both lets in consideration of
benefits that may not exist in a highly idealized state of nature, and because it forgoes
unnecessary complications about objectification, there are still ways in which Fisher’s
approach is problematic.
First, it is not clear to me that we should think that the content of our concepts is
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whatever delivers benefits rather than whatever accords with the possibly flawed or even
harmful purpose to which the concept answers in our community. To give an example,
suppose that there are no actual benefits to being able to identify uranium 235. Pretend it
could never be safely used for energy production and could only make weapons that were
likely to kill people for no real purpose. Also suppose that we could keep ourselves safe
from its effects by just labeling it a radioactive substance without any of the greater
details about its nature. Even if being able to identify U235 provided no benefits at all in
regular use, it seems clear that the concept would still about that substance. Concepts are
tools that serve our purposes, and sometimes our purposes are bad. Likewise, just because
the ability to mark a difference between sleepwalkers and normal decision makers is a
useful one doesn’t necessarily mean that it is the purpose or only purpose to which we put
the concept free will to work on. Some philosophers do want to talk about a highly
abstract metaphysical ability to do otherwise, and this is a purpose that it might makes
sense that the concept of free will was introduced to talk about.5 Perhaps Fisher might
respond that even if the U235 concept didn’t have beneficial use, the general practice of
identifying substances does and thus this is just an extension of that broader beneficial

5

It might be useful for the reader to know what I think about what the concept of free will pick out given
that this way of talking about the concept doesn't tie it to an ostension term picking out some feature of
a particular set o decisions that we make as I suggested the term might when I discussed Balaguer's
arguments. The truth is I think the concept was both introduced to talk about a certain set of decisions
and to talk about a highly abstract metaphysical phenomena. In fact I think many concepts are
introduced with ambiguous or multiple purposes and this only becomes problematic when it becomes
clear there isn't a single thing answering to that purpose. Whether we treat the concept as being about
one or the other purpose is, I think, ultimately a matter of social negotiation. With water we have
seemed to agree that its role picking out the stuff around here was more important than any theoretical
role we might have for it. Whereas, for the concept witch we might have decided that the idea that the
purpose was to pick out something magical was more important than its role in picking out particular
problematic people, and we are thus inclined to say witches don't exist. Whether people want to say:
“there is free will but it wasn't like we though” or “there's no free will, but it doesn't matter for what we
thought it did” probably depends on what revision the large community find it more natural to make and
thus not really resolvable from the armchair.
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usage. Unfortunately, his discussion of concepts like “free will” and “explanation” focus
solely on the benefits of them as individual concepts, so if he accepts this broader idea it
doesn’t find its way into how it would have to complicate his arguments.
Second, by framing itself in terms of analyzing the beneficial usage of our
currently existing concepts, this approach, as well as any that bill themselves as a form of
conceptual analysis, have a built-in blind spot. Our current set of concepts are only one of
a myriad of potential alternative conceptual frameworks, some of which may provide
many more benefits. To the extent that epistemology is about determining what we
should and shouldn’t believe and how we should or shouldn’t go about investigating the
world around us, it should be paramount to epistemologists to not be unduly conservative
in their methods. If our concepts of knowledge and justification are flawed or there are
alternative division of conceptual space that better serve our interests, it is important that
we find them if we are really seeking answers the core epistemic concerns that draw us to
the conceptual project as philosophers rather than as say linguists or psychologists. For
that we will need to approach the issue through the lens of design.

3.3 The Conceptual Design Method
What I am calling the Conceptual Design Method approaches concepts from
within the broad teleosemantic model. It begins by thinking about shared communicable
concepts as things that can exist because of a set of shared purposes and norms by which
we regulate each other’s use of the concept. The concept is a representational tool and
what it manages to count as representing in our community is a function of the
representational purposes it was introduced to serve modified by the communities

38
evolving understanding of that shared purpose. For example, our understanding of the
purpose that the concept water plays in picking out the natural kind has shifted over time
as our understanding of what kind of thing water is has changed, this shift is possible
because members of the community can recognize the concept as playing essentially the
same core representational role throughout the change in our theory about the world. In
fact, it is core to certain concepts like names and natural kind terms that we treat the
concepts nearly like ostension concepts. Water is “that thing” whatever it is. In so doing
we try to ensure that our concept is about a real thing in the world even when our
understanding of that thing is deeply flawed.6 This core purpose is reflected in the norms
of revision we maintain for the concept. Through discoveries we revise our associations
and individual conception of the concept, but we treat other members of our community
and even past people as talking about the same thing.
Many concepts, however, are not regulated by such clear ostensive purposes. The
concept good is an example. It would be a mistake to try to understand the concept by
looking at the objects first picked out when someone called them “good”. Rather, an
understanding of the concept comes from seeing that the concept isn’t an attempt to
ostend some underlying feature of the world, but rather an attempt to mark out the thing
as something that could give us reasons to pursue it. Good food is food it makes more
sense to pursue than bad food, and of course this depends as much on the interest of the
pursuer as the food itself. Often when we discover that something we thought was good is
Of course, there is no guarantee even when we use terms in this ostensive way that there will be
something real there we are pointing out, either because we are literally pointing at something that
doesn’t exist or there are surrounding flaws in our ostension. For example, a concept like water picks
out things at a certain generality, and it was certainly epistemically possible that the was nothing in
common between all the things we originally grouped together as water. But, we will tend to revise if
the is even any natural kind in the ballpark, so natural kind terms tend to be fairly sticky. This is perhaps
why it is tempting to think about them in terms of reference magnets. (Lewis 1983)
6
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different than we understood, we revise our evaluation that it was good, rather than our
core understanding of goodness itself (though of course not always). As with the more
ostensive concepts, the underlying purpose that the concept is being put to use for shapes
the norms by which we choose to make revisions to our individual conception of the
concept, and our understanding of when others are using the same concept.
The core difference between the Conceptual Design Method and merely looking
at concepts from within this broad teleosemantic view is that the design method doesn’t
solely focus on existing concepts. Concepts are representational tools and thus, like any
tool, we can produce new tools as we come to have new purposes, or we recognize
potential beneficial goals we had ignored all along. The concept of a double blind
controlled study is a recent invention, but serves a highly necessary epistemic need, and
the broadly teleosemantic view suggests that we can introduce new concepts to our
community as long as we can adequately communicate the core purpose to which the
concept is supposed to answer in such a way that even if the audience has an incomplete
understanding of the concept they can tell what kind of input would count as corrective
and thus engage in a process of refining their conception of the concept to ensure it better
serves that role. They recognize when others in the community are using the concept with
the same purpose and are thus attempting to communicate using that shared concept. To
take our double-blind example, a student might not know at first whether a certain kind of
information is blocked in a double-blind study, but if they know the purpose that doubleblinding is supposed to accomplish, its epistemic purpose, they can evaluate reasons for
why or why not studies that don’t block that information should be called double-blind.
The professor can also understand a student as using the shared concept, even when they
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make a mistake in their use, because they can see the underlying intention to use a
concept that serves the same purpose. Essentially the only limit to our conceptual design
is whether the members of the community are sensitive enough to pick up on the features
of the representational purpose the concept is meant to serve, can engage in corrective
activities to refine their conception of the resulting concept, and recognize when others
are attempting to use a concept with that purpose. This is largely why, for example,
mathematicians can get away with so many stipulative definitions. If members of the
community can recognize the purpose the concept has through the given definition, it’s
not a problem if the concept didn’t exist prior, nor that much of their deep understanding
of the concept will only exist after they have used it in proofs.
So, if we are designing epistemic concepts, what should our approach be? The
basic approach advocated here is that in the case of epistemic concepts we should design
concepts that would play important roles in the enforcement of epistemic norms and
regulation of cognitive activity in service of our epistemic ends. We have some set of
ends which it makes sense to label as epistemic ends be they truth, understanding, or
knowledge. Given the set of facts about the abilities of ourselves and the members of our
community there will be sets of norms that better and worse regulate our cognitive lives
relative to those ends. The set or sets of norms that best regulate or cognitive lives
relative to those ends are the norms we ought (at least epistemically) to let govern our
lives. The actual governing of our activities by those norms will require some set of
concepts for member of the community to represent the content of the norms and thus
follow and enforce them. The epistemic concepts thus get their content from our intention
to represent features of this normative space. For example, members of an epistemic
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community will likely need a concept to talk about when people have succeeded or failed
to live up to one or another of the norms. Justification might be an example of such a
concept, and many epistemologists have certainly thought about justification in terms of
following some set of epistemic rules. Of course, following the norms might require
being able to recognize concepts which are only indirectly connected to the fulfillment of
the norm. For example, you might need to have a concept of evidence to do what is
necessary to develop justified beliefs. The indirect concepts that still count as epistemic
like evidence will be so in part because the reason why things count as evidence or not
evidence is precisely because of the central role evidence plays in letting you represent
and follow the epistemic norms. Whereas, a concept like purple doesn’t have its content
determined because of its functional role in the enforcement and following of epistemic
norms in general7.
In sum epistemic concepts on this view are tools for enabling the expression,
following, and enforcement of epistemic norms. The conceptual design method
encourages us to approach epistemic concepts by first thinking about what purpose in the
larger normative structure this concept is supposed to serve and how best to tailor that
purpose in service of the accomplishment of our epistemic ends. The explication of the
content of a concept is thus constrained by a number of factors including (i) what our
overall epistemic ends are, (ii) what our abilities are as a group and individually to use
this concept in service of those ends, (iii) the interaction of this epistemic concept with
other concepts given its place in the overall structure of our epistemic normative theory.
This is a complex methodological picture and thus it will be best to explain it in more

7

Though of course a concept like purple might accidentally figure in a particular epistemic rule.
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detail as we go through some examples, which will be the subject of the next chapter.

43

Chapter 2: Designing a Sample Concept
1. Outline of the Chapter
When approaching broad methodological questions only so much can be said in
general about how we ought to approach issues that arise. Ultimately, much of what is
required by people following the method will be unstated or implicitly understood and
learned much more by the observation of the practice, than by the laying out of formal
rules. Scientist learn to use microscopes much more by being in the lab than by reading
the textbook. Philosophers learn the game and dialectic of their subdiscipline much more
by reading the literature and seeing what arguments get traction than by pure
consideration of the appropriate methods at a more abstract level. This is just to say one
learns much by seeing work within the method, and this chapter will attempt to provide
just such an insight into the conceptual design method advocated for here. Though being
a philosopher, I will unavoidably say some abstract things about the use of the method as
well.
This chapter will proceed broadly in two stages. First, we will go through an
outline of some characteristics of the abstract structure of the design method. We will do
this by detailing the general features that will serve as constraints in the design of
epistemic concepts. Second, we will attempt to design what seems like a straightforward
epistemic concept that of epistemic ought. In examining this concept, we will get insight
both into what extent the design method will produces concepts like those in traditional
conceptual analysis and some idea of what arguments or reasoning patterns differ
between the two approaches.
The chapter will end with a discussion of the internalism/externalism debate about

44
justification and will attempt to illustrate how approaching the issues raised in that debate
from a design mindset rather than as one of analysis of a static concept will help make it
clearer what or real epistemic import is really at issue in the debate, and may potentially
point to other sources of information than linguistic intuitions that would be useful in
resolving the interesting epistemic issue central to the debate. It can also help to reframe
some of the arguments commonly given in the literature into ones that seems more
substantive and less dependent on raw appeal to particular accidental features of our
intuitions about the terms “justification” or “knowledge.”

2. General Features of the Design Method
At the core of the design method is the idea that concepts are tools for
communicating both representational contents about our world and doing things like
making normative demands, such as requirements to revise beliefs or behaviors. These
conceptual tools get their content not simply from the way we use them, but from the
purposes that regulate our revisions of both our use of the concept and our individual
conception of the shared concept. The underlying purpose we understand a concept as
being introduced to serve is what makes sense of norms of correction that alter the uses of
the terms by novices and even experts when new discoveries or ideas arise. It also
explains the reason for altering our individual conception of whatever falls under that
concept.
However, once we recognize that concepts are tools introduced to serve particular
purposes, we can see that there is no guarantee either that (a) all the important purposes
that might generate a concept will have been invented, (b) the concepts used in or
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particular community were introduced with best or even good purposes for our projects,
or (c) that our current concepts serve a single unambiguous purpose.
So, suppose that we have an important goal that we desire to accomplish, perhaps
forming true beliefs about the world around us, given (a) there is no reason to suppose
that analyzing the concepts we have will be sufficient to give us clear conceptual tools
useful in reaching that end. We will no doubt constantly have to invent new concepts to
deal with epistemic issue that we confront over time.
Given (b), there is no reason to suppose from the outset that the particular purpose
that a concept like justification was introduced to serve will be helpful in the pursuit of
our ultimate epistemic goals when used by our community in the way that it is. For
example, it is conceivable that we introduced the concept justification simply as a marker
of when people can provide good reflectively accessible reasons for what they believe,
but if this concept is paired with a belief that unjustified beliefs must be given up, it could
demand that people, such as children, withhold beliefs in a way that might undermine
their later pursuit of the truth which is dependent on the formation of those initially
unjustified or even unjustifiable beliefs. In fact, this kind of fact about children's beliefs is
often used as a reason to accept an externalist view of justification. Within the design
method, this argument isn't merely a matter of how we are tempted to literally say the
sentence: “children have justified beliefs,” but rather the motive is directly practical. An
overly access-internalist view of justification would be bad to hold, if we understand
justification as playing a particular role in determining whether beliefs are permissible.
The access internalist view would be wrong, not because it is or isn't the concept we
have, but rather because it wouldn't be a concept of justification it would makes sense to
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use in determining what to believe.
Finally, given (c), there is no reason to suppose that any epistemic concept
currently used was introduced with a completely unambiguous purpose. For example,
numerous purposes for saying that someone knows something have been proposed by
philosophers in the last few decades. Knowers might be good informants (Craig 1990).
Knowing something might signal that you don’t need to continue to inquire about its truth
(Kvanvig 2011). Knowing might be required to justify assertion (Williamson 2000).
Perhaps only one of these is right, or perhaps more troublingly the term might have been
introduced in a context where it was assumed that all these purposes could be performed
by some single identifiable kind of mental state. But, actual investigation into our
epistemic practices might suggest that dividing these things up and thinking about them
in terms of different concepts with different standards is more useful. We certainly
shouldn’t proceed on the assumption that the seeming “Swiss-Army knife” concept of
knowledge really manages to pick out a univocal concept to refers to some clearly unified
cognitive phenomena. The suggestion of the design method is that we try to design
concepts to fit and perform these more narrow and easy to identify functions and if the
thing that comes out the other side looks like knowledge, then so much the better, but we
shouldn’t proceed on the assumption that it will, or that a hard look into our epistemic
practices might not demand the abandonment of even seemingly core epistemic concepts,
either because they are confused, or because using them undermine our real goals.
When we are thinking in general about designing a concept we can proceed in two
ways. One way is to find some narrow purpose that arises in a particular context and
invent a term to serve that particular narrow purpose. This is most likely roughly how
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most concepts are first introduced. I want to be able to refer to that stuff over in the river,
so I’ll introduce a concept to talk about it. In proceeding this way, we don’t explicitly try
to reflect on whether the purpose is really one we should have in the first place. We just
proceed on the assumption that the needs that arise in our particular contexts are
important ones, and that introducing concepts to satisfy those needs will be good. For
example, two friends at a baseball game might refer to the superfan in the third row as
“Green Guy”. They can use this concept to talk about him and when picking a concept
out to do the job, they will probably not think about whether it is worth talking about
“Green Guy” in the first place. The second way we could proceed when designing a
concept is to think about the role that the concept will have in some large project outside
of the particular needs we confront in a narrow context, and thus try to constrain the
purpose we introduce the concept to serve to fit within this larger project. For example,
we might introduce a natural kind term within the context of trying to construct a largescale scientific model of the world rather than just trying to pick out something in
everyday life, and the purpose that the concept must play within the theory might
significantly constrain what it would makes sense for use to say it picks out. When we are
thinking about concepts as epistemologists, we are clearly not trying to think about
concepts invented or used simply for narrow needs. Concepts like knowledge,
justification, evidence and rationality help to regulate all kind of cognitive behavior and
even play a crucial role in deciding whether actions are permissible such as sentencing a
person to prison because we reasonably believe he committed a crime. The role that we
want these concepts to play in the larger project of our lives is inescapable, and we ignore
the constraints that the larger project puts on our concepts at our own peril.
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If we are approaching epistemic concepts from this second mindset, then a natural
way to understand the general overall conceptual project in epistemology is as one of
designing the concepts that figure in the statement and use of the epistemic norms that are
instrumental in the achievement of what we understand as our epistemic ends. From
within this framework we can draw some general conclusions about what things ought to
constrain our designs for epistemic concepts. First, the epistemic concepts we should
design will be one that figure in statement of the epistemic norms we ought to follow.
This gives us a few broad constraints:
Some Constraints on Epistemic Concepts
1) Expression: Good epistemic concepts help us express and spread the appropriate
epistemic norms with minimal ambiguity.
2) Enforcement: Some good epistemic concepts will help guide us in the
enforcement and following of the appropriate norms.

Of course, what the appropriate norms are will thus be a constraint on the proper
expression and enforcement of the norms. Thus, things relevant for determining the
nature of the appropriate epistemic norms will in turn serve to constrain the concepts we
should design and use. If we adopt the seemingly obvious teleological picture of
epistemic norms, then we end up with at least these broad constraints on epistemic norms.
Some Constraints on Epistemic Norms
1) Teleos: the following of the epistemic norms helps us best (or at least satisfactory)
pursue our epistemic ends.
2) Implementable: the epistemic norms are something that we as cognitive agents in
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a community and environment like ours could actually follow.

There will no doubt be feedback and some sort of equilibrium between these
constraints. What norms creatures like us can implement in our communities is also to
some degree a function of what norms we can understand spread and enforce. This means
that we can’t really approach the question about what norms are the right ones completely
independently from the questions of what concepts figure in the expression and
enforcement of the norms. Thus, theorizing about the concepts and the norms should
happen more or less simultaneously. We can think about this by discussing the wider
epistemic theory that concepts and norms form parts of. At its core, epistemology is a
theory of a set of norms and the appropriate epistemic concepts are those that best allow
for the use and expression of that theory. So what general sources of information should
constrain the theory?
Some Information Relevant to Epistemic Theory
1) Cognitive Abilities: Facts about the epistemic agents and their effectiveness and
ability to use different potential norms
2) Environmental Facts: Facts about the likely environments of the agents and its
effects on the likely consequences of the epistemic agents using the norms.
3) Social Facts: Facts about how interaction between the epistemic agents influences
their ability to follow, spread, and effectively use different potential norms
4) The Agent’s Interests: The epistemic interests of the agents often modified by
practical concerns about what information or epistemic goods are most relevant to
their situation.
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If all this information is relevant, as it seems it must if we want our theory to
capture what norms epistemic agents should be using, then it is fairly clear that
epistemology can’t be a purely a priori discipline. I’m never going to figure out what
cognitive abilities humans actually possess just sitting in my armchair, nor will I be able
to deduce the iterated social consequences of adopting and enforcing certain norms.
All of that being said, we can at least potentially make some progress from the
armchair in determining whether or how particular arguments and evidence might be
relevant to answering different question. For example, it is obvious from the armchair8
that the agent’s cognitive abilities matter to answering the core epistemic question. The
remainder of the chapter will approach those design issues that we can hope to make
some progress on from the armchair and will mostly relegate itself to pointing out what
lines of thought and argument would be relevant to answering sets of questions about the
norms, but remaining, so far as possible, silent on details that could only be gotten from
empirical investigation in to complex psychological and sociological questions that
would require much deeper study. We will begin doing this by trying to narrow our scope
to a more concrete example.

3. Designing Epistemic Ought
A core issue that would seem to be of concern in any epistemological theory is
how we ought to or would best go about forming our beliefs about the world. It’s very

I don’t mean to imply here that this kind of knowledge is what most philosopher would call a priori nor
even the opposite. Just that I clearly don’t need much, if any, empirical evidence to reach these kinds of
conclusions about what information is relevant to assessing whether the norms are good or bad.
8
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natural to think of beliefs as having a kind of goal directed nature and to think of that goal
in terms of a simple account of epistemic value. Good beliefs are those that accurately
model the world. Bad beliefs are those that don’t accurately model the world.
Epistemology (or at least a large part of it) is simply the study of these norms and the
concepts derived from or emerging from the project of pursuing an accurate or true view
of reality. For convenience I will call this account of the core epistemological project:
(PT) or Pursuing Truth:
Pursuing Truth (PT): the view that epistemic norms are the norms that arise from
the project of pursuing a true or accurate model of the world.

(PT) is perhaps the simplest picture of epistemology in which the Design Method
seems most at home, and if (PT) is a good model of a core epistemic project, then the
methods endorsed by the Design Method seem easily justifiable. Despite (PT)’s apparent
obviousness, there are undoubtedly some problems with developing the concept of
“epistemic ought” using this this simple picture. In examining the problems for this
picture, we can begin to evaluate both some potential problems that might arise for the
use of the Design Method in this context and begin to layout some lines of reasoning that
may allow for the resolution of the various problems. To help us to elucidate these
potential problems, we will divide the (PT) picture of the epistemological project into two
parts. First, (PT) holds that epistemology is an attempt to understand a goal driven
enterprise, and holds that the norms and concepts are in some sense derivative of these
goals and the means of achieving them. We will label any epistemology that endorses this
first feature: (TE) for Teleological Epistemology:
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Teleological Epistemology (TE): guiding epistemic norms and concepts have the
content they do because of their use in or relationship to pursuing some end.

Second, (PT) claims that epistemology ought to only recognize accuracy or truth
as being of epistemic value or as being the epistemic goal. I will label any epistemology
that endorses this second feature: (VE) for Veridic Epistemology.
Veridic Epistemology (VE): only true beliefs or an accurate model is of ultimate or
final epistemic value.

One can object to (TE) by pointing out cases where it looks as though we
epistemically ought to believe things that fail to achieve our epistemic goals.
Philosophers also often object to (VE) by pointing out how merely believing something
which corresponds with reality doesn’t seem sufficient to make such a belief justified or
the thing one ought to believe. They also object because (VE) seems to ignore other
important epistemic goals such as understanding (Kvanvig 2009). In this chapter we will
begin or design project by assuming a simple version of (TE) and (VE), and will then try
to outline how a core epistemic concept would fall out of those assumptions. We will
consider how the norms and concepts derived in this way seems to be subject to the two
sorts of objections I mentioned above. In responding to these worries some modifications
of our simple understanding of (PT) will seem to reasonably follow, which will help to
avoid these issues. In particular, many of the objections to epistemological pictures like
(PT) that endorse (TE) and (VE) can be avoided by considering how an epistemic agent
as an information processing system, which unavoidably must treat all inputs at some
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level of generality, has to go about implementing processes for deciding what to believe.
However, even these modifications can’t protect (VE) from objections that it is
incomplete as a goal for the epistemic project. This is no threat to the larger Design
Method as long as some means exists for picking out the larger set of purposes which we
must answer to. The need for a means of determining what things can reasonably be
thought to be appropriate epistemic ends besides truth will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 4.

3.1 Simple Truth Consequentialism
The (PT) picture holds that epistemic norms and concepts are derivative of
epistemic goals. Unfortunately. “derivative” here cannot mean deducible and, as such, is
far too vague for our purposes. In order to sharpen up the view we can consider a simple
hypothesis: the epistemic norm of belief, the norm that directs us in how to revise our
beliefs, is derivative of epistemic goals in the same way that moral action guiding norms
are derivative from the good according to simple versions of consequentialism. We can
call this (EC) or epistemic consequentialism:
Epistemic Consequentialism (EC): An agent, A, ought to believe p iff A’s
believing p will maximize the net epistemic good for A.9

If this view is combined with a simple version of (VE) or which interprets the final goal

This is technically a form of egoism rather than consequentialism, since A is only concerned with her
epistemic good, rather than the epistemic good of all agents. Consequentialism in ethics is agent neutral.
(EC) is agent relative. But I don’t want to further burden (EC) with possible objections about revising our
beliefs because of the consequence of our beliefs on other agents. I think the best epistemic theory will be
more agent-neutral, but such a thesis has intuitive problems that would only cloud the presentation at this
point.
9
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in terms of true beliefs10, then we will arrive at (STC) or Simple Truth Consequentialism:
Simple Truth Consequentialism (STC): An agent, A, ought to believe p iff A’s
believing p will maximize the number of true beliefs while minimizing the
number of false beliefs had by A.

Before we proceed to the objections, which will be the main focus of this section,
I want to briefly address a worry that might occur to the reader given this formulation of
(STC). In so far as this is formulated in terms of “ought” and “ought” is a guiding or
deontological concept, it might seem as though (STC) is committed to doxastic
voluntarism. I am sympathetic to the idea that it is unlikely that doxastic voluntarism is
true, but I don’t think that we need to understand the ought claim in (STC) as requiring it.
It is fairly normal to talk about how someone shouldn’t have done something even though
the particular action wasn’t under direct voluntary control. A man with shaky hands
might perform a surgery and damage a person’s internal organs. It makes sense to say he
shouldn’t have damaged the person’s organs even though he had no direct voluntary
control over the direct cause of the damage. The shaking might not be under his control,
but performing the surgery is. Normative requirements might not entail direct control, but
only indirect control over the outcome. I take it that a common assumption by most
epistemologists, myself included, is that there are things we do have control over that can

I chose truth, rather than accuracy, as the good because it makes the initial presentation of the view
simpler. The more subtle and flexible notion of accuracy might solve some problems for (STC), but not the
particular worries we consider here. Thinking in terms of accurate models rather than set of true
propositions can be helpful, for example, in avoiding oddities that arise from questions about the counting
of numbers of true beliefs, and potentially deal with the fact that having false beliefs can be bad to varying
degrees. In some sense, if I believe John owns a Ford truck when he actually owns a Toyota truck is a better
false belief to have than to think he owns a bike, and specifying that in terms of other related propositions
true propositions the two false beliefs entail can drag one into ugly waters of proposition counting.
10
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improve how we go about forming beliefs, which will end up changing what we believe
in spite of the fact that we cannot merely will ourselves to believe various propositions.
Even if the actual semantics of “ought” doesn’t work in the way I’ve suggested, we could
define a new term “ought*”, where this just means that there is some requirement that we
take the indirect means at our disposal to ensure a certain outcome. Readers who are
especially worried by voluntarism issues by may just replace “ought” with “ought*” in
my formulations.
Now, that we have set the previous point aside, let’s consider the first of two
obvious problems with (STC). Suppose that there is a woman, Eva, with excellent
cognitive abilities. Eva has excellent vision, memory, and reasoning capabilities. Eva
goes shopping and receives some change from a cashier. She notices that one of the coins
she receives as change is a quarter. Eva also quickly inspects her pocket and notices that
it is intact and has no holes or places for a coin to naturally slip out. She places the
quarter in her pocket. Five minutes pass, and she sees and feels nothing suspicious
happening to her pocket. She clearly remembers putting the quarter in her pocket and
continues to believe that there is a quarter in her pocket. However, during this five minute
period, a mad scientist uses a teleportation device to remove the quarter from her pocket,
so Eva’s belief is false. This looks like a case in which Eva ought to believe that there is a
quarter in her pocket, and yet Eva would have more true beliefs and less false beliefs if
she were to believe that the quarter isn’t in her pocket. In fact (STC) implies that the very
second that the coin is teleported Eva ought to change her belief, but it looks like doing
so in her circumstances would simply be crazy. Eva has no evidence that the quarter has
moved.

56
Eva’s case seems to violate (STC) in one direction. Eva ought to believe
something which doesn’t maximize her stock of true beliefs. Our second case will
provide a problem for (STC) in the other direction. Suppose that there is a man, Randle,
who lives on the top floor of a 30-story apartment. Randle is an odd fellow. He is very
paranoid about fires. Sometimes, due to a random bout of paranoia, he forms the belief
that there is a fire in the basement of his building and runs down the fire escape. One day
Randle randomly forms such a belief, but, in fact, there is a fire in the basement.
However, this fire just started. Alarms haven’t been triggered, and Randle can’t see
flames or smell smoke. Randle’s belief is true, and his believing it increases his stock of
true beliefs without adding to his false beliefs. Thus, (STC) implies that Randle believes
how he ought to believe. But, believing in the existence of a fire in Randle’s
circumstances is just as crazy as believing it in cases where there is no fire in the
basement. Believing things on the basis of random hunches seems like something that
obviously something no epistemology should endorse.
A defender of (STC) might quibble with whether people have the intuitive
judgments I’m suggesting to these cases, or claim that intuitions like these don’t count as
evidence against the view. In fact, the reader might expect that I would dismiss these
intuitive judgments with a statement like “these may be common intuitions, but we are
concerned with the concepts that track and serve our purposes”. In the previous chapter, I
talked extensively about how we want to tailor and design the best norms and concepts,
not just the intuitive ones. This, however, seems to be a clear case where there is
something right about our intuitions. Though intuitions are not always evidence, since
they can easily come apart from our purposes for a myriad of reasons such as cultural
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bias or our incomplete understanding of an issue, there is no reason why our intuitive
responses and the underlying purposes that our concepts serve must come apart. In fact, it
is quite plausible that we develop some at least subconscious understanding of the roles
that concepts play in regulating our practice, and thus intuitive or automatic judgments
about case such as these could easily reflect our cumulative experience with how we have
to govern our epistemic activities and thus provide at least prima facie grounds for
doubting the adequacy of a theory that goes against them. At minimum, thought
experiments can be a very useful heuristic device to get us to see what issues are at play
in various possible situations. I believe that these thought experiments actually reveal
something important about the relationship of our norms and the fulfillment of our
purposes, and I hope to spell out what deeper problems for (STC) these stories reveal in a
way that isn’t dependent on just taking our intuitive responses as evidence without further
argument.
Before spelling out what the core problem with (STC) is that these cases reveal, it
is useful to consider an alternative explanation to the one I will ultimately endorse, since
this alternative explanation will no doubt occur to the reader. Perhaps the most natural
response to these cases would be to suppose that they supported either some kind of
epistemic internalism or some kind of evidentialism. How things seem from the inside, or
how the evidence weighs in these cases diverges from what’s true, and our inclination
seems to be to side with the predictions of a more evidentialist or internalist theory
against the predictions of (STC). Perhaps (STC) fails because truth is too external to our
perspective, and only an epistemology which takes the epistemic perspective of the agent
seriously can capture the nature of how we ought to conduct our cognitive lives.

58
This response to the case could be problematic for a defender of (PT). Suppose
that the defender did appeal to a notion of evidence to resolve the problem raised by these
cases. In order to remain true to the core of (PT), the notion of evidence would have to be
a concept that the method could have something to say about. This means that the notion
of evidence must be derivative from the pursuit of truth in some way according to (PT).
This might not be problematic, since some epistemologists do try to define certain
notions of evidence in terms of truth indication. But, even if the notion of evidence is
somehow defined in terms of or derivative from an aim at the truth, the defender of (PT)
has to explain why this particular truth aiming notion gets to override the actual obtaining
of true beliefs. Why follow the evidence instead of believing what is in fact true? To the
extent that getting at the truth and this notion of evidence separate, the defender of (PT)
can perhaps rightly be accused of bringing some other unnamed constraint to bear in
determining the appropriate epistemic norms. This would make (PT) incomplete as
epistemic theory without an account of this extra constraint. For this reason, a defender of
(PT) should look to ideas outside of evidence for the problem with (STC), at least if they
hope for a solution that is friendly the teleological approach. Even if the final theory turns
out to be evidentialist, evidentialism by itself doesn’t explain why evidence is relevant to
the pursuit of truth, and it is this latter question that the defender of (PT) must ultimately
address.
(PT) is concerned with the pursuit of truth, not just the accurate models
themselves. The trouble with (STC) from the design perspective is that, in its derivation
of the norms for belief, it focuses only on whether the truth is reached, and not at all on
the nature of the system engaging in a pursuit and how its nature constrains its capacity to
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pursue the truth in various ways. We need to be concerned not just with having true
beliefs, but with the practical question of how an epistemic agent can pursue those truths.
These are core ineliminable questions from a design perspective. Demanding that we
somehow believe the truth, with no method for distinguishing the true from the false, is to
ignore the heart of the design project. Although our goals partly dictate the structure of
our pursuits, our pursuits are also restricted by facts about our limits and what means we
can implement in pursuit of those goals.
In order to make this important distinction clear, let’s consider an example case of
a goal directed activity which clearly fits the (PT) model. Suppose there was a
competition of the following sort. Suppose a group of engineers were each given a small
mobile robot with an onboard camera sensor and a computer for processing its input and
modeling a space. The engineers are told that the goal of the contest is to program the
robot to accurately model the contents of a room that it is about to be placed in. The room
will contain wooden blocks of various shapes and colors and the robots will be judged
based on whether they correctly model the shape and color properties of the blocks and
their location in the room. Unfortunately for all the engineers, a few blocks in the room
are sealed inside boxes that the robots cannot open. Even without this obstacle, the task is
quite difficult, but as the competition proceeds some of the engineers manage to make
robots that accurately model every block except the ones in the boxes.
As the competition draws to a close there are only two engineers remaining: Ms.
List and Mr. Guess. Both engineers employ unconventional approaches. Ms. List enters
the room prior to the competition briefly opens the boxes and records the properties of
those blocks. Ms. List “programs” her robot by inputting the list of the various blocks’

60
properties directly into her robot. The robot never uses its camera or moves about the
room. It simply determines its final map based on the preprogrammed list.
Mr. Guess has learned prior to the competition that there were a few possible
arrangements of blocks that the designer of the robot course was considering using. Mr.
Guess programs these possibilities into his robot’s computer and decides to have a
random number generator run to determine which possible arrangement will be the
robot’s final model. Luckily, Mr. Guess’s robot picks the correct possibility for it final
model of the room.
Judging strictly by the goals of the competition we might be inclined to think that
Ms. List and Mr. Guess ought to win. Their robots were the only robots with a complete
and accurate model of the room. But, it’s also clear that if what we were looking for was
a system that could be generally implemented in varying situation and manage to
successfully model its environment, Ms. List and Mr. Guess have failed. It’s only by
using means unavailable to the robot alone that Ms. List managed to produce a complete
model. Mr. Guess’s robot “produced” a complete model of the room in the same way that
throwing a cat on a piano’s keys might produce Beethoven’s Ode to Joy. Although in
both cases the structure of the robot’s programing caused it to have an accurate model,
these structures aren’t the kinds of things that the robot could implement on its own and
expect success or expect to succeed in repeated use in future environments. Engineers
concerned with producing successful room-modelers should reject Ms. List’s and Mr.
Guess’s strategies, and we, as self-engineers, concerned with making ourselves into good
world modelers should take the same advice. We don’t have a list of the truths imprinted
on our minds and we can’t possibly count on luck to guide us to the truth. When asking
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the question “how should I run my future cognitive endeavors with the goal of getting to
the truth”, it is no answer to say I should believe the things on the list of truths or I should
lucky stumble my way to truth. To demand either strategy, is to demand miraculous
intervention or miraculous luck.

3.2 Formulating a Better Theory
So far, I have suggested that the means for improving (STC) is to recognize the
role that the practical ability to implement a means of determining the truth plays in our
actual epistemic task. But, the structure of a view which respects this issue remains
vague. To further our project, let’s consider a simple extension off of (STC),
Implementable Truth Consequentialism:
(ITC) An agent, A, ought to believe p iff:
(i) A has implemented some means, M, in order to determine whether p,
which indicated that p is true, and
(ii) A’s believing p will maximize the number of true beliefs while
minimizing the number of false beliefs had by A.
Unfortunately, this modification alone won’t solve the problem. To see this just
consider the cases of Eva and Randle again. Eva has implemented some means to believe
that the coin is in her pocket, but now that belief is false, so using this means in her
current circumstances won’t maximize the number of true beliefs she has. This theory
still implies that Eva shouldn’t believe that there is a coin in her pocket when it
disappears. In Randle’s case, he does implement a means. His means is paranoia, but it is
a means of coming to a belief, and his belief is still true, so (ITC) also implies Randle
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was doing what he ought to. Clearly the problem isn’t that Eva or Randle aren’t running
their cognitive lives, the problem is that these are unusual one-off cases that are
exceptions to normal patterns. In that spirit we can make the following modification to
produce Systematically Implementable Truth Consequentialism:
(SITC) An agent, A, ought to believe p iff:
(i) A has implemented some means, M, in order to determine whether p,
which determined that p is true, and
(ii) A’s implementing M is part of a larger systematic means of forming
beliefs, S, that A is implementing, and
(iii) The implementation of S will produce more true beliefs and less false
beliefs than other general systems available to A.
It may not be obvious at first glance, but (SITC) get the cases of Eva and Randle
correct. It’s likely that Eva’s systematic reliance on the usual kind of assumptions about
object persistence and movement generally get her true beliefs when systematically
applied. It’s also unlikely that Eva can currently implement another systematic strategy
which will generally perform better. Constantly checking her pocket (or for the presence
or absence of a myriad other things) would be too cognitively consuming. Since objects
rarely teleport, this is mostly wasted cognitive effort that could go towards pursuing other
truths. It’s also unlikely that Eva has an implementable means of determining when
teleportation cases would occur and thus lacks a means of determining when frequent
checking would be less wasteful. It’s also clear that Randle’s single success in predicting
a fire doesn’t make up for the false beliefs that are generated by his tendency to be
paranoid in cases where he isn’t so lucky. It’s also clear that Randle has no general
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implementable means for determining when his paranoia may be truth indicative or not
and thus he has no systematic way of utilizing his fears to get more true beliefs than other
more natural means of forming beliefs.

3.3 Implementation and Enforcement as Motivation for Systematicity
At this point the motivation for moving from (STC) to (SITC) has been fairly
vague and has relied primarily on the intuitive responses to the Eva and Randle cases
along with a set of intuitive ideas motivated by the example of the robot competition.
But, it is reasonable to ask why, when designing a concept of epistemic ought, the kind of
considerations prompted by these intuitive cases are really one we should heed from
within the design perspective.
It is useful to begin with a concept like that of epistemic ought because, although
it seems like one that should be transparent on its face, once we look at things from
within the Design Method it’s clear that we should have asked some important questions
about the role that the concept was supposed to play in regulating our practices at the
very start. These questions about concepts like ought are often ignored because they
either seem so obvious or so basic that they need not be questioned or expressed.
However, it is far from obvious what exactly saying someone ought to believe something
or ought not to believe something plays in our epistemic community, nor is it completely
clear that the role that asking this question plays is identical when I am asking this
question about one of my own beliefs rather than asking it about some about member of
my community. This is especially true if I happen to have information about the
reliability or unreliability of methods of belief formation that they lack.
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Rather than beginning with our natural intuitions about epistemic ought let's
instead begin by thinking about what conceptual jobs I would need concepts to perform if
I am to engage in an active pursuit of the truth. We can then see whether something like
our notion of ought fits one of those roles. To have true beliefs I will have to go about
forming beliefs. This means that I will have to have some methods for deciding what to
believe about particular questions, for example, whether to believe P or ~P. It will make
sense to introduce a bunch of relevant concepts right here. Some of the methods I use will
be reliable, some will not. Some methods will be safe, some will be sensitive. But, even
after I introduce all these concepts for evaluating the relationship between the method
and the truth, there is obviously a kind of question that I need an answer to if I am
actually going to form any beliefs at all. Should I use the method or not. Take all the
purely evaluate concepts, there is clearly still a kind of question about guidance. Believe
what this method says or believe what this one does. Any determination of which method
to use can be conceptualized as an answer to the question: “What should I believe?” Any
pursuit needs answers to guidance questions and, should, ought, permissible and the like
serve this kind of guidance role.
So far of course, I've said nothing especially new or controversial. Ought and
other deontic concepts are guiding concepts. They have a certain kind of active character
in shaping what we do and believe that is more direct than other normative concepts. One
very tempting thought is that since any agent can only ever end up taking one attitude
towards a proposition at any time, were we to design an epistemic guiding concept we
would want to make sure that it always delivered a single verdict at any one time. At the
end of the day, all things considered, there is something you should believe and
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something you shouldn't, given the facts about your present circumstances. But, I think
this line of thought, though very tempting, is mistaken because it abstracts too far away
from the use that any actual concept will have to be used when serving its guiding
purpose. The application of a concept to a particular question about whether to from
belief A or B will have to be performed by some cognitive process, and it might make
sense from a design perspective for different processes to give different guidance about
what belief should be formed.
This last point is very abstract, so it would be useful to go through an example.
Suppose again that I am designing robots to go about modeling a room containing
colored objects of various geometrical shapes, but suppose the robots can't move, but can
communicate and coordinate with their fellow robots that are at other locations in the
room. The designer of the robots, in order to try and get as good a model of the room as
possible from the robot team must consider two very different guidance questions. The
first question is one of what method the individual robots should use when separating out
objects from the background and determining what possible shapes are consistent with
the available camera data. Whatever method the designer picks can be conceptualized in
some way as an answer to something like the question: “what should the robot think the
shape is?” But, also the designer has to think about the method of coordinating
information. One robot may communicate to another that shape A could be either a
sphere, a disk, or a cylinder from its vantage point. The other robot may “know” from its
perspective that it can't be a disk or sphere and thus communicate back that the shape is a
cylinder. This is also, in some sense, an answer to the question: “what should the robot
think the shape is?” But, the guidance involved in the “advising” process vs. the initial
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internal process of determining what shapes were possible is very different. The advising
function of the second robot can't just be asking the question “Did robot 1 do the best it
could with the information it had?” It couldn't do its advising role properly if it answered
the question of what to believe by thinking only about what conclusions are warranted
from robot 1's perspective. Internal and external guidance are very different, and there is
no reason to think there should be some single univocal or non-contextually varying
guidance concept that does all the work one would need. What guidance on a belief
question should be given depends on what system of epistemic processes you pose the
question to, and there is no reason to think that different optimally running system
couldn't or shouldn't give different answers, or that we shouldn't try to conceptualize the
differences in those answers in terms of different guidance concepts.
It is at this point that we can get a better feel for why something like (SITC)
should seems so appealing from the design perspective. A conceptual tool like “ought”
can only do epistemic work in guiding our pursuit of the truth by being used either
explicitly or implicitly in the operation of some cognitive process. The only reason to
have come up with such a guiding concept at all would be so it could be used and applied
by such a cognitive process, and it only makes sense as a form of guidance if that process
is part of a large system in which the process making use of the guiding concept can weld
it in the modulation of the processes used in forming beliefs.
We can also recognize motivation for putting the concept at the level of the
operation of systems rather than more directly at the level of the utilization of individual
processes because many epistemic processes are fairly fixed and automatic. This means
that any applicability for the application of a highly intellectual guiding concept like that
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of epistemic ought or related concepts like justification or rationality, will to some degree
have to happen only at the level of higher order modulating processes. I can't really
control whether my visual system suffers certain illusions or that certain lines of
reasoning are natural, but conscious reflection on whether my beliefs are justified can
help in modulating our use of the more fixed lower level processes.

3.4 Implementation and Enforcement in Debates about Internalism
It is very natural to make argumentative moves from the kinds of guidance
considerations raised in the previous section to certain conclusions about the internalism
and externalism debate about justification. For instance, in our robot example it is very
natural to say something like “however the robot's function for determining it model
works, the processes have to operate on inputs that have made it into the robots system.”
So, when we are evaluating how the robot is doing with respect to having some kind of
optimal guidance of its world modeling processes, our evaluations must supervene on
things internal to the robot. Wouldn't supposing otherwise be to suppose that the robot
used some means not at its disposal?
I think this temptation is strong, but one thing that was hopefully clear in the
previous section is that the evaluation of guiding processes can occur from many different
perspectives, and we can have many different purposes in mind when we are making
evaluations of a process or belief. One of the problems in debates about justification is
that it is far from obvious that there is a concept with a single clear normative purpose
that is “justification”. The concept is supposed to play numerous different roles. Much of
the mid-twentieth century literature talked about justification mainly in terms of a
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condition on knowledge. It was something that was supposed to be a constitutive part of
pursuing something that is often thought to be the epistemic end. But, it has also from
time to time been thought of in terms of a quite literally having or producing an explicit
justification. It has also sometime been discussed as a version of epistemic permissibility.
Justified beliefs are ones we need not give up. It has also sometimes been thought of in
terms of securing some kind of truth connection. Justified beliefs are reliable, more likely
to be true, or provide some modal connection to the truth. No doubt each of these
concepts might be fine on its own, but it is clearly a substantive question as to whether
some single evaluative concept could or should play all these roles.
People have often argued against the concept of justification as the capacity to
give explicit justifications for beliefs on the grounds that it doesn't seem like that is
something that is needed for knowledge, or by pointing out that we wouldn't demand a
child give up their belief if they couldn't give such as justification for their belief. When
people argue in this way they are implicitly making some set of assumptions about the
guidance role of justification or its connection to truth or knowledge. The idea that only
people who can actually give a justification for their belief are justified seems like a
perfectly acceptable concept that one might want. Trouble only arises when one begins to
draw connections between that notion of justification and other normative demands. The
explicit giving of justification version of the concept can't be the one we use as a notion
of epistemic permissibility, not because (or not simply because) it doesn't fit with some
set of linguistic intuitions about how we apply the word “justified”, but quite clearly
because running our epistemic activities using that the overly intellectualized version of
justification as the concept of epistemic permissibility would be disastrous. We would
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end up constantly making demands that children believe nothing, and that would clearly
hurt their ability to pursue the truth in the long run.
This example highlights the fact that, if one is going to argue for a particular
account of justification, and thus some position with respect to the
internalism/externalism debate, it is absolutely critical that one make it as clear as
possible what one thinks the normative purposes that the concept of justification they are
talking about is supposed to serve. If, for example, we think of justification initially as
one of the conditions on knowledge and think of knowledge as something kind of special
connection to the truth, then it can be very natural to what to construe the concept of
justification in a very externalist friendly way. There is no doubt a lot of value in figuring
out different valuable and interesting ways that a belief might be related to the truth, but
we shouldn't expect that any one of them necessarily coincides with a view of
justification which is more tied to questions of internal guidance.
Beyond forcing us to think much more carefully about the very specific normative
function that concepts like justification should be thought of as playing, which is
something that many epistemologists have already begun doing with the proliferation of
justification adjacent concepts like warrant or entitlement, the design method also opens
up a new source of potential constraints to use when we are thinking about these
concepts. All of these concepts are ones we are hopeful introducing because their use will
have certain beneficial effects. One thing to consider, for example, is whether in deciding
what to believe they might perform better or worse when they conceptualize the question
more in terms of a more externalist view or a more internalist view. In other words which
concept when actually employed in the various regulative uses we can imagine actually
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does a better job at delivering the epistemic goods. To the extent that I think both
internalists and externalists must concede that the opponents concepts exist, much of the
debate seems really to be a question of what notion of justification has a certain kind of
normative authority, and what better way to try and answer this question than by literally
seeing the effects of the use of the different concepts in practice.

4. Conclusion
Although we have mostly only looked at the concept of epistemic ought, with a
small diversion to a discussion of justification, I hope it is clear that we should think that
there are a large number of regulative roles for epistemic concepts. For example, we
might have some reason to have an epistemic concept to discuss or use in monitoring and
modifying our beliefs and methods of belief formation and another for advising others.
This will make any attempt to design our epistemic concepts quite difficult as we are
forced to make deep and consider choices about what subtly different regulative purposes
it might be wise to collapse into a single imperfect concept and what things we might
want to separate. Questions surrounding how effective differing concepts will be as
playing a regulative rule in adjusting our epistemic activities will also quite clearly be a
difficult question requiring information from all kinds of sources from logic to
psychology to sociology. However, thinking much more careful about the roles that the
concepts play in our practice and more careful testing or observing the consequences of
using concepts of various sorts in different regulative roles opens up an incredible space
for potential improvements in our epistemic conceptual scheme. These improvements
would be impossible if we don't take quite seriously the idea that what earns an epistemic
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concept a place in our practice is that it is well designed to serve some clear and
identifiable purpose.
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Chapter 3: Defending Epistemic Teleology
1. The Teleological Assumptions of Design
As we have discussed in the previous chapters, the methodology proposed here
understands epistemic concepts as those involved in the expression and use of the set of
norms that we could best implement to satisfy our epistemic ends. This approach frames
our epistemic practices as a goal directed activity and our concepts as tools we use in the
pursuit of those aims. This makes the application of the Design Method to epistemic
concepts proposed here explicitly committed to some form of epistemic teleology. As
such, it is important to consider objections and concerns that have recently been raised
for the teleological conception of epistemology. One especially sharp version of a
criticism of teleology in epistemology has been raised by Selim Berker. Berker holds that
teleological views in epistemology, ones that hold that the epistemic good is prior to the
right, will end up endorsing strange and unacceptable trade-offs between beliefs.
In this chapter, we will examine Berker’s reasoning in more detail and attempt to
use it to reconstruct as powerful an argument against the methods suggested here as
possible. Two main objections will then be raised to Berker’s argument. The first will
note that the types of trade-offs that Berker finds so strange should be part of any
complete epistemic theory. In fact, we often implicitly reason through trade-offs of the
sort he worries about in contexts where they don’t appear as alien to epistemology. The
second will raise the issue of how Berker’s argument implicitly assumes that rationality
and epistemic ought have the same extension, and will attempt to illustrate how having a
concept of rationality distinct from epistemic ought that avoids the worrying trade-offs
could be a necessary tool in the furthering of our epistemic ends, and thus is consistent
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with the view that ultimately epistemic value is prior to epistemic concepts like
rationality and justification.
Given that Berker’s argument is only one of a possible number of anti-teleological
arguments, the chapter will conclude with an attempt to formulate a general argument for
why any plausible answer to the question about the priority and relationship between the
epistemic good and the epistemic right won’t threaten the method proposed here. I will
argue that no plausible account of epistemic ought will hold that an agent should forgo
following a system of norms that best gets them at the truth (or some close analog like
knowledge or understanding), and that any temptation we have to deny this claim is
either ultimately explainable in teleological terms or will appear arbitrary from the
epistemic perspective.

2. The Separateness of Propositions: An Argument Against Teleology
To begin, let’s discuss Berker’s conception of what it takes for a theory to be
teleological rather than non-teleological. Two promising possibilities that Berker
considers, but ultimately rejects are that (i) teleological accounts are consequentialist, and
(ii) teleological accounts are accounts that prioritize the good over the right. Berker
worries that defining teleological accounts in terms of consequentialism could cause two
confusions. First, when we talk about epistemic consequentialism someone might
mistakenly take that to refer to the idea that beliefs ought to be formed to maximize moral
value. In other words, beliefs should aim at the same kind of goods as actions. Any
plausible version of an epistemic teleology will have epistemic rather than moral or
practical value as its aim. Second, he worries that many philosophers understand
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consequentialism as defined in terms of value maximization. Nothing about taking a
teleological approach commits one to a maximizing conception of the epistemic deontic
concepts.
The notion that teleological accounts put the good prior to the right is mostly
correct, according to Berker, but he thinks it is incomplete and doesn’t give us the full
picture of how teleological accounts see the relationship between value and deontic
concepts.
What is distinctive about the teleological perspective is not just its taking
value to be fundamental, but moreover its attitude toward the nature of
value and how we should respond to it. According to the teleologist, the
proper response to value is to bring it about, and the proper response to
disvalue is to stop it from being brought about: in short, for the teleologist
all value is “to be promoted,” and all disvalue is “to be prevented”
(Berker, 2013, 344)
To be a teleologist isn’t just to see goodness as fundamental, but to see any deontic
question as settled ultimately in terms of the promotion of the good and prevention of the
bad.
According to Berker, it is in its attempt to promote possibly conflicting values that
the potential trouble for a teleological account of epistemic notions like rationality and
justification might arise. When we think about teleological ethical theories, like
utilitarianism, it is well understood that the theory will often demand that we make
certain sacrifices in order to promote greater value. The utilitarian may demand that we
sacrifice one person to save five, or that we forgo some present good in favor of
protecting a greater future good. The utilitarian makes comparisons in values between
people and across time in order to resolve conflicts and determine what actions are
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ultimately required in the name of promoting the most good. This is both a strength and
weakness of the position. The ability to make comparisons lets the position give clear
guidance as to what is required, and it guarantees that the view won’t endorse actions that
lead to disaster just because they happen to involve some sacrifice. But, these kinds of
trade-offs have been one of the most common sources of potential counterexamples to
utilitarianism. This is done perhaps most famously in Williams’ piece in Utilitarianism:
For and Against (1973) arguing that utilitarians demand we sacrifice our individual moral
integrity to promote the good.
Berker leaves it open whether the potential problems due to trade-offs in
teleological views in ethics are too problematic to solve, but he argues that having
epistemic concepts that endorse analogous trade-offs is clearly and universally
unacceptable to epistemologists. Berker initially illustrates this with an example derived
from Firth (1998) and Fumerton (2001). Suppose we have a very simple account of
epistemic value, veritism. The only thing of value is true belief and the only thing of
disvalue is false beliefs. Suppose that we decided to define justification directly in terms
of the promotion of these values. So, I should form whatever beliefs and use whatever
methods will lead me to end up with the most true beliefs and least false beliefs. Now
imagine that I am a scientist who has evaluated all the available evidence and am
rationally convinced that God does not exist, but recently a religious organization has
offered a large research grant. I know that, if I get that grant, I can do research that will
lead me to form many new true beliefs and get rid of many false beliefs. I’m an awful
liar, so I can only convince the organization to give me the grant if I manage to actually
believe in God. One thing that seems true is that I am not justified in my belief in God in
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this situation. It may be practically rational for me to acquire the belief, but no
epistemologist would say that I was epistemically rational in forming this belief.
So, where is the trouble arising in this case? Berker identifies the source of the
problem as a failure of the simple veritistic account to treat propositions as separate. No
amount of future true beliefs I might form by believing this proposition can affect the
evidence I have for this proposition. When we are concerned with the justification of a
belief in a proposition we isolate the proposition and consider only what things indicate
whether it is true, not what effects it has on my other beliefs. Berker sees this problem as
analogous to the problem of the separateness of persons that has often been raised as a
worry for consequentialist theories in ethics. As such, we might ask whether the kinds of
moves made in ethics in defense of consequentialism would work in defense of veritism.
For example, consequentialists have often made value relative to agents or times in order
to get out of puzzling counterexamples. (Parfit 1984) Perhaps the epistemologist can say
that justification aims at promoting the number of truths I believe now rather than at all
times in the future. Maybe the veritist could restrict the means by which justification says
we can promote true belief to not include causal promotion, so that the causal effects of
believing in God on getting the grant will be irrelevant. But, without saying more about
why now matters more than later, or why future causal effects on other beliefs are
epistemically irrelevant, these moves seem deeply ad hoc from the teleological
perspective.
Unfortunately, the trouble with trade-offs doesn’t just end with the causal impacts
of believing.
…when forming beliefs in ways other than through explicit reasoning, we
rarely—if ever—acquire beliefs one at a time; rather, we tend to acquire
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batteries of interconnected beliefs about a given subject matter. But if one
of these batteries of beliefs contains an inevitable false belief but also
many true beliefs, then accepting that battery of beliefs could be a
constitutive means of sacrificing our veritistic aims with regard to one
proposition in order to at the same time further our veritistic aims with
regard to a large number of other propositions. So even veritistic epistemic
teleologists who restrict themselves to constitutive means or to a timerelative theory of final epistemic value must concede that there can be
cases in which it is epistemically appropriate, by their lights, to sacrifice
one proposition for the greater (epistemic) good. (Berker 2013, 368)
To illustrate this phenomena, Berker has us imagine that I am presented with a
case in which I am shown three highly plausible propositions that I already believe, but
which have been shown to be jointly inconsistent. However, a friend has solved the
paradox and knows that only one of the propositions are false. What should I rationally
believe if my friend won’t tell me which two of the three are true? Berker thinks it is
obvious that I should suspend judgment about all three propositions until I can discover
which of the propositions is the source of the inconsistency. But, this verdict seems to
conflict with what veritistic epistemology would demand. I end up with more true beliefs
than false beliefs if I just go on as before. Even if we think that avoiding false beliefs is
more important than acquiring true beliefs, it seems that we can expand the set of
propositions so that the trade-off is as large as we want. Suppose the set of propositions is
100 and only one of them is false and the source of the inconsistency. Unless the veritist
is willing to make errors infinitely disvaluable, then they must endorse some trade-off of
this sort.
Another example that illustrates this potential problem is the forming of higher
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order beliefs. Suppose that when I form a belief that p I either simultaneously, or as a
matter of the constitution of the belief that p, also come to believe that I believe that p,
and that I believe that I believe that I believe that p, and so on. Now, although my belief
that p might be mistaken, my higher order beliefs will all end up being true. This seems
to imply that merely by randomly forming a belief, with no concern for whether it is true,
I also end up accidentally acquiring a huge stock of true beliefs. It thus appears that given
the trade-off between all the higher order true beliefs and the single false first order
belief, it was ultimately an epistemically good thing I came to believe p.
We can continue to go through the potential counterexamples that Berker gives,
but it would be more useful if we could encapsulate the core reason that cases like these
seem to arise and use it to construct a more general argument against teleological views:
(P1) It is epistemically rational to believe P only if the evidence (or methods,
processes, etc.) relevant to the truth of P alone support believing P.
(P2) There are situations in which believing P promotes more epistemic value
than not believing P even though the evidence relevant to the truth of P alone
supports not believing P.
(C1) There are situations in which believing P promotes more epistemic value
even though it is epistemically irrational to believe P.
(P3) If epistemic teleology is true, then it is always rational to believe P if
believing P promotes more epistemic value.
(C2) Epistemic teleology is false.
Here (P1) is an (imperfect) gloss on what Berker takes to be the core intuition that all
epistemologists accept. When deciding whether someone is rational or justified in

79
believing something, it seems reasonable that any considerations given must be relevant
to the person’s relationship to the truth or evidence about P and not some other
proposition. (P2) is supported by the series of counterexamples that Berker presents, but
also suggests a fairly straightforward recipe for constructing potential counterexamples.
In fact, I think something like (P2) is so obviously true that I will spend very little time
discussing the particularities of Berker’s cited examples, at least as far as they are offered
as support for (P2), even if I think a few of them are deeply misleading or mistaken11.
The more general point they illustrate seems obvious enough. (P3) seems to just follow
from the way that Berker has characterized what it is for a view to be teleological. Since
the teleologist wants to derive all deontic notions like rationality from value either (P3) is
true, or the teleologist must have built in something to their account of rationality that is
alien to the teleological perspective. Why restrict rationality to be about individual
propositions, or particular times, or particular methods, if ultimately doing that does
nothing to further epistemic values. This additional restriction or constraint on our pursuit
of the truth seems like it must be non-teleological in origin.
It is here that we can most clearly see the relevance of Berker’s argument to the
project advocated here. If I am advocating determining the content of epistemic concepts
in terms of their purposes in the promotion of our pursuit of our epistemic ends then it
seems that, by necessity, I will leave out whatever consideration motivates this restriction
on rationality that Berker sees as fundamentally alien to the teleological perspective.

For example, I think many of the problems that arise in particular examples are more due to the over
simplification of monist theories of epistemic value like veritism, the diminishing and low value of metabeliefs, or due to particularities of what we understand as full belief rather than provisional acceptance, etc.
11
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3. Rationality: Non-Teleological or Limited Conceptual Tool?
Ultimately, I think Berker is mistaken, but given that I completely concede to him
that there are some cases where epistemic value would be promoted by beliefs in things
there is insufficient evidence for, there are only two remaining obvious places to attack
Berker’s reasoning. One option is to deny (P1) and soften the blow of thinking that
deontic notions like justification or epistemic ought aren’t connected to evidence for
particular propositions, and the other is to deny (P3) and argue that constraints on deontic
concepts that don’t arise directly from concern with the promotion of epistemic value can
be motivated on a teleological view. I will end up doing a bit of both. Although I agree
with Berker that our intuitive concepts of justification and rationality don’t endorse
beliefs that may ultimately produce more epistemic good, I will argue that we need some
overriding deontic concept that does endorse the making of some of the kinds of tradeoffs that Berker so abhors. I will also argue for why a restricted and single proposition
focused conception of rationality is ultimately a necessary conceptual tool in our toolbox
even if our final purpose is the pursuit of something like true belief.
To begin the first branch of the objection to Berker’s argument, let’s examine an
example case. It has been known for quite some time after the Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen paper (1935) that relativity and quantum mechanics are mutually inconsistent, or
at least no one knows what assumptions are the correct ones to give up to make them
consistent. I think it is reasonable to say that scientists accept both theories. They use
them as models, they design experiments around them. Engineers and chemists use them
as models in designing mechanisms and molecules. Now, perhaps in some sense of full
belief they don’t believe the theories, but if their attitudes towards these theories isn’t
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belief, then I am uncertain that I have any beliefs at all. Scientists maintain some positive
cognitive attitude towards the theories, and it is one that is strong enough that it
rationalizes their actions. Whether we label this positive attitude “belief” is mostly
immaterial. The core question is whether this positive attitude, rather than strict
withholding of judgment, is something that they epistemically ought to hold? I think it
obviously is. These two theories form broad outlooks on the world that enable a huge
range of research programs that simply would not be possible if the scientist’s reaction to
the discovery of the inconsistency between the two theories was a total withholding of
judgment about what was true or at least what they would treat as if were true. It is a
matter of epistemic practicality that they must continue to use the theories as models to
make predictions and judgments about the world even though they know some of those
judgments will end up being false. The epistemic cost of forgoing the use of these
theories as models of reality is just too high.
This esoteric example from physics is hardly an isolated phenomenon. I am
highly confident that I have inconsistent beliefs12. I do not think the appropriate reaction
to this fact is to completely suspend judgment until I can ferret out all the inconsistencies
in my beliefs. Any epistemological theory that demanded that kind of revision in light of
any inconsistency would be so impractical as a system for pursuing the truth that it must
be mistaken. It must be epistemically allowable for me to have inconsistent beliefs, even
when I know they are inconsistent, if only as a matter of practical fact. I need a model of
the world around me for action and inconsistencies in the model will inevitably arise.

From this point forward I’m going to talk as though belief is just an attitude to treat something as part of
your model of the world for the purpose of acting in the world. Whether this is full belief or something else
will be largely set aside since it just unnecessarily complicates the phrasing of the views.
12
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This doesn’t mean those inconsistencies don’t matter. We should try and find them out
and correct them, but giving up our use of and positive commitment to the model just
because we abstractly know that it is inconsistent would be a clear mistake.
Does this mean that it is rational to have inconsistent beliefs? This question cuts
to the heart of the issue because when we first begin to translate the language of
epistemology into their analogs in ethics it is very tempting to equate either rationality or
justification with the role of being an epistemic ought or, more weakly, epistemic
permissibility. This is so natural we essentially never mention the move we make when
we go from claiming that Φ’s belief that P is irrational, to the claim that Φ shouldn’t
believe P, but this seems to me to be a substantive move. I hear no contradiction when
someone asserts that a belief is irrational and yet it is something that the person ought to
believe. When reframed as questions about epistemic ought many of my qualms about
Berker’s counterexamples seem to drop away. If the scientist from Fumerton’s case really
can only get the grant by believing in God, I think that his belief will be irrational, but
that he epistemically ought to form it. To see this more clearly imagine that you were
suddenly given complete control over whether the scientist forms the belief or not.
Suppose your only concerns are epistemic. You want everyone to have a more complete
and accurate understanding of the world. How could you not choose to give him the
belief, even if it is irrational? It seems to me that any view that doesn’t ultimately endorse
the forming of this belief with some deontic concept is one that fetishizes the rules of
rationality at the expense of the real sources of epistemic value.
Suppose you buy that there is a distinction between epistemic ought and
rationality or justification, and that epistemic ought is more directly tied to the pursuit of
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epistemic value than rationality. Doesn’t this just make Berker’s worry more pressing, at
least for concepts like rationality and justification? Even if there are more deontic
concepts than rationality, or we could conceive of and run our lives in terms of the
concepts more directly effective in terms of producing true beliefs, why aren’t rationality
and justification those concepts, and could there be any motive for retaining concepts like
these on a teleological picture?
I believe there is good motive, even from within the teleological perspective for
having some epistemic concepts that work like Berker thinks the concepts of justification
and rationality do, i.e. one’s that isolate out evidence relevant to single propositions. The
first reason is straightforward. Even if answering the question of whether the evidence
supports a proposition doesn’t definitively determine whether we epistemically ought to
believe that proposition, being able to easily refer to how things stand with respect to the
evidence surrounding P alone can be very useful. We shouldn’t expect every normative
concept to be one that completely and determinately picks out exactly what will best aid
our overall pursuit of the good. Having a simpler concept that deals narrowly with what
is relevant to an individual proposition simplifies things. Nothing about a teleological
approach commits one to the view that all epistemic concepts play an all things
considered guidance role. We can see this perhaps more clearly in another context. The
design of buildings is clearly teleological in nature. The practice of design has an aim:
making a building. But, many of the normative concepts that engineers use in the process
of design are limited in scope and don’t answer the overall question of whether the
building is well-designed. For example, a design might be efficient, and “efficiency” is
clearly a teleological concept even if finding out a design is efficient doesn’t entail we
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should build it.
The more interesting and challenging question for a teleological perspective isn’t:
why someone with a teleological perspective would have concepts like justification that
isolated the concerns about a single proposition? It is rather: why is it essentially
unquestioned practice to treat answers to the question about the evidence surrounding the
single proposition as definitive about whether the belief should be formed or not? How
can this be sensible when we acknowledge there are exceptional cases where doing so
will lead us to have a poorer and less accurate model of the world?
There are a few reasons why I think leading a rational cognitive life, where
rationality is construed as forming beliefs based on the evidence for or against individual
propositions, is almost always the epistemically right thing to do. The first is a problem
with unexpected side-effects of trade-offs. Because our beliefs don’t have an isolated
impact on our future beliefs, it is very important to significantly worry about the
propagated effects of false beliefs. For example, in the case of the scientist in Fumerton’s
example, if he really came to believe in God, that belief by its very nature will begin to
put pressure on other beliefs. It will have this effect has whether he wants it to or not. It
will also implicitly influence all the beliefs he forms in the future. An unexpected sideeffect of forming that belief might be that he gives up certain scientific beliefs or his
observations and judgments become clouded, and he is ultimately impeded in his pursuit
of the truth. Given the huge range of potential consequences, it is impracticable and likely
counterproductive for people to form beliefs by explicitly thinking about what
consequences they will have for their future ability to access the truth. This calculation
problem is a common justification for rule utilitarianism in ethics, and I think similar
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considerations apply here. Be rational is at minimum a highly useful rule of thumb, and
most cases where you think you’ve found an exception, I suspect you’ve not fully
considered the potential down sides.
The second problem is that it is unlikely that psychological mechanisms that
allow for the formation of beliefs in conflict with the evidence about individual
propositions could be isolated and only used in a single context. If I become the kind of
person who can form a crazy belief in one context that mechanism might be exploited in
others. There’s simply no reason to think that our belief forming mechanisms are so finegrained that they will only be applied in a single context. Even if there are a few contexts
where employing an irrational method might work out, its general employment could be
disastrous from an epistemic point of view.
The third problem is that rational formation of beliefs is often constitutionally tied
to epistemic values that go beyond those suggested by the simple veritistic picture. I am
not merely epistemically concerned with the goal of having some true beliefs. I am
concerned with understanding the world. I don’t merely want facts. I want explanations.
Although epistemic reasons and explanatory reasons are different, this doesn’t change the
fact that someone who forms a belief rationally is more likely to also have or develop an
understanding of the explanations for why what they believe is true. This is because a
huge amount of the rational support for our beliefs is ultimately abductive. The trade-off
of forming an irrational belief thus often goes far beyond that single belief and on to
impact the person’s capacity to form a generalized understanding of the world. This
likely holds even if we have a reductionist view of understanding like Sliwa (2015) or a
more traditional non-reductionist view. In plausible versions of both views, having some
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set of false beliefs about important things will undermine understanding.
Before we wrap up this section on Berker’s argument I want to also highlight how
thinking about the epistemic good in overly simple terms, particularly in terms of
counting numbers of true beliefs, plays some role in making the teleological view seem
much worse than it really is. At least some of the seeming pressure on teleology provided
by Berker’s cases is caused, not by a commitment to teleology, but by a commitment to
an overly simple understanding of the epistemic good. No thoughtful epistemologist can
think of the project of getting to the truth as literally about maximizing some enumerable
set of true beliefs.
First, beliefs are not something that can be counted, at least not without a huge
set of difficult or arbitrary assumptions about how they should be individuated, and there
is little reason to suppose that the number of beliefs fixed by some set of individuation
rules will track their epistemic value. Even if beliefs were unambiguously countable,
there is literally no reason to suppose that they all have the same epistemic value. It is
here that epistemology is most obviously disanalogous with ethics. In ethics we naturally
proceed under the assumption that all individuals have some equal worth, but some
propositions are just more important to know than others, and not just practically but
epistemically. If I know Newton’s laws, I know vastly more and something of much more
epistemic value than if I know three other random propositions to be true. Newton’s laws
have many more implications and most importantly have explanatory value that, for
example, knowing someone’s address would clearly lack. Interestingly, it is the very nonseparateness of propositions that makes thinking about them in terms of simple numbers
deeply misleading. Propositions bare logical and explanatory relationships to each other,
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and those relationships are at least as much a part of what make them of epistemic value
as the truth of the single proposition itself.
Rather than seeing epistemic value as tied to the number of true beliefs one has, a
more useful (though still imperfect) framework is to think of epistemic value as
analogous to the information content of a map. A literal map has some amount of
epistemic value. It represents the world more or less accurately in a number of different
ways. When comparing two maps for their epistemic value it would be foolish to try and
evaluate their value in terms of the number of true beliefs looking at it would give you.
There is simply no fixed or consistent way to list all the truths contained in the map.
Despite this there are clearly better and worse maps. Distances and shapes can be
represented more or less accurately. They could contain information on borders or not.
They could contain topological information or not. The question of whether a map
contains better or more information about some feature of the world is often an
answerable question even if it isn’t reducible to some literal counting of propositions.
The map idea also highlights an important feature of epistemic value, which is at
least potentially much more worrying as an objection to the teleological account I am
offering. Often epistemic values are incommensurable. “Does a political map or a
topological map contain more information” is essentially a nonsense question. Both
contain information the other lacks, but there is no clear way to say that political
boundaries are more or less information than information about topological levels (except
perhaps in extreme cases where very little of one kind of information is represented, but
huge amounts of the other is). Despite this, since epistemic value is usually an
instrumental value, we can often still ask commensurable questions by bringing in
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practical values to determine some weighting of the value of the relevant information. If I
am concerned with politics I need the map with the most information about that matter,
and this is more often an answerable question. Likewise, it is often answerable whether a
person’s beliefs are more accurate about subject X than another person’s, but it may not
be answerable whether overall one person’s beliefs have more epistemic value. “Does a
doctor or a lawyer have beliefs with more epistemic value?” is essentially the same kind
of nonsense question as the one about topology vs politics. Despite this it does seem
typically answerable whether a person has more knowledge about a particular subject
area than another, and this estimation is unlikely to come down to them listing out all the
facts they know and us literally counting them.

4. How Teleological are Our Epistemic Concepts?
Berker’s argument began by claiming that teleological views are ones that assume
that the pursuit of value is the core determiner of the content of our concepts. He then
argued that epistemic concepts like rationality often endorse forming beliefs in ways that
don’t seem to pursue the epistemic good. I responded to this reasoning by arguing that
not every epistemic concept needs to function as an overall evaluation of what the agent
ought to believe, and that there is space, even within a teleological account, for concepts
that point out positive features of forming certain beliefs when they don’t serve one’s
overall epistemic good. That the evidence supports the truth of a particular proposition is
something we should have a concept of even if sometimes it is to our epistemic benefit to
find ways to ignore the evidence.
An important question to ask at this juncture is, what makes a concept teleological

89
according to me, if it isn’t that it endorses the act or belief that produces the most value?
The answer is that I understand a concept as being fundamentally teleological when the
primary explanation of the concept having the content that it does is because of the role it
plays in the project of pursuing an end. For example, I think the concept of efficiency is
teleological in nature. People invented the concept because it helps them manage
resources wisely, but the concept of an efficient solution is not the same as the right
solution or even the solution that produces the best outcome. A consequentialist ought is
the purest kind of teleological concept, but it is not the only one. As Berker recognizes
seeing things teleologically could just amounts to seeing the end or good as prior to the
right rather than as being strictly consequentialist in nature. I simply take this a step
further. Being teleological about concepts other than “rightness” is to see their role in
serving an end as fundamental to their very construction.
To make the teleological commitment I accept more precise, we can suppose that
I am committed to the following notion of teleology.
A concept is teleological iff the features of the concept can be explained in terms
of the role that the concept plays as a tool in the pursuit of some end.
The core commitment of the method I propose then is that all epistemic concepts are
fundamentally teleological in nature. Each one is a tool and its features can be explained
and should be shaped by the role that the concept plays in the pursuit of epistemic good.
Rationality is a teleological concept not because rational beliefs are always true or the
beliefs most likely to get us the most epistemic value, but because being able to evaluate
every proposition on its own merits is a skill and of value in the project of pursuing the
truth. Rationality’s role in this project shapes all kinds of features of the concept. If we
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didn’t at least think that evidence was indicative of truth in most circumstances, or that
rational belief formation was a mostly successful strategy we would never have invented
the concept in the first place nor would we use it so frequently in our epistemic practices.

5. How Non-Teleological Can Our Epistemic Concepts Be?
At this point we may begin to wonder whether there are any epistemic concepts
that have features that aren’t explicable by reference to their role in our project of
pursuing the truth. We might try to pursue this question by thinking a bit more deeply
about whether the features of rationality or justification can really all be explained away
because they serve some role, perhaps indirect or partial, in the pursuit of the truth. In
order to consider this issue more fully I want to think about a view of justification which
we might suppose has some significant chance of not playing a role as a useful tool in the
pursuit of the truth.
One epistemic view that one might attempt to use as a counterexample to the idea
that all epistemic concepts are teleological is a version of phenomenal conservatism.
(Huemer 2007) A fairly simple version of phenomenal conservatism could be understood
as committed to the following thesis:
(PC) Agent A is justified in believing P iff it seems to A that P and A doesn’t have
sufficient phenomenally justified defeaters for P.
For our purposes, it won’t matter whether this or a more sophisticated
phenomenal conservatism is in fact correct. Instead I intend to use this theory as example
of a dilemma I think all views face. Any defender of a theory of justification must either
be committed to a number of bridge premises which indirectly connect their notion of
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justification to the pursuit of an epistemic end or have their view of justification seem
epistemically arbitrary. This idea has been expressed in other ways by epistemologists
over the years. BonJour for example argued that any concept of justification must have
“...an internal relation to the cognitive goal of truth” (1985, 8). This is essentially the
same idea.
Before proceeding to this dilemma argument, it is important to pause to see how
something like (PC) might seem to be a threat to a teleological view of justification. If
(PC) is true, then the following pair of cases are imaginable. There could be an epistemic
agent, let’s call him Carl, who has seemings which appear to be of a coherent world, but
which fail to lead to any true beliefs. Let’s suppose that Carl is subject to a Cartesian
demon. There is a sense in which Carl’s following of the dictates of (PC) doesn’t serve
any typical epistemic purpose like truth. This is essentially the central case in the New
Evil Demon problem. (Cohen and Lehrer 1983) Another case would be one where an
agent, let’s call her Zoe, lived in a community of agents who typically, systematically,
and reliably formed beliefs13 without any phenomenal seemings. She and her community
are philosophical zombies. Suppose that at some time Zoe begins to have phenomenal
seemings that turn out to be hallucinations caused by an abnormality in her brain. If Zoe
follows the dictates of (PC), rather than forming her beliefs via the usual means used in
her community, she is undermining her aim of getting true beliefs. An objector to the
teleological account of epistemic concepts could then hold that these examples show that
the epistemic duty involved in justification comes apart from epistemic ends without
seemingly becoming clearly non-epistemic or epistemically arbitrary. Carl and Zoe are

Or at least the functionalist analog of beliefs if you think belief contents require phenomenology or
connection to phenomenal states as Horgan and Tienson (2002) do.
13
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epistemically obligated to believe in ways that don't help them get to the truth.
I personally am not very convinced that Carl and Zoe are justified when they
believe what seems true, but I’m not here to merely push my view about these case. If
neither of the two are justified so much the better for me, but I know that there are some
philosophers who will clearly think Carl and Zoe are justified, and our question will be
whether this stance could be accommodated within the teleological framework. To begin
we will examine a series of possible explanations of how a concept that counted Carl and
Zoe as justified could fit within a teleological framework, and then turn to an argument
for why any alternative non-teleological explanation will ultimately be unsatisfying.
There are at least three possible explanations for why it might make sense to have
a concept of justification that labeled Carl and Zoe as justified:
1) Subjective: Following (PC) amounts to aiming at the epistemic end when seen
from the first-person perspective.
2) Implementable: The kinds of belief formation open to epistemic agents are
constrained by their seemings, so a demand that the agent deviate from (PC) is a
demand that they guide their belief formation in impossible ways.14 Carl can’t
help but believe in the world the demon feeds him and Zoe will have to start
believing on the basis of her new seemings.
3) Contingency/Relativity: The norm picked out by (PC) only applies to epistemic
agents in our possible world or perhaps to agents in epistemic communities and
environments like ours. So, when we think that Carl and Zoe are justified what we

This justification might seem odd to the reader, but Phenomenal Conservatives like Huemer have argued
that seemings are the causes and bases of all our beliefs, so demanding that we base our belief on
something other than how things seem to us is in some sense literally impossible, according to him.
14
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are doing is applying our contingently true or community relative norms to them,
but other norms might be true in their worlds or communities.
The first proposed way of explaining why (PC) might give the right verdict to the
Carl and Zoe cases fairly straightforwardly connects the view to the pursuit of truth. Even
if there is an important sense in which, from the third-person standpoint, the beliefs and
means of forming beliefs of Carl and Zoe aren’t objectively aimed at truth or likely to
help them in the pursuit of true beliefs, their ways of forming beliefs are at least
intelligible from the first-person perspective as aiming at and pursuing the truth. We can
imagine that Carl and Zoe are motivated by an attempt to believe the truth and thus they
go with what seems true to them from that perspective. We might wonder about whether
such a defense really works for the case of Zoe. Perhaps the right response is that her
other beliefs are justified defeaters for the seeming even though they themselves lack
justification via seeming. But, our worry is not whether this approach solves this
particular case. What matters is that this is an initially plausible line of explanation that a
defender of (PC) could give as to why we ought to adopt this concept of justification.
Whether it is satisfying as an explanation of the Zoe case really depends on whether (PC)
is right about the Zoe case, and that is something we've put to the side.
The teleological features of the second defense are a bit less straightforward then
the first, but we can understand the connection via the following train of reasoning. Part
of the purpose of having epistemic norms is to use the application of them to alter how
we go about forming our beliefs. If there is a main purpose of the norms involved in the
concept of justification, then their nature will have to be constrained by what kinds of
ways of forming belief are within the agent’s abilities. If we have no eyes, it is senseless
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to demand we form beliefs based on sight, if we have no intuitions, then it is pointless to
demand we trust them. If we suppose that the ways of forming beliefs are quite
constrained, such that either we follow the dictates of our phenomenal seemings or we
arbitrarily form beliefs, then even if our concern is truth, it will still always make more
sense believe what seems true than to do what amounts to guessing.15 There are
undoubtedly problems with this justification of (PC), especially for these cases. For
example, the case of Zoe seems like one where she clearly has other means of forming
beliefs that aren’t arbitrary and don’t go through phenomenal seemings, so the default
victory of (PC) seems less obvious. We might also worry about whether the bias of seeing
following (PC) as superior to guessing is an artifact of assumptions about the nature of
seemings that we hold to be contingently true. In regular life relying on how things seem
is a fairly reliable method of forming beliefs. But, even if there are concerns for the
plausibility of this way of trying to justify the (PC) view on the cases, it is clear that its
approach connects justification to the pursuit of a purpose. It does this in an indirect
manner by relying on what it takes to be clear limits on our abilities of non-arbitrary
belief formation. Ends are not the only source for teleological concepts. Concepts are still
teleological when they concern questions about the constraints on our means of pursuing

15

This is in some sense what I think Huemer's self-defeat argument against alternatives to (PC) comes down
to. He thinks that anything you believe is ultimately caused by what seems true to you. If we combine
that with an assumption that a belief can't be justified if the thing that ultimately caused it doesn't
produce justification, then we will end up with the claim that no beliefs are justified. I think this
reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, it isn't obvious that all of persons beliefs are caused by
phenomenal seemings unless we really trivialize what it means to be a seeming. This causal claim about
the role of phenomenal states seems like a matter for psychological research that Huemer clearly hasn't
done. But second, and more importantly, the fact that phenomenal seemings are part of the causal story
doesn't entail they are the part relevant to determining whether the belief is justified. For example a
particular kind of cause of a belief might only be justification conferring when the cause has some truth
indicating quality. Even if all our beliefs had to causally be formed on the basis of seemings, that need
not entail that the presence or absence of the seeming is the epistemically relevant thing rather than
some other aspect of the belief forming process such as its reliability.
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those ends, and if weighing seemings is really the only way to pursue truth, rather than
just happening to end up with true beliefs, then any theory of justification will have to be
couched in those terms.16
The next explanation of our intuitive response to the Carl and Zoe cases that tries
to tie the view into the teleological picture would deny that it makes sense to talk about
whether Carl or Zoe are justified without determining what contingent concept or perhaps
culturally relative concept we are using. This explanation would hold that the norms of
justification are highly dependent on features of our actual world, or perhaps more
narrowly, just our particular community's language. It would hold that (PC) is contingent.
It is what justification is for creatures like us in our possible world or our epistemic
community. Someone from within the teleological framework could then argue that the
reason why (PC) is contingently true is that in our possible world, we aren't subject to
evil demons, nor are we philosophical zombies. In our world, there is a tight, or at least
tight enough, connection between our trusting our seemings and pursuing the truth that
trusting our seemings is the best, though contingently best, means of pursuing the truth.
This explanation then is that when we say that Carl or Zoe are justified or unjustified, we
are using a concept of justification that ultimately derived it shape from its use in
governing our epistemic lives which turn out to be very different than those of Carl and
Zoe. Of course part of this view, if it is taken from within the teleological perspective,
would be that Carl and Zoe should perhaps have different concepts of justification in their
worlds. What matters is that when we apply our concepts to them, it will end up

16

I am certainly not actually endorsing the view that we should frame epistemic questions in terms of
weighing seemings just that it would be a sensible view within the teleological framework, if we made a
bunch of other assumptions about the nature of our psychology.
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producing (PC)'s verdict.
Perhaps one of these explanations work, or perhaps it is a mistake to believe the
verdicts about the Carl and Zoe cases that are entailed by (PC). But, it seems clear to me
that either the intuitive responses go against (PC) or some teleological explanation must
be correct, because if we can't tie justification to truth, knowledge, or some similar
epistemic value, then (PC) at best would seem to be an endorsement of a kind of
cognitive fetish rather than a truly epistemological view.
To illustrate the worry, let's begin by considering a possible cognitive norm that
would clearly not be epistemic. Then, let's try to ferret out whether (PC) would resemble
this odd norm if (PC) lacked some explanation of its connection to the pursuit of the truth
like those offered above. To get a wacky enough rule that won't end up having strange
interactions with our beliefs about what kinds of belief forming mechanisms are possible
in humans, let's consider a completely artificial case involving a robot. Suppose I
programmed a robot with a very large list of arbitrary propositions and assigned arbitrary
numbers to the propositions. For example, proposition #3 could be “all cats are hairless”
and proposition #20 is “some apples are green”. I then give the robot two currently empty
lists that it can assign propositions to, one labeled “true” the other labeled “false”. I then
give the robot a camera and program the robot with an object detection algorithm that
divides the space of the picture it receives into some number of objects that are in front of
it. I then give it the following command: every 5 seconds determine the number of
objects, X, detected by the object detection algorithm and if X=proposition number, place
that proposition on the “true” list, if 2X=proposition number, place that proposition on
the “false” list. I could then carry this robot around from place to place and slowly over
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time it might sort all the propositions I gave it onto the true and false lists. But clearly,
nothing this machine is doing is in any way epistemic. The rules it uses are completely
arbitrary from the epistemic perspective. The seemingly obvious reason why is that
nothing about these rules for labeling a proposition “true” or “false” has the least bit to do
with whether it actually is or is even likely to be true. If more true propositions ended up
on the “true” list, it would clearly be a complete accident.
Now, let's return to the case of Zoe, and let's suppose that we said what (PC)
would suggest about Zoe being justified or unjustified, but also just took (PC) as a kind
of brute fact. In so doing we are supposing there is no deeper teleological explanation of
why (PC) is true along the lines of the three explanations that we considered. The reason
to follow (PC) isn't because it’s what subjectively seems like the way to pursue the truth.
It isn't because it’s the only way we can go about forming beliefs that's within our
control, nor is (PC) something that we follow because of some contingent connection
between our seemings and reliably pursuing the truth. If none of these or similar
explanations are why we should follow the dictates of (PC), is there any way that
following (PC) wouldn't be as arbitrary as following the rules of our hypothetical robot?
To help us see the arbitrariness, let's deconstruct what following (PC) amounts to when
disconnected completely from any role it could serve in pursuit of the truth. (PC) is at its
core a kind of rule about content matching. It says you should form a belief that matches
the content of a phenomenal state unless doing so conflicts, according to a complex set of
rules about defeaters, the combined contents of the other phenomenal states you have.
The robot from the above example is also engaged in a kind of content matching. What
number is in the content of its camera image determines what proposition it puts on the

98
true or false lists. But obviously, just engaging in some kind of coherent content matching
game can't be enough to make what you are doing an epistemic activity. There has to be
something epistemic about the contents or the rules, and if we can't say it is something
about how those contents are at least typically connected to the truth, or that the rules
typically help in pursuit of the truth, then the content matching seems as epistemically
pointless as the behavior of our poor little robot.
We have so far only talked about a single concept from a single epistemological
theory, but it seems clear that the considerations used against this simplified version of
(PC) that didn't connect its normative demands to the pursuit of the epistemic good are
highly general. Nothing in the final recognition of the application of (PC) rules as being
arbitrary without a connection to the epistemic teleos seems to turn in any substantive
way on the details of (PC). The general argument seems to be this:
(P1) If epistemic teleology is false, then there must be some norm N such that (i)
N is an epistemic norm but (ii) N doesn't fundamentally get its content from the
role it plays in regulating our pursuit of the epistemic good.
(P2) Any norm that doesn't fundamentally get its content from the role it plays in
regulating our pursuit of the epistemic good will, from the epistemic point of
view, resemble an arbitrary cognitive rule.
(P3) If, from the epistemic point of view, a norm, N, resembles an arbitrary
cognitive rule, then it isn't an epistemic norm.
(C1) Any norm that doesn't fundamentally get its content from the role it plays in
regulating or discussing our pursuit of the epistemic good isn't an epistemic norm.
(from P2, P3)

99
(C2) Epistemic teleology is true. (from C1, P1)
I have some doubts as to whether this argument is one that would be accepted by
someone who rejects epistemic teleology because the key premise (P2) would likely be
something that they would reject. After all, what else could it be to reject the teleological
picture than to not feel this kind of teleological intuition, but this is in fact why I think it
is useful to go through a case like that of (PC) first. What underwrites (P2) is all the pull
that we feel towards giving some explanation or other of why we ought to pursue (PC)
that somehow connects it to the truth, and the kind of empty mere content matching that
we are left with if we sap all the connection to truth from the picture.
A reader might begin to complain at this juncture that the thing that justifies (P2)
is a kind of linguistic intuition, and may worry: “Isn't what we are doing here just a return
to conceptual analysis of the bad kind. 'Epistemic' seems teleological to people speaking
English, so what?” But, this would be a misunderstanding of my methodological position.
If concepts are tools to serve certain representational purposes, then in many instances
our natural linguistic intuitions will be quite useful when they are informed or shaped by
the underlying purposes it makes sense to design a concept to serve. It makes clear and
obvious sense to have terms to separate activities in accordance with the different ends
they serve. There are moral ends, aesthetic ends, epistemic ends and numerous others. We
only have reason to doubt the way we use a term like “epistemic” from the design
perspective if there we some reason to suppose defining a notion of epistemic concept in
a non-teleological way was somehow a better way to get at some representational
purpose we have or should have, and I see no reason to suppose such a purpose exists,
whereas the teleological notion has a clear purpose and does important work. It makes
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sense our intuitions would or should track this.

6. Conclusion
This chapter argued that Berker's arguments against the teleological nature of
epistemology are mistaken because he confuses the claim that rationality is a teleological
concept with the claim that it is the all things considered epistemic ought, and that we can
understand rationality's divergences from the complete and perfect pursuit of the truth
from within the teleological framework by thinking of it as a more limited conceptual
tool. Efficiency is a teleological concept, but its applications don't definitively determine
what construction projects we should pursue. Rationality should be no more difficult to
see as teleological in the same way.
The chapter ended with the question of whether there could sensibly be an
epistemological concept which wasn't teleological in this more limited way. To do so we
considered the possibility that justification functioned according to the dictates of
phenomenal conservatism because following such a view could in theory undermine an
agent's pursuit of the truth in certain contexts. Three possible explanations were given
that could still tie (PC) to the pursuit of the truth, and it was argued that unless one of
these explanations or something analogous was true, then (PC)'s version of justification
would stop appearing to be an epistemic concept and appear to be an endorsement of a
completely arbitrary kind of content matching game. This argument against (PC) was
then argued to be generalizable. Any proposed epistemic concept which doesn't
ultimately derive from a norm which has its normative force because of its relationship to
the pursuit of our epistemic ends will ultimately seem arbitrary from the epistemic
perspective.
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Chapter 4: Determining Our Ends
1. Outline of the Chapter
The previous chapters have been part of an extended argument for a teleological
approach to clarifying the content of concepts that I’ve called the Design Method. Those
chapters have also argued that, when applying the design method to a set of normative
concepts like those found in epistemology, we should see epistemic concepts as tools for
expressing and using epistemic norms to regulate our activities in pursuit of our epistemic
goals. As such the primary constraints on the content of the epistemic norms are our
epistemic goals and the facts (be they physical, biological, psychological, or sociological)
that determine the effectiveness of potential norms when followed, promulgated, and
enforced by creatures like us. These same sets of facts also serve as constraints on the
type and nature of the concepts that should be used in expressing and enforcing those
norms. For example, whether we think of the concept of justification as an evaluation of
whether a system is operating in a consistent manner on the basis of some set of
epistemic rules, or as a marker that could be used by third-parties to determine whether
they should demand belief revisions by that system will matter greatly to how we should
think about and construct the concept of justification. The uses and purposes we put the
concept to will deeply influence the content we should design it to have.
Given the above picture of epistemological theorizing, the epistemic goals that
have some final or intrinsic value will play a huge role in determining the content of
epistemic norms and concepts. If we begin our theorizing with vastly different ideas of
epistemic value we will likely get very different intermediate purpose that it makes sense
for our epistemic concepts to serve. Different input values will produce very different
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outputs. The problem that has been set aside so far is how to make a rational choice about
what purposes or ends we should plug into the method. Is there some single goal or set of
goals that are the epistemic goals? If so, what evidence could we have that this is so, and
if not, are we stuck in an extreme form of epistemic relativism where different people or
groups will have fundamentally different epistemic concepts. Could it turn out on some
of them that any way of forming beliefs is permissible if someone has perverse enough
purposes in mind?
These are difficult questions, and there is no way they can be definitively resolved
here. But, this chapter will attempt to make some progress on two objectives relevant to
the problem of determining what values to use in the design of our norms and concepts.
First, the chapter will discuss in broad detail what methods and evidence are available for
resolving questions about epistemic values and our concepts of those values. This is
crucial because the model applied to the set of regulative epistemic concepts we have
looked at so far, for example in chapter 2, will not be directly applicable to the concepts
of the goals themselves. Second, the chapter will discuss a more concrete and somewhat
less general problem relevant to the determination of our epistemic goals: the debate
between realism and anti-realism. It will be illustrated how design focused thinking can
provide useful arguments for deciding whether truth or empirical adequacy are properly
thought to be our epistemic goal.

2. General Features of a Method of Finding our Ends
Before we begin looking at a particular example, it will be useful to discuss what
methods are available for the resolution of questions about our epistemic ends, and their
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potential compatibility with the methodology that has been argued for so far. Let’s begin
by briefly thinking about why the approach outlined in the previous chapters cannot work
as a means for designing concepts of our final epistemic ends themselves.
The picture outlined so far is this: Epistemic norms are teleological norms. The
best norms, those that should regulate our cognitive lives, are those that best achieve our
epistemic ends as modified and adjusted by various practical considerations such as the
need to have an accurate model within a certain time frame, or the need for detailed
model of a particularly important thing rather than a broad model, etc. What norms will
actually best achieve those ends is a function, not just of the ends themselves, but also of
our cognitive abilities, social facts like the division of labor, or levels of trust and
conformance attainable in the epistemic community. This entails that questions about
what epistemic norms are best are only answerable at least in part empirically based on a
study of these complex facts about what is epistemically achievable for creatures like us
with the cognitive resources we possess in the environments we inhabit
Many (though not all) epistemic concepts are understood on this picture to be
cognitive tools used in the expression and enforcement of these epistemic norms.
Concepts like evidence, justification, warrant, knowledge, support, basis, and many
others can be understood on this model. Many, like justification, seem to be directly tied
to marking achievements or directly suggesting changes in belief due to failures to meet
some set of standards. Though as pointed out in chapter three there might be reason to
think justification only marks out an achievement with respect to a single proposition
rather than functioning as an overall determinate of when to revise our beliefs. Other
concepts are far more indirectly tied into suggesting what we should or shouldn’t believe.
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Evidence, for example, functions as a concept that recommends beliefs only when
complimented by a complex theory of weighing, counting, and standards. It’s useful to
think of a large number of epistemic concepts as falling into three categories: (i) success
and failure markers, (ii) theory concepts, and (iii) goal concepts. Justification, knowledge
and warrant are success and failure markers. Their use is typically either a mere
description of whether someone has followed the correct norms, is in some positive or
negative epistemic state, or expresses a demand that someone change their beliefs or
epistemic behaviors. Evidence, epistemic basis, and reliability are theory concepts. On
their own they typically don’t clearly recommend any specific belief or behavior, nor
directly entail that a belief or method is epistemically positive or negative, but they need
to be understood and used explicitly or implicitly in coming to conclusions about what
behaviors or beliefs do in fact satisfy our epistemic norms. Roughly concepts of type (i)
are invoked in direct evaluations of behaviors and beliefs, and concepts of type (ii) are
necessary components of a theory which explains when, why or how those evaluations
are appropriate.
Both the success markers and the theory concepts fit nicely into the design
method advocated here. The core problem that motivates this chapter is that the goal
concepts themselves don’t fit nicely into the method, at least not where it seems they
would need to be. In the method discussed so far, goals are constraints on epistemic
norms and thus on the concepts involved in our regulative theory about them. In this way,
goals are inputs into the method, not outputs. If we treated the concept of our epistemic
ends as an output of the method, we would be asking the seemingly circular question
“what concept of my ends would best satisfy my ends?” If I knew and understood my
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goals already there would be no need to ask, and if I don’t know them, asking in this way
won’t seem to help. This perhaps wouldn’t be an issue if there were no difficult or
interesting questions about our epistemic ends themselves. If so, we wouldn’t need a
detailed method for answering them. But, there is no completely a priori obvious thing
that should be our epistemic goal, and many interesting philosophical debates have raged
on whether knowledge or true belief is the aim, or even whether realist things like truth
and knowledge rather than something else, like an empirically adequate model, is a more
appropriate epistemic aim. These critical questions can’t be put aside, especially if one
wants to use the method proposed here. Depending on the goals that are used as
constraints on our epistemic norms, we will get very different resulting norms, and thus
very different concepts of justification and evidence.
One might imagine turning back to the naive model discussed in the first chapter
in a desperate attempt to resolve the problem. Perhaps linguistic intuitions about
“knowledge”, “truth”, and “epistemic purpose” could save us. Just probe people’s
intuitions and plug whatever concept comes out into the method. But, this seems clearly
silly. Even if everyone we asked gave linguistic judgments that entailed that true belief
was coextensive with our intuitive notion of what fulfilled of our epistemic goals, it
would seem to be an open question whether they were right to do so. It might, for
example, turn out that in their actual practice they didn’t treat true belief as being good
enough, but just fail to recognize it, or they failed to understand what they want or what
would make their lives go well, etc. If we recognize, as I think we must, that there is a
potential gap between what we think is good and what really is good, any overly naive
prompting of linguistic intuitions, about the content of the word “good” will be
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unsatisfying as an attempt to answer questions about what our epistemic goal is. Much in
the same way as when we invent concepts for natural kinds like water, we want to leave
open the possibility that our understanding of a thing diverges significantly from what the
thing itself is. We recognize at least naively that there is some cognitive good, and we no
doubt have a concept of it long before we fully understand all the details of what it is.
Any adequate answer will have to account for this potential gap.
So, how should we proceed instead? Although there is no doubt some gap
between our understanding of our ideal goals and the goals themselves, it is plausible to
think that we have enough understanding of our own interests that if we are given enough
information and experience with a set of options we will often reliably be able to identify
those things that better satisfy our interests. A person, for example, might not know what
flavor of ice cream best satisfies their desire for something tasty, but if you let them taste
all the flavors and think careful about them, they will get quite good at telling the good
flavors from the bad. Likewise, if they are given enough information and experience with
what having different sets of beliefs that satisfy the different possible epistemic purposes
is like, they can most likely tell you which ones they find more satisfying and thus are
more plausibly thought of as epistemic ends. I think, for example, that if I were to
compare belief sets that consisted only of true beliefs, but no interconnected
understanding of the facts necessary for using them in explanations, I would likely think
that understanding had epistemic value that was missing from the mere collection of
facts.
The picture above indicates that at the end of the day, the design model advocated
here relies on intuitive judgments, but interestingly at its ground are intuitive judgments

107
not about the extension of linguistic items grounded in conceptual competence, but rather
intuitive judgments about what satisfies our needs, desires, and interests. There’s little
reason to think these judgments are completely infallible, but there are many plausible
stories one could give about why judgments about our own interests are reliable. For
example, many of our interests likely ground out in our desires and the satisfaction of our
desires is something we plausibly have knowledge of. These intuitive judgments are no
doubt a decent source of evidence, but I think that we can go a bit further than just
relying on straight forward judgments about the value of different potential epistemic end
that we have experienced. The question of what people actually value in their activities is
a potential subject of social science investigation. Economists, for example, often try to
study or investigate people’s hidden preferences and talk about revealed preference that
are indicated by choices that agents make. Careful examination and experimentation
about our valuing behaviors could serve as a possible corrective mechanism to counter
possible self-deception about what things we really value. There are no doubt countless
hidden preferences we have about our own belief states. A more sophisticated
examination of our hidden preferences about epistemic value might be especially
interesting when we think about complex epistemic value questions like what we care
about in a good explanation. All of that said, there are very difficult questions which will
surround potentially separating our the concept of what we value rather than what is
really valuable, and this can only seemingly be potentially resolved by careful reflection
on whether the valuing behavior is better explained by a kind of dysfunction or whether it
is a deeper reflection of what we ought to have recognized we wanted all along, and this
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does seem at best to come back to some kind of intuitive judgment17 combined with some
kind of reflective equilibrium balancing those intuitive judgments against other
considerations.
Finding out what ends seem to satisfy our interests clearly isn’t the end of the
story. Finding out that a particular thing satisfies our interest doesn’t resolve a core
question about the weighing of the values or what role they should play in the design
method. To give a more concrete example, suppose when we reflect on what satisfies our
interests we discover that we both enjoy having true beliefs and having understanding.
Different systems of norms will deliver these two things in different amounts in different
contexts. If we are going to make a choice about which norms to follow we need to be
able to make a decision about how to weigh these values against each other.
Unfortunately, there are probably no easy answers about how to answer these questions
about weighing potential plural epistemic values against each other. Is understanding
topic A really more important than say knowing a huge set of fact I don't fully understand
about topic B? This kind of thing seems only answerable, if at all, within a particular
context, and as will be suggested in the next section, what I will see as important will
probably be influenced by pragmatic values about the natures of A and B. Regardless, I
think anyone investigating questions about epistemic value will have to confront the fact
that some questions about value may not be answerable, or might be indeterminate due to
issues of incommensurability. Does this throw the whole normative project in

17

Obviously, how one characterizes this insight into value is going to depend highly on whether one hold a
subjective or objective account of value. I'm going to talk about things in terms of intuitions giving us
insight into our subjective interests, but I see no reason that a more robust notion of intuition couldn't be
inserted here if one is a fan of more objective values, but the story would have to be more complex than
the fairly straightforward account of knowing your own desires are satisfied.

109
epistemology into chaos? Probably not. The fact that some weighing questions have no or
at least very difficult answers, doesn't mean that there aren't clearer answers in other
cases, or that certain general patterns of reasoning can be recognizably better from the
epistemic standpoint than others. This is especially true when we think about the kind of
single proposition evidential rules of thumb embodied in concepts like justification. In
most cases believing what your internal evidence suggests will be good. In almost no
cases will believing explicitly contradictory things be good for you. All of that being said,
we should probably be skeptical that any well-thought out notion of epistemic ought will
deliver definitive verdicts on every issue, or at least verdicts we can know are correct.

3. Pragmatic Encroachment
If we end up grounding out questions about what our epistemic goals are in
questions about what our interests are, as has just been suggested, there is a natural
question about the encroachment of pragmatic values. This seems especially pressing if
we begin thinking about revealed preferences about our belief states. For example, even
if most people wouldn’t directly tell you they prefer to believe things that are likely false
given their evidence, it seems likely, given the large number of studies on phenomena
like confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), that many of our preferences about our belief
states are more about the maintaining of a sense of identity than about having an accurate
model of ourselves and the world around us. Is this revealed preference an epistemic
preference? If so, doesn’t that mean that a design method would end up with a very
distorted view of the concept of evidence? Perhaps something like: “evidence is whatever
supports a view that fits with a general sense of your identity?”
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There are two things at stake in the worry about pragmatic encroachment. One is
simply that letting pragmatic facts influence what you believe seems bad, at least from an
epistemic point of view. So, even if people have a preference for not believing what the
evidence suggests, we shouldn’t act on it. The second is a more conceptual question. Is it
even possible to separate out the epistemic from the pragmatic? The first issue is
interesting, but not one we can fully address in this space. I will just say that it seems
obvious that we shouldn’t epistemically let facts like what beliefs make us happy
influence what we believe, but the question of whether all things considered we should
have our beliefs influenced by such factors is a far more complex question, and it is one I
am going to set aside on the assumption that epistemologists don’t need to settle this
more general question. We can leave that to the unfortunate ethicists. The second issue
about there being a distinction at all between the epistemic and pragmatic is more
pressing because if there is no good way to divide between the two kinds of value, then
there is a genuine threat that the method advocated here would say crazy things like “you
are epistemically justified in believing whatever makes you feel good”, and this seems
flatly unacceptable.
Although it is unlikely that the pragmatic and epistemic are purely separable,
there is little reason to think they aren't separable enough that we can delineate things in a
way that makes sense and accords at least roughly with how we typically talk about
epistemic concepts. The reason that the two aren’t completely separable is because our
understanding of a model’s epistemic value is influenced by pragmatic factors like, for
example, the accessibility and usability of the model. A map that I have now rather than
later is a better map, even thinking about things from an epistemic viewpoint. A map that

111
is small enough to carry is a better map, because if I can’t carry it, then I can never really
gain its epistemic value. The accuracy of the map and the usability of the map are
different values, and no doubt it is more natural to call the former epistemic value, but
things like the size of the map are still epistemically valuable in so far as the main reason
that size is important is that it plays a role in enabling access to the accurate information.
In a similar way, it makes sense to say that Wikipedia is of higher epistemic value than a
similar set of physical encyclopedias, even if they contained the same information. The
ease of accessibility is valuable, and its value is instrumental in providing the epistemic
value itself. The value of the accessibility is derivative of the epistemic value. All of this
is just to say that there is a species of things that seem pragmatically valuable that should
count as epistemic values because they are instrumental in our use and access to the
epistemic good. That said, it seems fairly clear that there a decent delineation between
these sorts of instrumental values and pragmatic values like those of having belief sets
that conform with some sense of personal identity. The source of this later value need not
go through the value of accurate information at all.
A more fundamental worry than whether we can draw this line is whether it
makes sense to do so. If we really at the end of the day are more concerned with what we
should or shouldn’t believe, then why care what the source of the value is? Aren’t we in a
better position to answer the important question when we think about all the factors
relevant to whether the belief is one that serves our interests? I don’t know the answer to
this question, but even if the non-epistemic factors need to be weighed in making a final
determination on what one should believe there is no doubt still value in separating out
questions about the different values if for no other reason than clarity and ease of
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theorizing. To use an analogy, when designing a building, an architect must consider
many different values. Is the building monetarily efficient? Is it safe? Is it beautiful? How
does it feel to be inside? Just because all these things weigh in the final design doesn’t
mean there is no value in idealized theorizing about safety in building design. We clearly
shouldn’t stop teaching classes on safety in design simply because safety isn’t the be all
end all of design. Likewise, even if non-epistemic values do ultimately impact what we
should or shouldn’t believe, there is value in considering what behaviors and norms
would be suggested when thinking solely about concerns relevant to questions about
paradigm epistemic concerns such as knowledge or accurate beliefs about the world.

4. Using Design Considerations to Reconsider Our Ends
So far, we have talked as though the Design Method has nothing to add to debates
about the epistemic values themselves, and this has been justified by the idea that values
are inputs to the design method and not outputs, thus we must look to other methods in
resolving questions about the inputs. Our basic divisions of values into epistemic and
non-epistemic and our experience with the epistemic value of various cognitive states can
no doubt do some work in narrowing down the list of potential purposes to use as inputs,
but most philosophers already debate between a fairly narrow range of potential
candidates for epistemic ends. We have plenty of experience with the difference between
knowledge and true belief, but this and our intuitive sense of what we care about or is in
our interest hasn’t clearly settled the debate about which, if either, is the more valuable or
the more basic epistemic end. Is there anything that a design mindset can bring to the
table that is different from the broad picture of evaluating potential ends against our
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judgments about our own interests, which seems to be a common feature of all normative
theorizing? It can once we realize that what we ought to treat as an end of our pursuits is
influenced not just by whether the end satisfies our interests, but also by questions
surrounding how things turn out when we engage in a pursuit of that end. By thinking of
the task as one of design we are forced to reflect on how the very act of aiming for that
goal and designing our practices in accordance with that aim has additional consequences
in and of itself. These additional consequences of treating the end as one we are
designing our practices around can give additional feedback about whether the end is the
appropriate one to pursue.
The paradox of hedonism is a useful example to illustrate the kind of feedback I
think a design method can provide. We all recognize to some degree that pleasure and
happiness are valuable. Yet, many of us also recognize that when we try and treat
pleasure as our sole and direct goal, we undermine our ability to gain pleasure itself. To
get some kinds of pleasure we have to see things other than pleasure like family, beauty,
love and work as valuable. This suggests that even if something has value, the question of
whether it should be treated as an object of pursuit when designing our norms is a
complex question that depends on the consequences that arise for a creature like us
actively thinking about pursuing that end. We might think similar kinds of issue arise in
the epistemic case. Perhaps if epistemic agents pursue the truth directly things will turn
out worse for them than if they try and pursue it indirectly by trying to form rational
beliefs. This isn’t to say that pleasure or true belief in these cases wouldn’t function at all
as constraints on what the best set of norms are, but simply that their influence in our
designs will have to be more indirect.
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4.1 Realism/Anti-Realism and Feedback on Our Aims
To more concretely illustrate what kinds arguments a design mindset can bring to
bear, let’s consider the concrete example of the debate between realism and anti-realism.
This debate is relevant because anti-realist and realist views have very different
conceptions of the epistemic good, and at least potentially could lead to the endorsement
of very different epistemic concepts. An anti-realist concept of knowledge should look
very different from the realists. The goal in discussing these anti-realist and realist
arguments isn't to resolve the realism/anti-realism debate, but rather to show how design
reasoning plays a role in that debate, and thus could provide evidence that could factor
into which side wins out. Our concern here is methodological and not with actually
evaluating which arguments succeed. This section’s goal is to establish the relevance of
certain sources of evidence and lines of argument, not to fully evaluate where the
evidence and reasoning should ultimately lead us.
Philosophers mean many different things when they talk about realism and antirealism, so to begin let’s define some ideas to narrow our focus. Here is a non-exhaustive
list of six possible ideas one could refer to with the term “realism.”
1) Strong Semantic Realism: there is a single true description of a mind-independent
reality which is true because it corresponds to features of that reality.
2) Weak Semantic Realism: descriptions of reality are more or less accurate
depending on some relationship, maybe not as simple as correspondence, to a
mind-independent reality, and there may not be a single most accurate description.
3) Strong Epistemic Realism: we have some knowledge of mind-independent reality.
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4) Weak Epistemic Realism: it is possible to have knowledge of mind-independent
reality.
5) Strong Aim Realism: the primary aim of science/inquiry is acquiring/knowing the
true description of mind-independent reality.
6) Weak Aim Realism: an aim of science/inquiry is acquiring more accurate models
of a mind-independent reality.
Our concern here will be with Weak Aim Realism. I’ll largely be ignoring the
strong version because the two respects in which it is stronger are difficult to defend, and
not of concern for the point I am making. Strong Aim Realism is stronger than Weak Aim
Realism both because it assumes there is some single correct description of reality, i.e.
Strong Semantic Realism, and because it assumes truth is the primary aim of inquiry or
science, which while perhaps plausible, would take us into other debates about the
differing value of explanation, understanding, and truth that would side track the
discussion. Weak Aim Realism is strong enough to illustrate the point needed and weak
enough to plausibly argue for or against in the space. I also take it as fairly obvious that
someone committed to Weak Aim Realism is obviously rationally committed to Weak
Semantic Realism, but not necessarily Strong Semantic Realism or Strong Epistemic
Realism. Weak Semantic Realism is necessary because the notion of accuracy contained
in it is the aim expressed in Weak Aim Realism. Strong Semantic Realism isn’t a
commitment because Weak Aim Realism makes no mention of the model being the only
or single best model. Strong Epistemic Realism isn’t a commitment because supposing
something is my aim doesn’t entail that I believe I have actually achieved it. The
relationship between Weak Aim Realism and Weak Epistemic Realism is a bit trickier,

116
and will in fact be the first thing we will be concerned with.

4.1.1 Anti-Realism, Skepticism, and Evaluability
This connection between Weak Aim Realism and Weak Epistemic Realism (which
I will from this point on just call Aim Realism and Epistemic Realism) seems to be the
potential basis for an anti-realist argument that looks something like this:
(P1) Because of the problem of underdetermination (or some other skeptical
problem) knowledge of mind-independent reality is impossible.
(P2) If knowledge of mind independent reality is impossible, then we can’t make
evaluations about whether the aim of truth has been achieved.
(C1) We can’t make evaluations about whether the aim of truth or accuracy has
been achieved.
(P3) We can make evaluations about whether some more limited anti-realist aim
such as empirical adequacy has been achieved.
(P4) The satisfaction of some more limited anti-realist aim satisfies essentially all
the interests we have in having a true or accurate model.
(P5) If two potential aims satisfy essentially all the same interests, but we can
evaluate whether one aim has been achieved and the other we cannot, then we
should adopt the aim whose achievement we can evaluate.
(C2) We should adopt an anti-realist aim rather than the realist aim.18

18

Whether this argument works or not is irrelevant as to whether the kind of design-based reasoning it
employs is methodologically sound, and that is all that matters for this project. However, I ultimately think
this argument fails on a number of grounds. First, it seems to be a mistake to assume that the kind of
knowledge typically undermined in skeptical arguments is required for making some reasonable
evaluations as to whether we are more or less likely achieving the goal of believing something true or
approximately true. Just because our measures aren’t perfect and never will be doesn’t mean that they can
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This argument is an intrinsically design motivated line of reasoning because the
primary motivation for accepting (P5) is some practical concern about how we will have
to design our practices. Why would we care about the evaluation of whether we have
achieved our aims except as input back into our recalibration of our norms? No capacity
for feedback would mean no ability to improve performance in the achieving of the aim.
We can get better at building empirically adequate theories, but if some form of
skepticism is right, then who knows what corrections we should make to try and get true
theories. This kind of reasoning from skepticism to anti-realism is common in anti-realist
arguments and is a fairly natural method of argument when considering and evaluating
potential aims. Good aims aren’t just good because we would like to have them. More
practical questions about the achievability and measurability of the aims should
reasonably figure into any discussion of what aims are appropriate.
In essence an anti-realist who used the Design Method would argue in the
following way. Let’s suppose we initially thought or intuited that truth was valuable. We
then try to begin the design process using truth as the constraint on our evaluation of

be useful or even mostly reliable in indicating whether we have gotten some at least approximately true
beliefs.
Second, for any proposed anti-realist measure of success there is a question about whether it’s true that the
measure has been achieved. For example, there is some fact of the matter about whether a theory is
empirically adequate, and it is only valuable if it really is empirically adequate. This means that the antirealist argument can’t be completely general. Their aim only has essentially the same value as truth if it
really has been achieved, which means any evaluation of the fulfillment of the anti-realist measure requires
at least something like realist knowledge of whether the measure has been fulfilled, and this is qa nontrivial kind of knowledge just as susceptible to skeptical doubts, so even the empiricist has to hold that we
can evaluate our success relative to some doubtable body of truth, namely truths about empirical adequacy
itself.
Third, even in situations where we can’t tell whether some aim has been achieved, the retention of it as an
aim, can play a crucial and essential role in informing and structuring the revision of our epistemic aims
and values. This important role that truth plays as an ideal, even if often unattainable or completely
verifiable end, will be the subject of the realist argument we will consider.
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various epistemic norms. We immediately run into a problem. The only direct means
available to us in the evaluation of the norms is comparing them to our empirical
observations and not the underlying truth. Thus, we can’t make any progress in deciding
on what norms to follow if we attempt to use truth itself as a constraint, thus we must
settle for designing our norms using the actual measures at our disposal. Whether this
argument or line of reasoning actually works or not isn’t really important for what we are
concerned with here. All that matters is that this reasoning is relevant and must be taken
seriously and is a kind of reasoning we must consider in our evaluation of whether to
treat truth as an epistemic end.
If this is a fair characterization of a common line of anti-realist reasoning, then
philosophers have been engaging in design-based reasoning about the appropriateness of
various epistemic ends for years. This should hardly be surprising since the most
common form of anti-realism for decades was pragmatism and such views quite
explicitly argue from the achievement of certain ends to the adoption of certain norms
and concepts. All of that said, I want to use this point as a place to head off some
potential confusion. Using the Conceptual Design Method and being a pragmatist are
theoretically compatible, but not identical. Pragmatists define certain epistemic values in
terms of certain pragmatic values. Truth for example might get defined in terms of beliefs
with a certain utility. The Conceptual Design Method makes no such assumption about
epistemic value. All it says is that whatever we find the epistemic values to be, we should
figure out the content of our other epistemic norms and concepts by trying to design them
with the achievement of those ends in mind. But, the epistemic ends that are plugged into
such a method can at least in principle be either realist or anti-realist. Pragmatists can and
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I think have used what I've called the Design Method, but not all users of the Design
Method are Pragmatists.

4.1.2 Reward Hacking and Side-Effects of Non-Realist Aims
In this section we are going to turn our attention to potential realist arguments that
can be given from a design-focused view. We will begin in what might seem like an
initially unlikely place: AI design. When someone is trying to construct an artificial
intelligence, the core question of what goals or evaluative functions to build into your
design is crucial in understanding whether it will behave in the ways we desire. People
working in AI safety have begun to do detailed researching into potential problems that
might arise if the utility function of a potential AI is poorly programmed and have
identified a few potential problems that might arise. The problem raised by AI safety
researchers that will be most useful for framing our discussion is the problem of reward
hacking.
Let's use the example of a reward hacking cleaning robot that is used in many AI
safety papers to illustrate the problem (Amodei et al. 2016). Suppose I am designing a
cleaning robot. There is a difficult question for anyone designing such an AI system. The
presence or absence of a mess in a room isn’t something that is transparent to the AI, and
thus I can’t simply directly program it to minimize the mess in the room. We need some
set of sensors to provide the AI with some measurements about the features of the room,
and then give it some way to determine what messes are there on the basis of that data.
Naively, we might suppose that we could program our robot simply to be rewarded
whenever it doesn’t detect a mess in the room and to receive some negative reward
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whenever some mess is detected by its sensors thus motivating the AI system to clean the
mess. If it cleans the mess, no negative reward and lots of positive reward. Problem
solved, right? The problem with this reward scheme is that it can easily be hacked by a
good AI. It could, for example, just obstruct its own sensors, and voila no detected mess!
In so doing it gets lots of positive reward and no negative reward. The core problem with
reward hacking is that, if the AI can treat a measure of something as the target, rather than
the thing itself, then the AI is incentivized to manipulate any weakness in the relationship
between the measurement and the thing measured because doing so is often easier than
really getting the intended goal. This is of course a familiar problem with regular old nonartificial human agents. In school, students obsess not over the intended goal of learning,
but rather the goal of getting good grades or a good test score. In doing so they have
transformed a measurement of the aim into the aim itself, and thus any weakness in that
measure will cause declines in the achievement of the truly important goal.
In a similar way, anti-realist positions which treat some measure such as empirical
adequacy as the ultimate aim of inquiry are potentially vulnerable to odd manipulations if
we really take seriously the idea that those measures are the true target. For example,
suppose at some point in the future we have come up with a physical theory that has no
observed anomalies and gets what essentially amounts to completely accurate empirical
predictions when current instrumentation is used. Suppose then that some scientist thinks
he can invent a new instrument which will enable probing the physical world at some yet
unobserved level of reality. If we take seriously the idea that our true aim is merely
empirical adequacy, then this scientist is a possible threat to our aim rather than ally.
There is some likelihood that whatever new observations we can perform with the new
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instrument won’t fit with the predictions of our current theory. Why take this risk? If our
goal is a theory that fits all our measures, then new methods of measurement aren’t
unambiguously good. They may prompt new ideas and lead to better theories that are fit
better with our previous measurement, but this is no guarantee. If our current theory is
especially good at making predictions with the current set of potential observations, then
the new instrument would seem to offer more potential risk than reward. Treating
empirical adequacy as an aim rather than a measure would create a conflict where none
should reasonably exist. New instruments and observations should be seen as an
unambiguous good, but defining the goal in the anti-realist way makes any new
instrumentation a best a risk/reward decision. This is essentially the problem of reward
hacking. Just like the cleaning robot turning on its cameras isn't necessarily a good thing
or even likely to harm its reward function, if we look at fulfilling our observed measures
as ends in themselves, then “turning on” new sources of evidence isn't necessarily a good
thing, and could even be something that a consistent empiricist should work against. But,
turning your back on new evidence is clearly epistemically bad.
One can of course try to come up with an empiricist view which account for this
kind of reward hacking problem by adding in significant modifiers. For example, we
might say that our aim is a theory that is empirically adequate on all the measures we
have or could potentially design. But, these changes seem unmotivated from within a
purely anti-realist position. Why care about the size of the pool of observation if what
really matters is merely fitting our view to what observe. Why add any addendums to the
basic empiricist view except in so far as you think that these additional measures are
potential indicators of something else outside of the measures themselves that you really

122
value. It might be possible to suggest a set of measures that can’t be reward hacked, but
the reason to adopt them seem unambiguously because of their connection to the deeper
value of truth, and it is hard to see how you would go about designing this more
sophisticated empiricist view except by implicitly designing it with the assumption that
observation has some value due to a relationship with something beyond the contents of
our minds. It doesn't do to make a complex anti-realist view, if all the additions that are
made are fundamentally motivated by an implicit commitment to a realist constraint.
That's why a modal version of empiricism which demands we pay attention to all possible
or potential sources of observations makes sense. Without the realist appeal, a modal or
other move is unmotivated. At its core the realist commitment to truth as an aim of the
source of a kind of unrevisable commitment to a fundamental conceptual distinction
between our measurements of a thing and the thing itself, and to always be open to things
which seem like they might improve the measure's connection to that underlying reality.
So, from within the design perspective, even if the final truth is unattainable, we
might think that something akin to a commitment to realism as an idealized aim still
plays a huge normative role in determining how we should respond to and think about
revisions to our methods of observation or changes in epistemic rules and procedures. A
commitment to reality prevents us from hacking the epistemic game.

5. Conclusion
Much of determining what our epistemic ends are will end up not changing
significantly when we think about things from within the design method. Philosophers for
a long time have given careful consideration to their intuitions about what things are good
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for humans or bad for them, and this remains an ineliminable feature of epistemic
theorizing from within the design method. Our intuitive judgments about what epistemic
ends are of value also should no doubt be factored against other judgments in a process of
reflective equilibrium
However, the design method does help turn some focus on a certain set of
considerations that belong in that equilibrium process. The appropriateness of adopting
an aim isn't merely a function of how appealing we find the fulfillment of that aim to be,
but interestingly facts about what norms we will adopt and what ends we can actually
manage to achieve should and do feedback into our evaluation of whether something that
we value is something that we should be pursuing, and in the case of the design method,
using as an aim in determining our norms of action. If truth is unknowable or
unattainable, then there is no way we could ever engage in an evaluation of our pursuit of
that aim. This could be reason to revise our understanding of the aim into something that
can actually play a role in the regulation of our actual epistemic activities. Considerations
like this explicitly see the role that a proposed goal has in shaping our practices and uses
the success or failure of that goal in the role as feedback into whether the goal was the
right one to pursue in the first place.
We began this chapter with the concern that, since epistemic ends are inputs to the
design process, the design process can give no reasons for or against the endorsement of
any particular epistemic end, but this is wrong. By trying to see what different norms and
behaviors will result from thinking about different things as our epistemic ends we can
revise our understanding of whether those ends are appropriate precisely when seeing
them as ends causes clear problems in producing implementable or sensible norms. Just
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as an engineer might revise what he thinks of as a good bridge when he finally gets to the
business of designing real bridges. We as epistemic agents can and should revise our
understanding of the epistemic ends in response to all the practical realities that arise
from designing our practices in the pursuit of those ends.
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Chapter 5: Revising Norms: Self-Defeat and Bootstrapping
1. The Design Method and Potential Self-Referential Problems
In chapter one, I set aside a group of possible worries for the account of the
methodology of epistemology proposed here. They centered on the idea that there is
something problematic about a view that places epistemic concepts at the end of the
process of inquiry and which makes them susceptible to significant revisions. This
chapter will examine and clarify two potential ideas of what might be problematic about
the method due to these features and attempt to resolve any potential worries.
The first potential problem that might affect an account of the sort proposed here
is that, in the process of revision, it somehow becomes self-undermining or selfdefeating. We will go into more detail in the next section, but the basic worry is that
potential revisions to concepts like justification might render things we believed in the
past unjustified, and if those beliefs played an essential role in justifying the revisions of
the concept of justification in the first place, then those very revisions seem to be selfundermining. If we make them, then in retrospect, it will seem as though we should not
have made them. Self-defeating methods are unstable and that is clearly a problem.
The second potential problem isn’t that the view may undermine itself, quite the
opposite. The problem is that the justifications for the final contents of the epistemic
concepts will end up being circular in a way that seems problematically self-justifying.
Again, we will go into detail later, but it will be useful to begin with an initial
characterization of the potential worry. The design method proposed here proceeds in two
broad steps. First, we determine what sets of norms will best produce things of epistemic
value, for example, true beliefs. Then we design a set of epistemic concepts that will best
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allow us to talk about, enforce, and promulgate those norms. The circularity worry
emerges in the first step. Determining what set of norms will best produce things of
epistemic value is a cognitive activity and is thus governed by epistemic norms. This
raises the potential that our initial norms might “bootstrap” themselves into our final
view, not because they are in fact the norms that produce the most epistemic value, but
because initially following them leads to a view of the world where those norms will
necessarily seem reliable. To give a toy example, suppose I start off thinking that trusting
my senses is a good norm, so I end mostly up believing that things are as my senses have
told me. Suppose I then try to determine what norms would give the most true beliefs
when followed. Well, of course some norm along the lines of “trust my senses” will seem
to have a great track record. This isn’t necessarily because it is the best norm, perhaps I
am a brain in a vat, but simply because my initial assumption that my senses are
trustworthy redounds into my very view of the world, and can thus make the norm seem
like a good guide to truth. I believe P because I follow norm N. I believe N is reliable
because it leads to true beliefs like my belief that P. I should follow N because it is
reliable. Potentially self-justifying methods are problematic because our view of them as
justified may have nothing to do with their actual positive epistemic features.
In this chapter we will examine the potential problems of self-defeat and
bootstrapping for the design method. In the end we will see that there is no reason to
suppose that the design method will undermine a sufficient positive epistemic status for
the methods it itself uses, and thus it need not be problematically self-defeating. There is
also no reason why the design method need involve any bootstrapping. In fact, the
problems caused by bootstrapping should be obvious from within the design perspective,
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and thus we have reason to use the design method in ways that avoid the problems of
bootstrapping.

2. The Problem of Self-Defeat
Worries about self-defeat have famously been raised for a number of highly
revisionary epistemological positions. George Bealer (1998), for example, gave an
argument against radical empiricism on the grounds that the only justification for the
empiricist’s justificatory standards rely on intuition, a source of evidence the empiricist
rejects. Self-defeat has also been used as an argument for phenomenal conservativism by
Michael Huemer (2001). He argues that any position that rejects his phenomenal
conservative view of justification will end up self-defeating because of the role that
seemings play as the basis of all of our beliefs. Given the prevalence of arguments of this
sort, it is only natural to wonder whether the potentially significantly revisionary
methodology defended here is a possible target of this kind of argument.
In this section, we will proceed in three stages. First, we will attempt to examine
the concept of self-defeat in order to better understand how self-defeat works. Second, we
will examine self-defeat arguments from the literature and determine what features the
method proposed here has that might make it the potential target of self-defeat arguments.
Finally, we will attempt to illustrate how the method might be employed in ways that will
not suffer from problematic self-defeat.

2.1 What is Self-Defeat?
To begin our examination of self-defeat let’s begin with perhaps the easiest to
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understand kind of case, self-defeating arguments. Here is a commonly shared view of
self-defeating arguments expressed by Paul Silva. “An argument is epistemically selfdefeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s
conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises”
(2012). To give a fairly simple toy example, suppose I gave the following skeptical
argument:
(P1) An agent Φ is justified in believing P only if Φ can eliminate all possible
sources of error in believing P.
(P2) No one can eliminate all possible sources of error in believing any
proposition.
(C) No one is justified in believing any proposition.
This argument is clearly self-defeating simply because the truth of its conclusion
undermines the justification for every possible belief. It thus certainly undermines any
justification for the belief in its premises. The trouble with self-defeating arguments like
this one isn’t that its premises can’t be true, or that the truth of those premises don’t entail
the conclusion. The trouble is that accepting the argument seems to undermine our very
justification for believing the premises of the argument in the first place, and thus any
entitlement we might have to believe the conclusion.
Silva’s understanding of self-defeat explains the simple case above, but it seems
like arguments can have the same self-defeating character even when the truth or belief in
the conclusion doesn’t undermine the justification for the premises. We can also have
self-defeat when the truth or acceptance of the conclusion undermines the justificatory
status of the inferences used in the argument. Here is a toy example:
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(P1) Inference to the best explanation has been unreliable in the past
(P2) The best explanation of the past unreliability of inference to the best
explanation is that inference to the best explanation is generally unreliable.
(C1) Inference to the best explanation is generally unreliable.
(P3) If a belief is formed by a generally unreliable method, then it is unjustified.
(C2) Our beliefs formed by inference to the best explanation are unjustified.
Ignore for now whether the premises are true. What seems true is that we are only
justified in believing (C1) on the basis of (P1) and (P2) if inference to the best
explanation produces justified beliefs. Although the conclusion doesn’t obviously
undermine our justification for the premises themselves, it certainly undermines the
justificatory status of the necessary inference used in the argument. This kind of selfdefeat is clearly a distinct phenomenon from the type involving the undermining of the
justification of the premises themselves, but clearly has the same self-undermining
character. To fully capture the variety of kinds of self-defeat we will have to substantially
broaden our initial notion. It seems to me that the following is a more general account of
the core notion of a self-defeating argument:
An argument is self-defeating iff the assumption that the conclusion of the
argument is true or justified based on the inferences used in the argument supports
(in combination with background beliefs) the claim that the argument lacks some
feature necessary for conferring justification on the conclusion.
The truth of the premises and validity of the inferences are only the most obvious features
of an argument that are necessary for its success. There might be others. For example, we
might think a 100 premised argument for the conclusion that one can’t be justified in 100
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beliefs would be self-defeating even if the conclusion doesn’t entail that any particular
one of the premises is unjustified. Another kind of case might be one in which an
argument’s conclusion entailed we were physically incapable of performing the
inferences used in the argument, even if those inferences would be justification
conferring were we able to do them.
Now that we have a better and more general grip on self-defeating arguments,
let’s again broaden the scope of our discussion to the issue of whether we can understand
self-defeating beliefs and self-defeating methods.
Let’s begin with self-defeating beliefs. Suppose that I believed, as in the first selfdefeat argument of this section, that: “An agent Φ is justified in believing P only if Φ can
eliminate all possible sources of error in believing P”. This belief seems to be selfdefeating, but only once we include some further assumptions. To see this, we can
construct a hypothetical scenario in which this belief wouldn’t be self-defeating. Suppose
that a being like Kant’s God believed this claim about justification. Kant’s God’s beliefs
are active rather than passive because what God believes about the world determines
what is true about the world rather than being a passive attempt to represent the world. It
seems that this kind of a being could believe that justification involved the elimination of
all error without self-defeat because his believing that very proposition would eliminate
all possible error about its truth. However, we are not gods, and the facts about our
epistemic capacities seem to entail that we could be in error about most of our beliefs. It
also seems that the issue of the structure of justification is so complex, that it seems that
we could easily be in error about most or all justificatory principles to some degree. It is
in that sense that the proposition is self-defeating. What this highlights is that self-defeat
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is a relative phenomenon. Believing some proposition might be self-defeating for me and
not for you because of differences in our epistemic capacities and the means by which we
formed the belief in the proposition. I propose we consider the following to be a decent, if
imperfect, notion of what a self-defeating belief is:
An agent Φ’s belief that P is self-defeating iff either:
i. The truth of P supports (in combination with background beliefs) the claim
that Φ’s belief that P is false or unjustified
ii. The fact that Φ believes that P supports (in combination with background
beliefs) the claim that Φ’s belief that P is false or unjustified.
An important component of self-defeat is that the acceptance of the belief itself or its
contents are what leads to the potential problem for the justification of the belief and not
something else. A belief merely formed by an unreliable process or with lack of evidence
is not thereby self-defeating. The contents of the belief or the fact that one believes it
must be the reason the justificatory status of the belief is in question. We might also try to
understand the concept of self-defeat in terms of explanation. Beliefs are self-defeating
when either their content or the fact that you formed them could form the central part of
an explanation for either why the belief is false or unjustified.
Having seen the role that methods of belief formation play in plausible accounts
of self-defeat of both beliefs and arguments, it is time to turn to the question of what
makes a method of belief formation self-defeating. So far, we have defined self-defeat in
part in terms of what a person believes or the conclusion they have reached as a result of
an argument. Unfortunately, things don’t appear quite as simple when we turn our
attention to methods of belief formation. Unlike a belief, or an argument with a defined
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conclusion, methods of belief formation have no necessary or specified conclusion that
they reach in every case. Because of this we must begin by examining a more general
notion that of a potentially self-defeating method.
A method of belief formation, F, is potentially self-defeating iff some agent, Φ,
could correctly use F to either:
i. form a belief that method F is an unjustified method of belief formation, or
ii. form some other belief P which in conjunction with Φ’s norms of
justification and other beliefs justify them in forming a belief that method
F is an unjustified method of belief formation.
Essentially a potentially self-defeating method is one where a person who properly uses
the method might end up arriving at the conclusion that their very method was flawed. It
might do this directly as in case (i) described above, or indirectly due to action of other
methods as in (ii).
It should be fairly obvious why potential self-defeat could be a problem. If I am
using a method and its uses tells me to no longer accept beliefs formed by that method, it
seems the only stable and consistent position I can maintain is to give up the use of that
method. But, of course, potential self-defeat is only a potential problem. We can see this
by considering how methods we rely on all the time are in fact potentially self-defeating.
Suppose I go a party where hallucinogen use is common. At the party, someone seems to
whisper in my ear “I put something in your drink.” Hearing this in conjunction with the
norms surrounding testimony might entitle me to believe that I am unjustified in
believing what I see or hear at this party. This is a case where the use of hearing seems to
end up self-defeating. However, the existence of this kind of potential self-defeat does not
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seem to be a general reason not to rely on hearing in most contexts. When considering
problems for a general methods we will have to look beyond potential self-defeat.
There are at least three kind of self-defeat that are more pressing issues, given the
goal of this project. I will label them: necessary, general, and contextual self-defeat.
Necessary self-defeat occurs when a method cannot be implemented by any agent in any
context without producing a self-defeating belief. Given the variety of possible epistemic
agents, this kind of self-defeat is only likely to occur for very unusual and probably selfreferential belief forming methods e.g. “believe P only if you have most reason to believe
not P”. General self-defeat occurs when a method implemented by an agent produces a
self-defeating belief that puts into question the general reliability of use of the method by
that agent in any context. This is contrasted with contextual self-defeat which occurs
when a method implemented by an agent produces a self-defeating belief that puts into
question the reliability of the method in some isolatable epistemic context. The
hallucinogen party example would be a case of contextual self-defeat. The reliability of
hearing is put into question in that case, but only for some isolatable time when it is likely
the drug might be in effect. General methods of belief formation can be sustained if the
only self-defeat they will suffer from is contextual because reliance on the method can be
modulated in accordance with the presence of the defeat. Thus, significantly worrying
kinds of self-defeat will have to be more general in character.

2.2. Self-Defeat and the Design Method
In the previous section, we did some work in attempting to isolate out and identity
the phenomena of self-defeat. In this section, we will proceed in two stages. First, we will

134
go through a self-defeat argument from the literature to isolate issues that are likely to
cause philosopher’s worries about the potential for self-defeat in philosophical positions.
Second, we will examine what I take to be the strongest version of a problem of selfdefeat for the design view.
Michael Huemer has forcefully argued that anyone that denies the truth of
phenomenal conservativism will ultimately hold a self-defeating belief (2001, 2007).
Phenomenal conservativism is the view that if it seems to me that P is true, and I don’t
have relevant defeaters, then I have some degree of justification in believing P. His selfdefeat argument goes as follows:
1. When we form beliefs, with few exceptions not relevant here, our
beliefs are based on the way things seem to us.
2. If one’s belief that p is based on something that does not constitute a
source of justification for believing that p, then one’s belief that p is
unjustified.
3. Therefore, if seemings or appearances do not constitute a source of
justification for us, then our beliefs are generally unjustified (including the
belief that PC is false). (2007)
The core idea of this argument is that any theory of justification will be unjustified
if it excluded the claim that phenomenal conservatism is true because the belief in that
theory will ultimately have its basis in something that only the phenomenal conservative
says can justify a belief. Our goal here is not to evaluate whether this argument works19,
but only to extract something about the argument structure given. I think this argument as

I think it ultimately fails due to a mistake surrounding how we should understand the notion of epistemic
basis. Being the proximate cause of a belief is not the same thing as being its basis in the relevant sense, but
that is a subject for another time.
19
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well as ones given by philosopher’s like BonJour (1998) and Bealer (1996) in defense of
intuition have a common structure.
Both Huemer and some defenders of a priori intuition begin with some method
that they think is the basis of a large subset or even all of our beliefs. To defend that
method from people who question whether it is a justifiable method they argue that any
reason for questioning the justificatory status of the method ultimately relies on the use of
that very method, thus the denier of their method is placed in a bind, either (i) their belief
is unjustified because it has no proper source of justification, or (ii) it does have a
potentially good source, but is in fact false. This is an interesting kind of defense because
it doesn’t establish that what the critic claims is false. It only establishes that if the critic
of phenomenal conservativism or of a priori intuition is right, then ironically, they have
no justification for saying so and thus their case should be unpersuasive.
Given this structure, we should expect that many self-defeat worries for the
position I am advocating will occur if the method I am advocating brings into doubt the
justificatory status of some highly general and ubiquitous belief forming method, and
thus we will begin by turning our attention towards this prospect.
To begin let’s start by considering the set of beliefs that form the basis for the
justification of epistemic norms on my picture. A huge number of beliefs go into shaping
the contents of the norms on my view, but we can divide them into these rough
categories:
1) Beliefs about what are the best and/or most desirable epistemic ends.
2) Beliefs about the cognitive capacities of creatures like us.
3) Beliefs about the general functioning and maintenance of social norms.
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4) Beliefs about the general environment we find ourselves in.
5) Beliefs about the likely result of the general adherence to a social epistemic norm
given (2), (3), and (4).
These beliefs are formed in all sorts of ways by untold numbers of methods and thus
there are lots of at least potential places where self-defeat might arise. But, let’s begin
with a salient example. We might suppose that any initial beliefs about (1) are formed by
something that appears to be intuition.20 It is imaginable that we might have the following
issue. Suppose that we come to believe that allowing people to rely on intuitive beliefs
tends to produce worse epistemic outcomes than forbidding it or limiting it more than we
do now. If this were the case, then the Design Method would seem to sanction the belief
in a self-undermining norm. To highlight the potential problem, let’s consider the
following self-defeating argument for an anti-intuition norm that the Design Method
might potentially sanction.
(P1) Believing truth and avoiding falsehood is the final epistemic end.
(P2) Social sanction of a norm endorsing beliefs formed via mere intuition tends
to lead to less true beliefs and more false beliefs that alternative norm X.
(P3) We shouldn’t sanction norms that are worse at serving our final epistemic
ends than some alternative.
(C) We shouldn’t sanction a norm endorsing beliefs formed via mere intuition.

20

It's probably worth reminding the reader here that at least as far as I have characterized our way of
forming beliefs like (1) in chapter 4, I have not rejected the use of intuition out right. Though I have
mostly talked about knowledge of things like (1) as being grounded in knowledge or our own interests,
which is likely a different phenomenon than linguistic intuitions or a priori intellectual seemings that
some think ground knowledge of logic and metaphysics. I don't think anything in the design method is
fundamentally hostile to these either, though I harbor some personal doubts about robust intellectual
intuitions.
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The self-defeat in this argument arises in so far as we have reason to think that the
truth of the conclusion would undermine the source of the positive epistemic status of
(P1) for us. In other words, if the design method told us to give up intuition, but intuition
was how we came to be justified in believing that a particular purpose was the correct
epistemic purpose in the first place, then it appears that we would have lost whatever
initial justification we might have had to follow the method at all.
Of course, this case is only the most contextually salient possible case of selfdefeat. The method advocated here has a high potential of producing significantly revised
norms. It doesn’t just potentially threaten to bring into doubt our reliance on intuition, but
potentially just about any other common sense means of forming beliefs. For example, it
seems highly unlikely that the norms of reasoning or testimony that most people naively
follow in their everyday lives are optimal for the service of their epistemic ends. This
raise a potential problem. Anyone attempting to follow the design method will have to
begin with some set of beliefs to initially begin the process of deciding what norms
would best serve their ends, but all those beliefs were formed by following common
sense norms. For example, I have some beliefs about how my cognitive system functions,
but it is highly unlikely that in coming to form these beliefs I did so in accordance with
whatever norms I would conclude were best suited for a creature like me to follow to
achieve its ends. The design method sees norms as tools that we engineer through a
process of optimization. There is essentially no chance that the tools we naively began
with are identical to the optimized epistemic tools the method aims to work us towards.
This seemingly obvious point leads to the following potential argument against the design
method:
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(P1) A method is self-defeating if an agent correctly using the method would form
a belief that entails that the method is an unjustified method of forming beliefs.
(P2) Using the design method is likely to produce a belief that our everyday
methods of belief formation are unjustified.
(P3) The design method initially relies on beliefs produced by our everyday
methods of belief formation.
(P4) If a method relies on another unjustified method, then it is an unjustifiable
method of forming beliefs.
(C1) Using the design method is likely to produce a belief that entails that the
conceptual engineering method is unjustified. (from P2, P3, and P4)
(C2) The design method is likely self-defeating. (from P1 and C1)
It is to responses to this argument that we will turn in the next section.

2.3. Self-Defeat as a General Concern
In this section I will argue for a plausible solution to the problem of self-defeat
that centers around the idea that revision of norms is consistent with according the
following of previous norms with some positive epistemic status that makes sense of the
normative appropriateness of employing the revised methods.
In the final argument of the previous section, the premises of the argument turns
on the question of what methods of belief formation are held to be justified or unjustified.
However, as was made clear in the second chapter, I am far from confident that there is a
single univocal notion of justification, and I think the problem of self-defeat can be
resolved by distinguishing between several different types of positive epistemic status
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that a method, belief, or proposition might have. In the previous section, I gave an
informal argument for (P2) of the final argument that went something like this: It is
unlikely that our common sense epistemic norms are the optimal norms for serving our
ends. Thus, if we follow the design method, then following our everyday norms is
unlikely to be justified. This is a good argument if we understand justification as a
concept picking out whatever set of norms it is optimal for us to follow to serve our ends.
This is an obvious and important concept to have and one that could be a prime focus of
someone pursuing my project, but there is nothing about the method that I employ that
entails that the only norms are norms of optimization. It is both possible to recognize that
common sense norms aren’t perfect and recognize that they have some more limited
positive epistemic status. There are numerous possible positive statuses that common
sense methods could have even if they aren’t perfect or the ones we ultimately ought to
be following. We might think that people who believe on the basis of these methods are
immune from a kind of epistemic blame. Common sense beliefs would then be justified
where justified is understood as epistemic blamelessness. More importantly we could
understand common sense methods as evidence providing methods even when they are
flawed. As an analogy imagine that I was a person attempting to predict the winner of a
political election from relevant polling data. There might be polls that I have good reason
to think have flawed methods in some respect. Despite this it might make sense to believe
that including the data from these polls will, in the aggregate, end up making my
predictions more reliable than if I ignore them altogether. There is still useful information
in the polls even when they aren’t done perfectly. Likewise, even if common sense beliefs
are often formed in less than optimal ways, it is still reasonable to hold that the beliefs
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formed by these methods still have sufficient true indicative qualities to make them
useful, if imperfect, evidence. This positive epistemic status isn’t something that we
normally label justification, but it is in fact the more plausible epistemic status that would
figure in a better version of (P4). (P4) states: “If a method relies on another unjustified
method, then it is an unjustifiable method of forming beliefs”. A more plausible (P4)
would likely read: “If a method relies on another insufficiently truth indicative method,
then it is an unjustifiable method of forming belief.
Since I don't know ultimately what beliefs following the design method will
ultimately lead to I can't give a full justification of the claim that it won't lead to selfdefeat. But, I think we can point to some decent reasons to think that it leading to a
sufficient undermining of our common sense norms and their positive is unlikely. The
primary evidence I would point to is our past experience with revising our common sense
norms about epistemic matters. Over the years scientists and philosophers have
discovered many sensory and cognitive illusions. We know not to trust the appearance of
objects when there is likely lots of refraction of light. We know that certain patterns of
argument will seem valid to us, but are not. Had we tried to translate many of our
ancestor's behaviors into commitments to some set of common sense epistemic norms,
many of them would be what we would recognize as deeply flawed. But, despite this it is
clear that we still see our senses and reasoning capacities as good enough, at least in
certain narrow and carefully applied contexts, that we can explain how we could have
correctly come to recognize that our norms were in need of revisions in spite of all our
other failings. In fact, it is hard to imagine how we could or would possibly be led to a
view that sufficiently undermined the positive epistemic status of our everyday methods
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that such a story couldn't be reconstructable, at least not without supposing that the
experiences that lead us to such a view would make it rational to be a skeptic.

3. The Problem of Bootstrapping
Unlike the problem of self-defeat, which is a problem fundamentally about
instability, the problem of bootstrapping is one of a kind of over-stability. It's a problem
centered on how the acceptance of certain norms or methods could being potentially selfreinforcing. This self-reinforcing could lead them to be thought of as more reliable or
justified than is appropriate.
The original problem of bootstrapping isn’t a perfect analog to the problem we
will be discussing, but has enough common features with the problem at issue that it will
be a good place to begin our discussion. Let’s start by laying out one paradigm example
of the problem of bootstrapping given by Vogel:
The Gas Gauge. The gas gauge in Roxanne’s car is reliable, though she
has no evidence about its reliability. On one occasion the gauge reads F,
leading her to believe that the tank is full, which it is. She notes that on
this occasion the tank reads F and is full. She then repeats this procedure
many times on other occasions, eventually coming to believe that the
gauge reliably indicates when the tank is full (2000).
The problem with what Roxanne has done should be obvious. Regardless of
whether the gauge on the car is really reliable, this way of forming her beliefs will lead
her to think it is reliable. Essentially the only cause of her belief in the reliability of the
gauge is her initial assumption that she should believe what the meter says about the tank.
The meter is subjected to no outside test or verification and thus she couldn’t ever have
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come to believe it was mistaken.
This example was originally proposed as a counterexample to reliabilism. Vogel
pointed out that if the gas-gauge was actually reliable, then both Roxanne’s belief that the
gauge reads F and that the tank is full will be justified because they both are the results of
reliable processes. Since Roxanne can then deduce that the gauge is reliable from her
beliefs, it looks like the reliabilist is committed to saying that Roxanne’s belief in the
reliability of the gauge is justified. This looks bad because it essentially says that just
randomly trusting a reliable process without putting it to any real external test will lead to
a justified belief in the reliability of that method. There are no doubt replies that the
reliabilist can give to this worry, but defending reliabilism is not the concern here.
So, how does this problem generalize beyond the worry for reliabilism to apply to
what has been proposed here. To begin let’s start by giving a more abstract account of
what is going on in the Roxanne case. The case appears to involve bootstrapping because
three things are true.
(1) An agent, A, believes a set of propositions P on the basis of method M that A
has no outside reason or justification for thinking is reliable.
(2) The truth of P would entail that M is reliable.
(3) The agent A concludes that M is reliable on the basis of P alone.
Given that a highly plausible view of our epistemic ends is that we ultimately want
something in the ballpark of true belief, establishing that a method is reliable in a
questionable way would quite easily affect not just our judgments of what methods are
reliable, but also affect, if the method argued for in this work is correct, our judgments
about our epistemic norms and concepts more generally. To see this let’s abstractly
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outline a case with three slightly different features.
(1) An agent, A, believes the set of propositions P on the basis of method M that A
has no outside reason or justification for thinking is a good method to follow.
(2) The truth of P would entail that a norm endorsing the following of M would
maximize our epistemic good.
(3) The agent A concludes that M is a good method to follow on the basis of P and the
view that we ought to follow methods that maximize the epistemic good.

It would obviously be bad if we could bootstrap any old norm into our epistemic
practice just because we happened to initially believe things in accordance with it. It still
looks pretty bad even if the method we end up justifying in this way really does
maximize our epistemic good.
It has been claimed by some internalists that the solution to the bootstrapping
problem is that we can’t be justified in believing something on the basis of a method
without having good reason for believing that method is reliable or is a justified method
of forming a belief. This is essentially to claim that the belief mentioned in (1) isn’t
justified because it lacks internal justification and thus the belief in (3) that is deduced
from it will be unjustified, too. The trouble with this as a solution is that it seems to be
worse than the disease. Such meta-belief requirements are infamous for their skeptical
consequences.
Let’s return to the case of Roxanne to show why merely adding a meta-belief
requirement would lead to skeptical problems, and even worse, wouldn’t in fact resolve
the real issue. The first thing to note is that it won’t do to just say that Roxanne has to
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believe that the gauge is reliable at the start because that belief could just be a guess. So,
presumably Roxanne would have to have good reasons for thinking the gauge is reliable.
So, suppose she tested the gauge against a dipstick device. She believes what the dipstick
tells here about the tanks contents and that gives her reason to believe that the gauge is
reliable. But, the dipstick device is also a method of forming a belief and thus she would
need a good reason for thinking it is reliable, and so on, and so on. To escape the
skeptical regress, you must either posit a point that the regress stops or invoke something
like a coherentist solution. Whatever method I take to be basic will be subject to the
bootstrap problem, and coherentism suffers from a significant number of other problems.
Worse yet, the demand for a meta-belief doesn’t really solve the problem as
Weisberg (2010) notes. Adding a justified meta-belief in the reliability of the gauge may
make your beliefs about the verdicts of the gauge justified, but it doesn’t change the fact
that it would still be problematic to use the gauges verdicts as reasons for believing it is
reliable. Suppose I was told by a trusted person that the gauge was reliable and thus was
justified in believing what it told me, and then I used the verdicts of the gauge to increase
my credence in the reliability of the gauge above what I gave them from the trusted
source. This would still be problematic. Even if I know the gauge works from another
source, I shouldn’t use the gauge itself as additional reasons to strengthen my belief.
So, what is the source of the problem? It seems to me that the core issue is the one
identified by Weisberg (2010). We need to prohibit methods of forming beliefs that lead
to what he calls feedback. Feedback occurs when a conclusion receives more support
from a set of premises and their inductive lemmas than from the premises alone.
Essentially the problem is when the strength of a set of reasons is increased beyond what
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they alone support due to the fact that their consequences seem to inductively support
things the premises alone did not. For example, in the case of Roxanne, the gauge reading
full does not by itself support the claim that the gauge is reliable, but the gauge reading
full and the lemma that the tank is full does support the claim that the gauge is reliable.
This kind of amplification of the support provided by claims leads to these bad
consequences.
What consequences does this have for the problem of bootstrapping raised for my
view? The core question is whether the conclusions drawn from the method necessarily
involve feedback. The answer is obviously: No. When designing our epistemic norms we
shouldn't and don't just think about the employment of methods of belief formation and
whether they are reliable given what we believe about the world. We also think about
general features of how epistemic systems must check and monitor their employment of
the various processes at their disposal, and the problem of a process unwarrantedly selfreinforcing its use is one that we can and should abstractly recognize when thinking about
designing ourselves as epistemic systems. This means that we will, if we are good
designers, try to determine what barrier we can put in place to prevent this kind of
problematic reinforcement. We also have to figure out what systematic rules can best do
this in a way that doesn't undermine the whole project, like a blanket meta-belief
requirement would.
So, how can we plausibly design norms for belief formation that avoid
problematic bootstrapping? I have little in the way of definitive and complete answers,
but there is at least one fairly obvious prohibition that the problem of bootstrapping
suggests should be part of any adequate set of self-revisory epistemic norms. The direct
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assessment of a method M's epistemic track-record using M cannot be reason to accord
M a more positive epistemic status than before. Spelling out what “directness” amounts
to here is a bit difficult, but I include it and the reference to track-record to differentiate
between two possible uses of a method in verifying itself. One example is the
problematic case, as in the gas gauge case. The other would be a use of a method to
investigate features of the world that underwrite the mechanisms that explain the
method's reliability. For example, a vision scientist might investigate the operation of
human eyes and the fact that there seem to be clear physical mechanisms that can explain
how we come to see things in the outside world does seem to give some more support to
our use of vision as a tool in investigating the world. Why isn't this problematic
bootstrapping? The reason is fairly simple. When I trust what I see, that trust does
nothing to fix or alter the content of my visual experience itself (except perhaps in some
fringe cases). So, for example, the fact that the vision scientist trusts their eyes doesn't by
itself make it any more likely that the world that he experiences will be of one with
physical bodies that have eyes that work in particular ways. In this way, the use of vision
and our trusting it doesn't guarantee we will experience a world where it seems like there
are mechanisms that exist to explain the reliability of visual experience. This means that
the presence of absence of experiences of these kinds of physical explanations can serve
as a kind of test of the method precisely because there is no guarantee the results will
come back in support of the use of vision. In fact investigation into the mechanism
behind our visual experience has been used to undermine the justificatory status of some
of our visual beliefs. Our eyes have blind spots and only a small part of the retina has lots
of light sensitive elements. This suggests our sense that we see all the objects that lie in

147
our visual field at any moment is a kind of illusion despite appearances. This suggests it’s
not a mere matter of self-checking that makes bootstrapping a problem, but rather using
our methods to check themselves in ways that don't function as genuine tests because the
use of the method will inevitably verify itself
To assure the reader that these anti-bootstrapping requirements would arise when
we think about things from within the design method, I want to return to a case I've used
repeatedly: designing robots that must function as world-modeling systems. When
designing such a system, I must recognize that it has some limited set of methods and
operations it can use to come to form its model of the environment. I will also recognize
that none of the methods are likely to be perfect and can malfunction or perform poorly in
different contexts. This means that I will have to put in place monitoring systems to
determine if, for example, the cameras have failed or if the microprocessors are
malfunctioning, etc. The worry about bootstrapping is essentially a prohibition against
programming the system in certain kind of ways where its self-monitoring techniques
will fail to function as adequate tests and end up potentially (though not necessarily)
reinforcing the use of bad methods. For example, suppose I programmed my machine to
use its cameras to model the environment, and the way to monitor for errors was just to
record an image from its camera and then compare it to its model to see whether they
match. Since the model was formed using the camera, this is a useless test. It will always
come back positive. However, this doesn't amount to a general prohibition against using
the camera in monitoring tests. If the robot detects a person or entity doing damage or
messing with its camera system, it doesn't matter that the original information came from
the camera. This is still a potentially useful monitoring device.
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How we should best go about monitoring our own epistemic activities using only
those methods used in our epistemic activities is a difficult question. It's one that I can't
hope to answer here, but there is no reason to think that approaching these issues from a
design mindset makes them anymore problematic than from more traditional
perspectives. The things that make bootstrapping unattractive aren't things that only make
sense from within the traditional conceptual analysis framework, and thus we can have
good reason to build prohibitions against bootstrapping into the design method itself. Nor
is there reason to think that we can only get evidence about which methods are good one
in problematic bootstrapping ways. We clearly can only use our model of the world as a
indicator of what methods are appropriate to use, but this self-referential feature doesn't
entail either that methods can't provide tests of themselves in indirect ways or that other
independent methods we possess can't serve as monitors to prevent problematic feedback
that over supports our norms.

5.4 Conclusion
Use of the design method is potentially self-defeating, but not in ways that are any
more problematic than the potential self-defeat of our everyday belief forming
mechanisms. There is also no general reason to suppose that someone genuinely engaging
in a design based revisory project will end up producing a view of the world given by the
new norms that undermines some important truth connecting qualities of the previous
normative behaviors and beliefs we had. In fact since the new norms are formed on the
basis of a view of the world provided by the old norms, such a complete rejection of any
positive status of the old norms is highly unlikely. I have not shown that it is impossible
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because such a proof is likely impossible.
There is also little reason to think that the norms endorsed by thinking about
things from within the Design method will be problematically self-reinforcing. This is
because the problem of an arbitrary method providing reasons for its own acceptance is a
problem that should naturally occur to anyone thinking about the design of an epistemic
system, and thus a good designer will built in mechanism that avoid, at least as far as
possible, the use of methods in testing themselves that don't function as genuine tests.
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